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Abstract 
This dissertation seeks to alter the ways in which scholars address indigenous 
group formation. Instead of adhering to the rather pervasive, and anthropologically 
based, band/tribe/nation approach, this work argues that historians should address 
indigenous peoples as "tribal nations," a phrase that reflects both their unique place 
within the United States as "nations within" and their sovereign status. To do so, I have 
created a loose set of six characteristics that all tribal nations exhibit including territory, 
citizens/members, political authority, language, cultural representations and a shared 
history. Each chapter in this dissertation addresses one of these traits. Additionally, this 
work argues that to study indigenous peoples in isolation, or give primacy to indigenous 
reactions to non-Native actions, tends to give the impression that Native peoples are 
static, unwilling or unable to adapt and change. Therefore, the second part of the tribal 
nation model includes four forces of influence (internal demand, other tribal nations, the 
federal government and non-Native outsiders) who certainly promoted change, both 
good and bad, throughout the history of the tribal nation, but I give primacy, when 
possible to Native-Native interactions.  
Together, the six characteristics and four forces of change provide a model that 
can be applied to almost any tribal nation. This process of analysis allows scholars to 
better study indigenous people and create meaningful "tribal histories" that place Native 
people at the center of the narrative and underscore their resilience. To demonstrate the 
utility of this model, I have chosen to study the Northern Arapaho and Eastern 
Shoshone because of their unique position as two distinct tribal nations who live on the 
same reservation, yet are so very different. In the end, this dissertation demonstrates the 
ix 
efficacy of the tribal nation model and encourages scholars to reassess the ways in 
which they discuss indigenous peoples and their histories.    
1 
Introduction 
In the summer of 1883, Wyoming residents anxiously awaited the arrival of a 
very important visitor. Making his way toward Yellowstone Park, Chester A. Arthur, 
the President of the United States, scheduled a few brief stops in the territory as part of 
his sojourn through the West.  Social commentators lauded the tour as a standing 
endorsement for the region, because the President’s arrival could “advertise its 
advantages and resources…but will also give tone to and make it fashionable to come to 
the Rocky Mountains when the president of the United States comes here for his 
vacation.”1 But Arthur intended to visit with residents beyond the settled areas of 
Cheyenne, the Wyoming capital and epicenter of politics and high culture in the 
territory, as he requested an audience with the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho, 
two indigenous nations, who lived on the Shoshone Agency in central Wyoming.  
After much fanfare and celebration in the territorial capital, President Arthur and 
his entourage traveled into the “very heart of Indian country.” Frontiersman Edward 
Farlow later remembered the intense security detail that followed the convoy, as “troops 
were brought from Fort Russell, Camp Carlin, Fort Sanders, Fort Steele, and Fort 
Washakie and a detachment was stationed at each stage station along the entire route.”2 
Fear of an attack, undoubtedly bolstered by both factual and fantastic accounts of Indian 
depredations in the West, did little to deter the President’s vacation plans. Once settled 
at Fort Washakie, the presidential party organized a great feast and invited all of the 
surrounding inhabitants, Native and non-Native, to attend. When reflecting upon the 
                                                 
1
 Lola Homsher, “President Arthur Made West Happy by Yellowstone Trip,” Grace Raymond Hebard 
Collection, acc. no. 400008, Box 10, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie, 
Wyoming. (Hereafter, GRHC, Box 10).  
2
 Edward J. Farlow, Wind River Adventures: My Life in Frontier Wyoming (Glendo, WY: High Plains 
Press, 1998), 77.  
2 
occasion years later, those in attendance insisted that the highlight of this presidential 
visit, came not in the form of dramatic faux-battles or colorful shawl and wolf dances, 
but in an exchange between the leaders of three distinct nations. 
After a hearty meal and several dazzling performances by Native dancers and 
military personnel, a crowd of nearly two thousand spectators gathered closer to hear 
their representatives speak. First, Chief Washakie, leader of the Eastern Shoshone, 
warmly welcomed President Arthur to his home. Likewise, Northern Arapaho chiefs 
Black Coal and Sharp Nose addressed the President through an interpreter. As a sign of 
their appreciation for his visit to their reservation, the indigenous leaders offered the 
president an untamed, black and white stallion.3 Awed by the gift, Arthur graciously 
accepted the horse and responded in kind, with colorful blankets for the indigenous 
leaders. At this gathering, the men of three distinct nations did not speak of treaties or 
boundaries, yet the equal exchange of presents, mutual admiration and respect, illustrate 
the complex interaction between indigenous nations and the United States government. 
On the surface, this Wyoming celebration appears exceedingly rare, as indigenous 
peoples seldom received presidential visits. At the same time, this encounter 
represented the ongoing process of nationhood for indigenous people, as they met with 
United States representatives and mediated their precarious place as “domestic, 
dependent nations” within the larger federal system.  
                                                 
3
 Spectators later remembered that the President stood awed at the gift and asked his companions, “What 
shall I do?”  General Sheridan replied “Why take it, take it! It is a very nice pony.” The President shipped 
the horse by train to Washington D.C. and later allowed his niece to ride it down Pennsylvania Avenue. 
“President Arthur’s Visit to the Reservation,” John Roberts Collection, acc. no. 00037, Box 1, Folder 6, 
American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming. (Hereafter abbreviated JRC, 
Box 1, Folder 6). 
3 
Just one year earlier, at the Sorbonne University in Paris, Ernest Renan assessed 
the global state of nationalism in his now famous lecture, “What is a Nation?” [Qu’est-
ce qu’uune nation?]. The renowned philosopher and intellectual recognized that the 
subject of nationalism pervaded the era’s political dialogue, as war distorted state 
boundaries and countries gained new territory, but struggled to manage their growing 
empires. Renan believed that the parameters of nationhood had been distorted by even 
the most informed politicians, as they sought to address the spectrum of group 
organization in an ever changing world. In March 1882, Renan stood before a university 
audience and asserted that the purpose of his talk was to “analyse with you an idea 
which, though seemingly clear, lends itself to the most dangerous misunderstandings.”4 
Tantalizing his audience, Renan recounted the earliest expressions of nationalism, when 
and why European nations developed, and to whom this type of social organization 
applied. And though he maintained a rather serious and historically grounded analysis 
throughout, when defining the word “nation” he rather passionately proclaimed, “A 
nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute 
this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present… The nation, like 
the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacrifices and devotions.”5 
At the time, Renan received critical acclaim, as his ideas resonated with European 
audiences, whose nations in were in the process of solidifying their international 
political prowess.  
But what then, of the people who did not belong to the industrialized nations of 
the world? Despite his poetic definition of a nation, Renan found no room in his 
                                                 
4
 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Becoming National: A Reader, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor 
Suny, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 42. 
5
 Renan, “What is a Nation?” 52.  
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analysis for such organizations. In fact, the French philosopher cogently argued that a 
“far graver mistake” in the discourse on nationalism, was that “race is confused with 
nation and a sovereignty analogous to that of really existing peoples is attributed to 
ethnographic or, rather, linguistic groups.”6 Despite his florid description of a nation, 
Renan’s harsh and exclusionist view is reflective of the predominant mentality 
regarding colonized peoples. Indeed, as Renan pontificated about a nationalist 
(European) past, Native American nations, like the Eastern Shoshone and Northern 
Arapaho, halfway across the world, fought for their precarious place as “nations 
within,” by courting an American president while on his vacation.7 Given Renan’s 
fame, and the dominant ethnocentric mentality regarding non-white peoples, scholars of 
nationalism perpetuated this exclusionist view, which provided no room for a dialogue 
about the status of indigenous nations. Ironically, Renan’s working definition of a 
nation, which included “the possession in common of a rich legacy of 
memories…present day consent, the desire to live together, [and] the will to perpetuate 
the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form,” nicely 
accommodates the uniqueness of both Native American political and cultural 
proclivities.  So why, then, have so few contemporary nationalism scholars challenged 
Renan, and applied their rhetoric to indigenous peoples? At the same time, why have so 
few indigenous scholars dared to employ the rhetoric of nationalism?  
Divergent Methods  
                                                 
6
 Renan, “What is a Nation?” 42.   
7
 Here, I refer Vine Deloria, Jr.’s work The Nations Within, in which he systematically addresses the 
precarious place of indigenous peoples in the American federal system. See Vine Deloria, Jr., The 
Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1984).  
5 
Over the years, Native American scholars typically applied one of two rather 
divergent methods in addressing indigenous group formation and organization.  The 
first, and far more prevalent approach, utilizes an inherently evolutionary analysis, one 
derived from cultural anthropologists, in which the history of Native peoples begins 
with band formation.8 Considered the most “primitive” of social organizations, a band, 
or small group of approximately twenty-five to fifty individuals bound through kinship, 
lives autonomously and subsists primarily through hunting and gathering. Band 
members imbue an informally acknowledged leader – usually depicted as apolitical – 
with the authority to act as the arbiter of domestic disputes. In time, the band, under the 
influence of a variety of internal and external forces, matures into a tribe with more 
rigid social and political organization.  
The term “tribe” is deeply ingrained into the historical lexicon, and is used 
almost universally to describe seemingly organized indigenous peoples. Anthropologist 
Morton H. Fried’s influential work, The Notion of Tribe, provides critical analysis of the 
term and the difficulties associated with its usage. In his work, Fried argued that the 
word “tribe” is problematic because like other social constructs, its meaning is “taken 
for granted, but cannot withstand close scrutiny without fragmenting into contradictory 
packets of significance or dissolving in vagueness.”9 In fact, throughout The Notion of 
Tribe, Fried asked his readers “Do tribes exist?” seeking to demonstrate the ambiguity 
                                                 
8
 The list of scholars who embrace this methodology is quite long, and contains well renowned historians 
and anthropologists, including Frederick Hoxie, Clara Sue Kidwell and Peter Iverson, to name just a few. 
For the purposes of my research, Wyoming scholars who rely heavily upon the band/tribe/nation 
approach include, Virginia Cole Trenholm in The Arapahoes, Our People (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1970) as well as her coauthored The Shoshonis: Sentinels of the Rockies (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1964) with Maurine Carley. More recently, Henry Edwin Stamm, IV’s 
book People of the Wind River: The Eastern Shoshones, 1825-1900 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1999), relies on this approach as well.  
9
 Morton Fried, The Notion of Tribe (Menlo Park, California: Cummings Publishing Company, 1975), 1. 
6 
of the social construct. Unfortunately, after a fairly complex overview of the many 
iterations of the word, Fried offered no satisfactory definition. Instead, he concluded 
that “Tribe is a word that may be said to live in multiplex and changing real 
environments and its use is under constant adaptive pressure.”10 In turning to the 
anthropological orthodoxy, most cultural anthropologists describe a tribe as a group 
comprised of a few thousand people, linked together through kinship networks and 
shared cultural and religious practices. Members of the tribe recognize the authority of 
an informal group of elders or a singular political authority, a chief.11 Beyond these 
basic characteristics, tribes vary drastically in language patterns, familial relationships, 
gender roles, political strategies and defensive practices.   
 The final, and most advanced, sociopolitical organization in this predominant 
hierarchy is the state or nation. In general, a nation embodies a large population, and 
connects its members together through a highly centralized government, shared laws 
and practices, and personal commitment by its citizens. Like tribe, a nation is difficult 
to define because it can apply to a vast array of organized individuals, depending on the 
inclusivity or exclusivity of any one definition. Despite Renan’s attempt to deconstruct 
the seemingly clear process of state formation, the concept of nationhood remains 
shrouded in mystery and misunderstanding one hundred and thirty years later. To be 
sure, scholars of the past century have critically reassessed the national paradigm, and 
literature written in the last three decades alone revitalized the study of nationalism, as 
scholars from multiple disciplines across the globe, recast our understanding of 
                                                 
10
 Fried, The Notion of Tribe, 8.  
11
 In this anthropological hierarchy, a chiefdom or an offshoot of the tribe category, relies upon the 
centralized political authority of a chief, rather than a council of elders. In the Wind River case, scholars 
argue that the Northern Arapaho illustrated the traits of a tribe, the Eastern Shoshone, a chiefdom, with 
Washakie as their leader.  
7 
nationhood in a post-Cold War world.12 At the same time, Benedict Anderson, one of 
the most influential nationalism scholars today, asserts that “Nation, nationality, 
nationalism – all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse.”13 To 
better describe this type of social organization, nationalism scholars, including 
Anderson, turn to the components of a nation – that is, they create definitions based on 
what they consider to be the necessary elements of nationhood. These include, but are 
not limited to: ancestral heritage, culture, language, citizens, territorial boundaries, 
political organizations, societally accepted laws, and sovereignty. Yet, in this hierarchy 
of sociopolitical organizations, Native American groups rarely meet the qualifications 
necessary to be considered nations, because of their legal subordination within the 
United States. Instead, they are often relegated as tribes, stuck in the evolutionary 
hierarchy, forever reaching for the final stage of group advancement.  
 Academic literature can only bear part of the responsibility for the proliferation 
of the terms band, tribe and nation and their hierarchical applications. These social 
categories did not first appear in scholarly works, but rather, they were part of a global 
vernacular, one that sought to rank peoples of the world. Anthropologist Raymond 
Fogelson explains, “In earlier eras, when American Indians were still regarded as 
possessing considerable autonomy, military power, and political might, the term 
‘nation’ was frequently applied to Native American politics. When the balance of power 
shifted and Native Americans were considered as dependent nations or wards of the 
                                                 
12
 Of the many volumes to consider on the subject of nations and nationalism see Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 
2006); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); 
Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Eric 
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); and John A. Armstrong Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1982).  
13
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 3.  
8 
U.S. government, the term ‘tribe’ became more widespread.”14 In addition to the 
fluidity and longevity of the terms themselves within American society, anthropological 
studies and tribal histories of the first three-quarters of the twentieth century further 
reinforced such societal stratification.15  
A generation ago, Native American scholars began to question the efficacy of 
the band-tribe-nation approach. Emerging out of a scholarly movement known as New 
Indian History, academics sought to change the ways in which scholarship addressed 
the Native American past. Proponents of this alternative methodology, advocated for 
more comprehensive and indigenously centered studies, in which the past became a tale 
of endurance and adaptation, not defeat and decline. Out of this movement, significant 
shifts within the scholarship include, the extension of the Native American narrative 
well into the twentieth century, a focus on Indian-Indian relationships, an analysis of 
pre-Columbian societies, and in general, a reevaluation of every aspect of Native 
American political, social and cultural life.16 Anthropologist John H. Moore became one 
of the first New Indian historians to critically evaluate the band-tribe-nation approach, 
                                                 
14
 Raymond D. Fogelson, “Perspectives on Native American Identity,” in Studying Native America: 
Problems and Prospects, ed. Russell Thornton, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 51.  
15
 In 1979, anthropologist James Clifton argued that tribal histories were a “distinctive genre now grown 
obsolete.” In a scathing review of this type of scholarship, Clifton outlined the many pitfalls of tribal 
histories and strongly advocated for their replacement with the ethnohistorical methodology. James 
Clifton, “The Tribal History – An Obsolete Paradigm,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 3, 
no. 4 (1979): 81-100.  
     While perhaps justified in his analysis of the genre, Clifton’s failed to account for the possible 
cooptation of ethnohistory into the creation of tribal histories. As R. David Edmunds argues, when done 
well, tribal histories can become “the standard reference works on the individual tribes and serve as the 
basis for educational materials within the modern tribal communities.” R. David Edmunds, “Native 
Americans, New Voices: American Indian History, 1895-1995,” The American Historical Review 100, 
no. 3 (1995): 723. 
16
 For more information about the dramatic historiographical shift within the field, please see, Robert F. 
Berkhofer, Jr. “The Political Context of a New Indian History,” Pacific Historical Review 40, no. 3 
(1971): 357-382; Edmunds, “Native Americans, New Voices,” 717-740; Nicolas G. Rosenthal, “Beyond 
the New Indian History: Recent Trends in the Historiography on the Native Peoples of North America,” 
History Compass 4/5 (2006): 962-974.  
9 
in his 1987 work, The Cheyenne Nation. In his book, Moore addresses previous usages 
of both “tribe” and “nation,” and directly refutes Morton Fried’s assessment of the 
terminology in The Notion of Tribe. Specifically, Moore objects to Fried’s dismissal of 
“tribal traits,” and the assertion that bands only become tribes through contact with 
other, more “superior” nations. True to the tenets of New Indian History, Moore’s 
study, through the use of indigenous sources and ethnohistorical practices, places 
Native people and their understanding of group organization at the fore of his analysis.   
Instead of stunted social climbers, Moore argues that the Cheyenne, and other 
indigenous groups, were (and are) organic organizations. Undoubtedly influenced by 
the work of Ernest Renan, Moore explains,  
“A nation is like a biological individual. It is born from the shared needs of 
possibly diverse people who group together out of self-interest. A nation has a 
maturation during which it tends toward uniformity of behavior…But inevitably 
nations, like all social institutions, die, and they are fragmented into diverse 
groups that ultimately become other nations, with different languages, religions, 
and political structures. But only the nation dies; the people and their culture do 
not.”17  
 
In Moore’s analysis, this process of death and rebirth, known to the scholarly 
community as ethnogenesis, completes and reinforces the cyclical nature of the 
nationhood process. By writing Native American history in this way, Moore and other 
scholars also make an intimate connection with indigenous forms of recording the 
past.18 Furthermore, Moore complements this cyclical understanding of the Native 
American past with an all-encompassing definition of indigenous nations, one that 
                                                 
17
 John H. Moore, The Cheyenne Nation: A Social and Demographic History (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1987), 14. (emphasis original) 
18
 Plains Indian buffalo counts are, of course, the most prevalent example of the cyclical nature of Native 
record keeping, but other tribal nations employed similar styles. The Hopi, for example, believe that they 
survived the destruction of their world three times, each characterized by different circumstances, and 
recounted as three complete life cycles, or stories. Please see Frank Waters, Book of the Hopi (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1977).  
10 
includes citizenship, territory, political unity and a shared language. In defining tribal 
nations by these four components, Moore not only makes a connection with the larger 
body of nationalism scholarship, but also provides future historians with a model that 
can apply to other groups besides the Cheyenne.  
While perhaps the first, John Moore was not the only scholar to suggest a 
reassessment of indigenous organization, though few others directly employ the rhetoric 
of nationalism. In a position paper for Native American Educational Services, Robert K. 
Thomas proposed that indigenous peoples, as a singular entity, had to possess four 
characteristics to survive. They include, “a distinct language…a unique religion…a tie 
to a particular piece of land… [and] a sacred history which tells you who you are and 
why you must survive as a people.”19 Rather than a competing philosophy, Thomas’s 
analysis provides a nice companion to Moore’s argument. While reflecting some 
crossover (territory and language), Thomas’s addition of religion and a sacred history, 
provides a more well-rounded – and culturally sensitive – list of national traits. 
Unfortunately, Thomas did not explore this vein of research or publish further on the 
subject. He did, however, speak with historian Tom Holm on several occasions, and 
together, they refined a more nuanced approach to Native American social organization 
before Thomas’s death in 1991.  
Along with co-authors J. Diane Pearson and Ben Chavis, Holm adapted 
Thomas’s key elements of Native society into a “Peoplehood Matrix.” Seeking to 
construct a central methodology, or paradigm for American Indian Studies scholars, 
Holm and his coauthors argue that the Peoplehood Matrix as “a disciplinary model…is 
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 Robert K. Thomas, “Language and Culture: Persistence, Change and Dissolution of Tribal Society,” in 
American Indian Tribes in the 21st Century (Chicago: Native American Education Services, Inc., 1986), 
71. 
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universal to all Native American tribes and nations and possibly to all indigenous 
groups.”20 The authors utilize all four of Thomas’s essential characteristics – language, 
a sacred history, territory and religion – and believe that together they reflect “a much 
more accurate picture of the ways in which Native Americans act, react, pass along 
knowledge and connect with the ordinary as well as the supernatural worlds.” While in 
this matrix, no one element is more important than the rest, together the four 
characteristics provide a vehicle for the creation of a more comprehensive study of 
indigenous group formation, and illustrate an important shift within the historical 
literature. Today, an increasing number of scholars note the problems with the band-
tribe-nation approach, especially indigenous people’s position of eventual stasis within 
the academic literature. Most recently, Holm and his fellow co-authors have argued that 
the band-tribe-nation approach is damaging, not just because of the “narrow definitions” 
of such social categories, but because this evolutionary approach to indigenous 
organization has “served to excuse colonialism and justify the unilateral abrogation of 
Native American treaties by the United States.”21 As part of a larger effort to decolonize 
not only the past of Native peoples, but also the methodologies that scholars use to 
study indigenous society, the model created by Holm and his contemporaries 
contributes to more than one movement occurring within the field.22   
Despite these steps toward a more nuanced study of the Native American past, a 
central question remains: “Does the term “nation” apply to organized indigenous 
                                                 
20
 Tom Holm, et. al., “Peoplehood: A Model for the Extension of Sovereignty in American Indian 
Studies,” Wicazo Sa Review 18, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 12. 
21
 Holm, et. al., “Peoplehood,” 16.  
22
 See Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (Dunedin: 
University of Otago Press, 1999, and Maureen Konkle, Writing Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals and 
the Politics of Historiography, 1827-1863 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).  
12 
groups?” An increasing number of scholars argue in favor of such terminology, though 
the expression remains problematic and generates resistance within the field of 
nationalism studies, whose scholars point to the legal subordination of Native peoples in 
the United States. Twenty-five years ago, John Moore proposed a novel solution to this 
conundrum, with the phrase “tribal nation.” Moore explains, “My use of the term ‘tribal 
nation’…then, is intended to help bridge the supposed evolutionary gap between ‘tribes’ 
and the more complex ‘nations’ that have a state structure.”23 Moore’s innovative 
adoption of the phrase recognizes the unique position of Native Americans, as both 
sovereign and subject to federal authority. In using the phrase “tribal nation,” Moore 
and other scholars, myself included, assert that indigenous groups exhibit national 
behaviors, while at the same time they hold a unique place within the American 
political system.24  
Reflecting the paradigmatic shift in the study of indigenous history, this work 
will maintain two basic assertions about Native American peoples and their history. 
First, like other nationalism scholars, I have created a definition of a tribal nation based 
not on rigid criteria, but upon a loose set of six key elements: territory, citizenship, 
political organization, language, cultural practices and a shared history. To begin, all 
tribal nations claim territory or landscapes that are historically or spiritually important.25 
Indigenous peoples’ sense of belonging to a specific place is often indicative of their 
relationship to either ancestral or contemporary homelands, though that is not always 
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the case. For example, Native peoples, like the Lakota, claim both their contemporary 
reservation, and special or sacred places, like the Black Hills. Tribal nations are also 
comprised of citizens, who remain committed to the group, and connect to the tribal 
nation through membership, identity and belonging.26 In turn, citizens of the tribal 
nation look to a group of revered leaders, or in some cases one particularly gifted or 
well respected individual, and instill them with political authority and power. As part of 
a larger political organization, citizens place their faith in leaders, who enforce laws, act 
militarily, and make decisions, which should reflect the desires of the people.27  
Members of a tribal nation share a common language, a vehicle through which 
they can communicate, conduct business, discuss religious and/or cultural practices and 
a sacred history. Robert Thomas and Tom Holm have both pointed out the 
interconnectivity of these three key elements, as language fosters a sense of belonging 
through storytelling, indigenous record keeping and even dance. These cultural bonds of 
nationalism are essential, because when spoken in the tribal nation’s dialect, a sacred 
history provides more than a record of the past, it also gives “each member of the group 
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an understanding of where they come from...details kinship structures, the meaning of 
ceremonies as well as when they should be performed, and how the group fits within a 
particular environment.”28 While no one element is more or less important than the 
others, together they compose a malleable and all-encompassing definition of a tribal 
nation.   
This work will also recognize the influence of both Ernest Renan and John 
Moore, as I see indigenous organizations as biological entities. In doing so, I have 
adopted John Moore’s cyclical approach to Native history, in which a study of the past 
reveals that tribal nations are born, grow, die and become reborn through the process of 
ethnogenesis. This organizational structure is appropriate, though not without 
limitations. Specifically, this vein of scholarship tends to isolate Native peoples from 
the larger historical narrative, as previous scholars have failed to fully recognize and 
address the forces of change that surely affect all tribal nations. John Moore’s “life 
cycle” approach to the past, for example, is useful, because it allows scholars to craft a 
more comprehensive narrative of the history of tribal nations. But at the same time, in 
his application, Moore often minimizes the environmental and societal conditions that 
encourage growth (or generate crisis) during the life cycle of a tribal nation. 
 Similarly, the “Peoplehood Matrix,” created by Tom Holm and his co-authors, 
provides a useful and holistic understanding of “peoplehood.” Yet, the authors offer 
little indication as to how individuals of a “peoplehood” adapt to societal change, or 
how these alterations can affect the nature of a “peoplehood.” Indeed, on the subject the 
authors explain that most people “tend to view change as a terribly painful process that 
rarely takes place without damaging society or culture. Even well thought out, perfectly 
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rational changes can cause serious injury to peoples, especially if one or more of the 
four factors of peoplehood is attacked.”29 While certainly true, change is also an 
evitable part of human life. Instead of recognizing that change can be damaging to 
Native peoples, I think that we need to identify and address the myriad of ways in 
which indigenous people have adapted to ever changing environments and explore what 
forces promoted change within the tribal nation.   
Addressing this particular void in the existing scholarship, this study focuses on 
four major forces of change: internal demand, interaction with other tribal nations, 
negotiation with the federal government, and involvement with non-Native outsiders. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, tribal nations are not static entities. Indeed, citizens 
of tribal nations often seek out and encourage change when it appears in the best 
interest of the group. At the same time, internal divisions and factionalism can also 
create crisis and, in extreme cases, even bring about the demise of the tribal nation.  
Second, contact with other tribal nations plays an integral role in prompting both 
change and turmoil, yet it is perhaps one of the most understudied facets of indigenous 
history.30 Before the rise of New Indian History, a sense of timelessness and absolutism 
pervaded most discussions regarding indigenous cooperation and conflict. Through this 
lens, Native people secured either permanent allies or enemies, leaving no middle 
ground for conditional relationships, changes over time, or the possibility of extant 
circumstance that warranted occasional military aggression or enmity.31 Recently, an 
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increasing number of academics have addressed this void in the scholarship, including 
historian Frank Rzeczkowski, in his work, Uniting the Tribe. Rzeczkowski explores the 
complicated world of Native-Native interaction in his study of the fluidity of tribal 
nations on the Northern Plains. Uniting the Tribes notes the inaccuracies of previous 
scholarship that depict Native peoples as “effectively marooned on landlocked 
reservation islands, with both friendly and hostile contact interdicted by American 
officials.” Instead, the author argues that the reservation system of the Northern Plains 
was “surprisingly ineffective at restricting Indians’ ability to travel, communicate, and 
meet with members of other tribes.”32 Through these encounters, Native Americans 
mediated conflict, exchanged cultural practices including the Sun Dance and peyotism, 
and made and remade relationships with other tribal nations.  
 The third force of change, negotiation with the federal government, is by far the 
most thoroughly documented facet of Native American history. The National Archives, 
and their many regional repositories, teem with official correspondence and documents 
generated about indigenous people and their homelands. While this research provides 
the basis for most historical accounts of Native Americans, New Indian Historians and 
adherents of the ethnohistorical methodology, strongly encourage scholars to move 
beyond these records in the creation of a more comprehensive exploration of the 
country’s indigenous past. At the same time, studies like Francis Paul Prucha’s The 
Great Father, based primarily upon this one relationship, stand as an impressive 
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account of the Native past at the federal level, and can be useful in its assessment of 
indigenous legal subordination.33 I do not deny the importance of encounters between 
tribal nations and the federal government, but rather seek to minimize this relationship, 
when possible, and address it as just one of the four major forces of influence. 
 The final force of change is that of indigenous involvement with non-Native 
outsiders. This relationship, mediated on an ad hoc basis, came in many forms, 
including religious missionaries, explorers, traders, settlers, school teachers, doctors, 
land speculators, agency superintendents, anthropologists, tourists, Wild West Show 
promoters, film makers, etc. Though diverse, the role of non-Native outsiders is 
important, because it demonstrates that Native communities were not isolated, and in 
fact, indigenous people frequently interacted, on many levels, with everyday 
Americans. While often the subject of historical narratives, contact between indigenous 
people and non-Native outsiders is an essential, though perhaps less constant, force of 
change for tribal nations. Together, these four forces of influence connect tribal nations 
to a world far beyond the bounds of their own communities, and prompt both growth, 
and even periodic crises, which effectively shape and reshape the tribal nations. Of 
course, the true test of this model, which accommodates both an indigenous 
understanding of the past and a historical framework rooted in preexisting scholarship, 
is its application. Seeking a tribal nation both rich in culture and political prowess, I 
selected not one, but two, indigenous groups, the Northern Arapaho and Eastern 
Shoshone, located on the Wind River Indian Reservation in Wyoming.   
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  Today, the Northern Arapaho and Eastern Shoshone live on the seventh largest 
Indian reservation in the country, a space more vast than the Pine Ridge Reservation in 
South Dakota. As one of the 565 federally recognized tribal nations, they maintain one 
of the top 25 largest reservation populations, yet, few people are aware of their 
existence, their culture or their colorful past. It is this relative obscurity that I find 
compelling as a historian. Wyoming Indians live in rural areas of the least populated 
state in the country, and have enjoyed a measure of isolation unknown to most of 
America’s indigenous groups. As such, limited contact with the state’s non-Native 
residents, allowed for the creation of a unique reservation community, one that 
magnified a rather extraordinary Native-Native relationship. Using the Arapaho and 
Shoshone of the Wind River Indian Reservation as a case study, I will assess the 
ramifications of their prolonged interaction, as well as other forces of change, including 
internal demand, and involvement with the federal government and non-Native 
outsiders. In doing so, an analysis of the Wind River historical narrative illustrates that 
that these organized indigenous peoples are today, and have always been, tribal nations 
who demonstrate similar, but culturally unique, national traits, including territory, 
citizenship, political organization, language, cultural practices and a shared history. 
While perhaps a seemingly complex case in which to apply this model, my decision to 
study the Wind River tribal nations is reflective of both my time in Wyoming and the 
depth of their rich history. 
Birth of Nations - Paths to the Wind River  
To begin, the Arapaho and Shoshone took radically different paths to the Wind 
River. Several hundred years ago, a large group of Shoshonean speakers inhabited a 
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vast region of the West, known as the Great Basin. Following a serious drought that 
profoundly affected the area, these people participated in a great migration about 1350, 
in which they split apart from one another, creating their own tribal nations.34 Some 
stayed in the basin, while others traveled to the Southern Plains, and a branch, known as 
the Eastern Shoshone, claimed an area on the northwestern plains of the Rocky 
Mountains.35 Though separated geographically, the three groups remained in contact 
and shared linguistic and cultural ties. Oral reports and archeological evidence indicate 
that by 1700, former residents of the Great Basin extended as far north as present day 
Alberta, and as far south as the southeastern slope of the Rocky Mountains.36 The 
dispersal and migration of the Shoshone ultimately provided them with access to 
sources of power and prosperity, yet the arrival of European explorers onto the Plains 
from northern Mexico challenged their dominance of the region.  
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As Spanish conquistadors pushed into Shoshone territory, they brought with 
them guns, deadly microorganisms, and horses. Studies of this “Columbian Exchange” 
indicate that these non-Native newcomers left an indelible imprint upon the region, one 
usually marked by death and despair. But, as historian Pekka Hämäläinen points out, 
“the Plains Indian horse culture represents the ultimate anomaly – ecological 
imperialism working to Indians’ advantage.”37 Horses, once acquired, provided 
indigenous people with the ability to trade, travel, hunt and wage war more effectively, 
especially on the Great Plains.38 The region, replete with fertile grasslands, became a 
prime area for grazing animals, and allowed for the relatively easy adoption of the 
horse, though this move forever altered the socio-economic and environmental 
conditions of the Plains.  
 Initially concentrated in the southwest, horses spread northward via vast Native 
trade networks. Though it is difficult to determine when the Shoshone first acquired the 
animals, it is clear, that they were one of the first northern tribal nations to do so. 
Reasonable estimates suggest that near the turn of the eighteenth century, Comanche 
allies brought the creatures to the Shoshone Rendezvous, an annual gathering of 
indigenous people for trade, reunion and celebration.39 Eastern Shoshone woman Reba 
Teran explains, “so we acquired them [horses] in the early 1700s and then we began 
pushing all the other bands or like our enemy tribes, we began pushing them away.”40 In 
explaining the tribal nation’s memory of the acquisition, Teran clearly notes the 
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important connection between horses and power. Before the arrival of horses, most 
tribal nations relied upon dogs as their primary means of transportation, but horses 
allowed the Shoshone to increase their mobility, as well as their effectiveness at hunting 
and waging war, thereby securing their claim to the region. It took nearly a century for a 
strong horse culture to develop on the Northern Plains, as the weather and lack of winter 
forage problematized their full adoption. 41 Despite these limitations, the Shoshone, one 
of the first groups to perfect the practice of equine management, became renowned 
horse traders on the Northern Plains. Considered the “chief distributors of them [horses] 
all over the Northwest,” the Shoshones’ commanded a rather violent reign over the 
region, but one that was also relatively short lived. 42   
By the 1740s, the distinction between cultures with horses and those without 
clearly divided tribal nations. As major actors in the region’s horse trade, the Shoshones 
controlled a vast area of the Northern Plains, which in turn led to the creation of 
considerable enmity between indigenous peoples. Soon, even their allies recognized that 
the Shoshone were “not friendly with any tribe. It is said that in 1741 they had entirely 
ruined seventeen villages, killed all the men and the old women, made slaves of the 
young women and sold them on the coast for horses and merchandise.”43 While perhaps 
overstated, Shoshonean military dominance allowed them to raid neighboring villages, 
acquire additional horses and even slave labor, and produced socio-economic rivalries 
between the tribal nations of the Northern Plains. Their dominance would not last, 
however, as the Shoshone slowly lost their equestrian advantage to other tribal nations 
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including the Blackfeet, who managed to acquire large quantities of horses, in addition 
to guns from British traders.44  
Emerging as a fierce warrior society, the Blackfeet, in alliance with the Gros 
Ventre, Cree, and Assiniboine, relentlessly targeted the Shoshone. Unable to 
successfully fend off their attackers or reach British traders who peddled guns to 
western tribal nations, the Eastern Shoshone retreated from the horse trade and into the 
Rocky Mountain ranges of Wyoming and Idaho between 1750 and 1780. Compounding 
the devastation felt by the Shoshone, a smallpox epidemic decimated their numbers in 
the late eighteenth century. Many reports regarding the Eastern Shoshone after the 
1780s suggest that the tribal nation was a “timid” group who relied upon the Rocky 
Mountains for refuge. At the turn of the century, fur trader Alexander Henry wrote, 
“The Snakes [Shoshone] are a miserable, defenseless nation, who never venture abroad. 
The Piegans call them old women, whom they can kill with sticks and stones.”45 
Though he thoroughly debased the Shoshone’s reputation to the non-Native world, 
Henry, unlike most other travelers who encountered the tribal nation, did note their 
previous dominance. “They take great delight in relating their adventures in war,” he 
said, “and are so vivid in rehearsing every detail of the fray that they seem to be fighting 
the battle over again.”46 Given the spectacular rise and fall of the Shoshone, their 
historical legacy might have forever been remembered as one of decline and defeat. 
Instead, they achieved an entirely different notoriety when Meriwether Lewis and 
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William Clark arrived in Shoshone territory in August of 1805 seeking a Native guide 
on their voyage westward. 47 As the Shoshone, namely Sacagawea, achieved newfound 
fame in their Rocky Mountain retreat, other tribal nations including the Blackfeet, 
Lakota and Arapaho vied for a stronghold on the Northern Plains.   
It is unknown exactly when the Arapaho migrated to the Northern Plains, but it 
is likely that they settled in the region by the early eighteenth century.48 The Arapaho 
eventually established military supremacy with their Cheyenne and Lakota allies, a 
move that coincided with the Shoshone retreat, deep within the high mountains of 
Wyoming. By 1800, fur trader Pierre-Antoine Tabeau reported that the Arapaho were 
shrewd traders who had become rich in horses.49 Together, the Arapaho and Cheyenne 
positioned themselves in the Central Plains, and by the 1830s, they began to 
successfully monopolize access to trade at the newly established Bent’s Fort on the 
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Arkansas River.50 Acting as intermediaries between traders and tribal nations, the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho soon became highly specialized negotiators and intermittent 
allies with the Lakota, Dakota, Kiowa, Blackfeet, Gros Ventre, Comanche, Jicarilla 
Apache and the Taos Pueblo.51  
But in the early nineteenth century, the Great Plains trade network also produced 
volatile and even dysfunctional relationships.52 Bonds between tribal nations developed 
and dissolved, while alliances among the Arapaho and other tribal nations proved 
fragile. By the 1820s, the westward migration of Americans provided disruption, but 
also significant business opportunities, for Cheyenne and Arapaho traders who 
exchanged bison robes for guns. Strengthening their position on the Great Plains, the 
allied tribal nations finally secured a strong allegiance with the Lakota in the 1840s, and 
together they became, according to one historian, “participants in the only true success 
story of Plains Indian equestrianism.” Seeking additional horses to trade, Plains Indian 
tribal nations, including the Blackfeet, Lakota, Arapaho and Cheyenne, sponsored horse 
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wars in which they raided weaker communities.53  For more than half a century, war 
raged on the Northern Plains, primarily spawned by a perpetual lack of horses and the 
individual pursuit of wealth and status. While the raids initially focused upon the 
acquisition of horses and slaves, “in practice they led to frequent and bloody clashes, 
which sparked deadly counterattacks as the relatives tried to avenge their dead.”54  
The reduction of the once vast buffalo herds further problematized this volatile 
existence. By the 1840s, bison numbers fell in a steady decline, as indigenous people 
ignored traditional practices that prevented overhunting. Instead, they killed the beasts 
for their robes, seeking to exchange them for guns and ammunition in American 
markets. Reducing the number of bison on the Plains also created widespread 
starvation, as tribal nations ineffectively managed American encroachment, trade and 
dispossession. By the mid-nineteenth century, as settlers and the United States military 
sought to “conquer” the West, Plains Indian nations, “Exhausted by starvation, disease, 
and decades of fighting…could rally only weak resistance against the encroaching 
Americans.”55 As the long arm of the United States federal government reached out to 
indigenous peoples of the West, the Arapaho and Shoshone interacted with the powerful 
newcomers, but did so in dissimilar ways. Taking far different paths to their reservation 
home in the Wind River Valley of Wyoming, the Arapaho and Shoshone discovered 
that the reservation system would ultimately bind them together and at times powerfully 
magnify their antagonistic past. 
Studying the Wind River  
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By the end of the century, the Arapaho and Shoshone attracted scholarly 
attention, as their history and cultural practices lured anthropologists to the Wind River. 
In the summer of 1892, ethnographer James Mooney visited the Wyoming reservation. 
Though intently focused on the Northern Arapaho, and their participation in the Ghost 
Dance, Mooney also noted the social organization, kinship networks and linguistic 
patterns of the tribal nation. This background sketch of the Arapaho people provided the 
academic community with its first look at the inhabitants of the Wind River.56 Eight 
years later, Alfred Kroeber, a cultural anthropologist, entered the reservation and 
developed the first full length academic study of the Northern Arapaho, as well as their 
relatives the Southern Arapaho and the Gros Ventre. Unlike Mooney, Kroeber spent 
several months on the Wind River, studying Arapaho linguistic patterns, ceremonies, 
clothing, tools and social behaviors. The young anthropologist, fascinated by the 
mechanics of Arapaho religious practices and the symbolism of their dress, overlooked 
many less nuanced aspects of Arapaho life.57 The tribal nations’ lack of sufficient food 
and poor health, for example, failed to pique Kroeber’s interest. Certainly influenced by 
the era in which they lived, men like Mooney and Kroeber believed that all Native 
Americans, not just the Arapaho and Shoshone, teetered on the verge of extinction. In 
visiting the reservation, they believed that it was their responsibility to record the last 
remnants of a dying race, lest they would disappear forever.58 In doing so, 
                                                 
56
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27 
contemporary reservation issues, fell beyond the purview of their research. Though 
early scholars of the Wind River failed to recognize the resilience and determination of 
their subjects, these works provided a solid foundation for the creation of subsequent 
academic studies of the Arapaho and Shoshone.  
Yet, scholarly interest in Wind River inhabitants waned until a University of 
Wyoming professor delighted in the stories of two famous Shoshones.  In the 1920s, 
college professor, suffragette and prolific author Grace Raymond Hebard began a 
thorough research campaign to reveal the identity and burial site of Lewis and Clark’s 
Native guide, Sacagawea. Additionally, Hebard created a biography of legendary 
Shoshone Chief Washakie, whom she labeled “the foremost indian [sic] of the Trans-
mississippi West.”59 While working on these two projects, the author contacted the 
families of pioneers and settlers near the Wind River, previous Indian Agents, and 
contemporary reservation residents, in addition to locating countless pages of 
government documents. Ultimately, Hebard’s biographies, Washakie (1930) and 
Sacajawea: Guide and Interpreter of Lewis and Clark (1932), provide a highly 
romanticized depiction of the Old West and its Native inhabitants. Today, Hebard’s 
work is heavily scrutinized, particularly her findings regarding the identity of 
Sacajawea, as critics claim that the author manipulated her sources to produce a specific 
narrative regarding the Shoshone guide. Regardless of her questionable research 
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practices, Hebard firmly established the popularity of two Wind River inhabitants and 
renewed both academic and lay interest in the reservation.  
 In the 1930s and 1940s, two noted scholars visited the reservation. First, 
anthropologist and non-cloistered nun Sister Marie Inez Hilger lived with the Northern 
Arapaho from 1935 to 1942. Hilger held a Ph.D. in anthropology from the Catholic 
University of America, and reported health and living conditions of Arapaho children 
from both an academic and religious viewpoint. Her work provided, for the first time, 
an intimate look into the lives of Arapaho women, as well as a Native perspective on 
child rearing practices.60 Additionally, an anthropologist from the University of 
California-Berkeley, Demitri Shimkin, toured the reservation and wrote one of the first 
modern studies of the Eastern Shoshone. Shimkin’s work narrated nineteenth century 
Shoshone history, and placed them amongst the powerful tribal nations of an earlier era. 
Unlike his predecessors, however, Shimkin also hinted at the larger, contemporary 
implications of their organizational structure and their enduring relationships with non-
Native settlers and the United States government.61  
By the 1950s, people no longer viewed Native Americans as a race doomed for 
extinction. Instead, they became a curiosity of the American West, a fascination that 
could be studied (and romanticized) for the masses. Scholars of the Wind River shifted 
their focus accordingly, yet preexisting literature influenced even the most objective 
academic, as the reservation’s historiography established two very clear precedents that 
even modern historians still struggle to overcome. First, scholars of the Wind River 
                                                 
60
 Sister Inez Hilger, Arapaho Child Life and Its Cultural Background (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institute Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin no. 148, 1952).  
61
 Demitri Shimkin, “Dynamics of Recent Wind River Shoshone History,” in American Anthropologist, 
44, no.3 (July-Sept.1942): 451-462 and “Wind River Ethnogeography,” Anthropological Records 5, no. 4 
(1947): 245-288.  
29 
preserved and maintained the distinction between residents of the reservation. Though 
government officials repeatedly treated the Arapaho and Shoshone as two, seemingly 
inseparable cultural components of a united reservation, historians studied them as 
distinct entities. This trend, certainly facilitated by previous anthropological 
scholarship, allowed for the creation of more in-depth tribal histories. But, by adhering 
to this standard, scholars of the past sixty years continued to discuss the Arapaho and 
Shoshone separately, negating the complex multi-national nature of the Wind River 
community.  
Additionally, many Wind River narratives of the past half century end near or 
around the year 1900. This unfortunate pattern, also established by turn of the century 
anthropologists, perpetuates the notion that Native peoples are relics, or indigenous 
entities of days past, who have largely vanished from the western landscape.62 To 
counter such trite and simplistic interpretations of Native Americans, tribal nations and 
progressive scholars across the country denounced such caricatures that depicted 
indigenous peoples as static, or seemingly unable or unwilling to transition into the 
twentieth century. Some tribal nations, including those on the Wind River, attempted to 
correct this declensionist version of their past through the publication of literature 
sponsored and written by their citizens.63  
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During the 1960s, notions of indigenous of traditionalism and modernity clashed 
in the minds of everyday Americans. Changes within the historical community, led by 
academics like Robert Berkhofer, James Clifton and Loretta Fowler, among others, 
further cracked this simplistic scholarship mold. Fowler first visited the Wind River in 
1967, as an anthropology graduate student from the University of Illinois-Urbana. For 
ten years, she spent time on the reservation, became enmeshed in Arapaho society, and 
created an impressive work on Arapaho culture and politics. Unlike previous scholars, 
Fowler recognized the importance of not only the reservation past, but also 
contemporary issues that Wind River residents faced. Her definitive work, Arapahoe 
Politics (1982), provides the first comprehensive look at the Arapaho people, and is a 
foundational book for all other reservation studies. Unfortunately, after this publication, 
historical interest in the Wind River people once again declined. In the 1990s and early 
2000s, a non-academic publishing renaissance of sorts took place as previously 
unpublished memoirs, journals and family stories flourished.64 Wind River literature 
from non-academic sources abounded, introducing readers from around the world to the 
reservation and its remarkable inhabitants.65 For scholars, these works are 
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simultaneously invaluable and frustrating, as these anecdotes and memories are rarely 
corroborated with citations and easily accessible references. Still, these works recently 
revealed to scholars the memories of everyday people who experienced and recorded 
life on the Wind River more than a century ago.  
Beginning in 1991, academic interest in the reservation also grew, as renowned 
American Indian scholar Colin Calloway published a call for action in an issue of the 
Annals of Wyoming. In his article, “Indian History in Wyoming: Needs and 
Opportunities for Study,” Calloway jokingly suggested that his proposal could also be 
named, “Things that need to be done even though I’m not doing them myself.” This 
thoughtful analysis of Wind River historiography provides readers with an outline of 
existing scholarship and indicates the many areas in serious need of development. 
Assessing the voids in the historical literature, Calloway suggests a shift away from the 
dominant “Indian/White” dichotomy, a reevaluation of dominant biographies including 
Sacajawea and Chief Washakie, a reexamination of reservation life and an assessment 
of the importance of the vast natural resources found in central Wyoming. He writes, 
“Perhaps more than anything else we need to move the study of Indian history in 
Wyoming into the twentieth century.”66 In response to his call, the reservation began to 
attract scholars from a variety of disciplines. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
academics published articles about numerous reservation topics, both historical and 
contemporary, including language revitalization programs, indigenous water rights, 
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labor, and military service.67 In addition to these works, three monographs and a 
textbook style survey of the Wind River enhanced the reservation’s historiography.68  
In part, this study responds to Colin Calloway’s call to action, offered more than 
twenty years ago. By connecting the Arapaho and Shoshone together as two parts of a 
dynamic reservation community, I emphasize a more Indian-Indian focused approach to 
the history of the Wind River, and will begin to fill that void in the existing scholarship. 
At the same time, I recognize that the Arapaho and Shoshone have not, and do not, live 
in isolation. Accordingly, this work will also examine the four forces of change 
(internal demand, and interaction with other tribal nations, the federal government, and 
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non-Native outsiders), but give primacy, when possible, to the Arapaho/Shoshone 
relationship. I am also committed to bringing the study of the Wind River into the 20th 
century. In fact, a majority of this work focuses on the turn of the 20th century, as the 
Arapaho and Shoshone adapted to the changing environment of a new American era. 
Finally, this study assesses the Arapaho and Shoshone people, not as bands or tribes on 
an evolutionary trajectory, but as tribal nations.  
Accordingly, each chapter in this work highlights one of the key components of 
indigenous nationalism. By organizing my study in this way, both thematically and 
chronologically, I emphasize Arapaho and Shoshone expressions of tribal nationalism, 
while, at the same time, I recognize that these national traits supersede such temporal 
boundaries. Chapter 1 examines the reduction of Arapaho and Shoshone territorial 
claims through various treaties negotiated between 1851 and 1878. During this era, both 
tribal nations expressed their desire to remain on or near the Wind River Valley in 
central Wyoming, a place of spiritual and bodily fulfillment. By 1878, the contested 
nature of the region, and no small amount of governmental interference, allowed for a 
most unlikely outcome, Arapaho and Shoshone cohabitation of the Wind River.   
Chapter 2 explores the challenges and rewards of reservation life for Arapaho 
and Shoshone citizens, during their first twenty years together on the Shoshone Agency. 
While establishing reservation communities, Wind River inhabitants combatted 
starvation and assimilationist pressures in the form of agricultural pursuits, Christianity, 
boarding school education, and eventually land allotment. Though both tribal nations 
constantly advocated for Arapaho removal to a separate reservation, only land cession 
negotiations in 1891 inadvertently adjudicated the dispute, as federal officials 
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acknowledged both Shoshone and Arapaho claims to the reservation. Chapter 3 assesses 
a dramatic shift in political authority on the Shoshone Agency, as the death of chieftain 
leadership necessitated new forms of reservation governance. Slowly, both tribal 
nations adopted business councils, in which a group of recognized leaders managed the 
affairs of the tribal nations. A series of land cession councils, during the turn of the 
twentieth century, tested the resolve of councilmembers as they relinquished nearly half 
of their reservation, a disputed decision that prompted considerable dissatisfaction. Only 
the violent death of a Shoshone councilman, in 1907, stabilized the reservation as the 
leaders of both tribal nations reasserted their control over a greatly diminished 
reservation land base. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the role of language as it pertains to indigenous politics. 
Rather than the dialects spoken by the Arapaho and Shoshone, this chapter assesses the 
language of politics, or a new dialogue of legalese, land leasing and federal finance, 
employed on the reservation by Arapaho and Shoshone leaders, who formed a Joint 
Business Council to better manage reservation-wide affairs in 1907. This governing 
body utilized the language of politics as they negotiated land leases for natural 
resources extraction, established programs to care for the infirm and elderly, and 
reassessed the reservation’s education system. Though Office of Indian Affairs 
personnel frequently attempted to thwart Arapaho and Shoshone political advancement, 
by the 1920s, the tribal nations had achieved a fair measure of self-determination on the 
Wind River.    
Chapter 5 describes a process of cultural revitalization that took place on the 
Wind River, as both tribal nations encouraged the proliferation of Native dance and 
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performances on, and off, the reservation. While the Shoshone participated in 
celebrations of their culture closer to home, the Arapaho, with the help of show 
promoter Edward Farlow, attracted the attention of Wyoming event planners, and even 
the notice of Hollywood film producers. Eventually, the declining popularity of Wild 
West shows, and the rise of western tourism, drew unwelcome audiences to the Wind 
River, as cultural relics, not performers, attracted non-Native attention. Finally, Chapter 
6 illustrates the power and utility of history, as both tribal nations employed 
recollections of their past when addressing sweeping changes in federal Indian policy. 
During the administration of John Collier, one of the most controversial Commissioners 
of Indian Affairs, indigenous people across the country contemplated the pinnacle of his 
policy reforms, the Indian Reorganization Act. From 1913 to 1938, the Arapaho and 
Shoshone recalled their past experiences with the federal government and the shared 
histories of their people, as they filed Court of Claims cases, assessed federal Indian 
policy and charted a course for the future of their reservation. 
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Chapter 1 - Contested Space 
For centuries, the rugged beauty of the Wind River Valley astounded both its 
inhabitants and wayward travelers. In the summer of 1842, John C. Frémont led an 
expedition through the Rocky Mountains in order to assess the feasibility of an overland 
communication line between the Atlantic and the Pacific. As his group travelled 
throughout the region, Frémont recorded his experiences, and said of the Wind River, 
“Around us, the whole scene had one main, striking feature, which was that of terrible 
convulsion. Parallel to its length, the ridge was split into chasms and fissures; between 
which rose the thin lofty walls terminated with slender minarets and columns…the 
portion over which we traveled this morning was as rough as imagination could picture 
it, and to us seemed equally beautiful.”1 The clashing imagery of terribly rough terrain 
and the intrinsic beauty of such a place, characterizes many descriptions of the Wind 
River Valley and its surrounding mountains. Though terrifyingly daunting, the Wind 
River Mountains provided a measure of security, as well as beauty, to its occupants. 
A variety of indigenous peoples found solace in this harsh and seemingly 
uninhabitable region at the time of Frémont’s expedition. The Shoshone, Arapaho, 
Cheyenne, Crow, and Lakota often visited the area in search of shelter or food, as they 
followed bison herds across the Northern Plains. Shoshone cultural historian Reba 
Terran illustrates the complexity of this place, “This is our beloved valley… [but] we 
had to fight for our hunting territory. And before the buffalo were wiped out we didn’t 
have to fight as hard because, you know, if you have got thousands, millions of buffalo 
to eat you’re not gonna worry about where you are going to get food. So the Plains 
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people were satisfied with their buffalo.” As the number of bison dwindled and settlers 
pushed farther into the American West, this region evolved into a fiercely contested 
space. Terran describes the changing era, “when the buffalo were wiped out, there was 
no food for the Plains Indians and they began encroaching onto this territory because 
they needed food also, and so that is where that, the dynamics of the fighting, got 
worse.”2 The practice of establishing and maintaining territorial boundaries devolved 
into fierce battles between tribal nations who struggled to defend their claim to the 
region.  
For these tribal nations, the Wind River Valley was not simply a parcel of land. 
To them, the area represented a home, a place of spiritual and bodily fulfillment. The 
rugged mountains and pristine streams held within them memories, history, and a sense 
of belonging. As tribal nations left, or were forced out the region, their physical 
dislocation generated emotional distress, as well as a strong desire to return to the Wind 
River. Anthropologist Keith Basso describes the complex relationship between people 
and place, as well as the emotional disruption of dislocation. Basso explains that only 
after people are removed or “set adrift” from familiar surroundings, do they recognize 
the importance of place and belonging. “On these unnerving occasions,” he writes, 
“sense of place may assert itself in pressing and powerful ways…It is then we come to 
see that attachments to places may be nothing less than profound, and when these 
attachments are threatened we may feel threatened as well.”3 The contested nature of 
the Wind River, a by-product of considerable disruption on the Northern Plains, 
threatened the lifeways of thousands of Native peoples by the mid-nineteenth century. 
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The arrival of United States settlers to the area further complicated the struggle 
over this contested space. In the 1850s, Indian Agents arrived in the American West and 
proposed a series of treaties intended to officially designate Native homelands. 
Government officials did not understand the contested nature of some indigenous 
spaces, however. The Wind River Valley, as well as other locations in the American 
West, did not belong to one group alone. In the end, boundaries created through treaties 
further complicated, rather than alleviated, tension between tribal nations. Some 
indigenous communities responded with overt displays of aggression and rejected 
unwanted intrusions upon their land. Other tribal leaders developed working 
relationships with government representatives in order to secure desired regions through 
peace, not war.  
In 1851, Shoshone and Arapaho leaders pondered the costs and benefits of each 
approach. The Eastern Shoshone eventually chose a path of limited cooperation, while 
the Northern Arapaho decided to resist. These divergent paths exemplify the precarious 
position of tribal nations on the Northern Plains in the mid-nineteenth century. The 
contested nature of geographic spaces precluded wholesale peace agreements, easily 
defined boundaries or even lasting alliances. Between 1851 and 1878, the Northern 
Arapaho and Eastern Shoshone tribal nations endured a series of crises, as conflict with 
the federal government, non-Native outsiders and one another tore at the fabric of their 
societies. In response, the two tribal nations adapted to a rapidly changing world, 
preserved a cultural identity and political presence, and negotiated for a piece of the 
Wind River. By 1878, this complicated balancing act achieved an undesired and 
seemingly impossible result: shared cohabitation on a contested space. Though not by 
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their design, the Arapaho and Shoshone both secured a part of their beloved valley, but 
for the next sixty years, the contested nature of the Wind River remained as both tribal 
nations continually established and maintained their claim to the area.  
Life on the Plains  
Treaty negotiators met with the Lakota, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Shoshone, Crow, 
and other indigenous groups at Fort Laramie in 1851. The purpose of this meeting, an 
unprecedented gathering of tribal nations and government agents, was twofold. First, 
federal officials and Native leaders discussed various territorial claims on the Northern 
Plains. Seeking to create a legal document that would bind tribal nations to demarcated 
zones, federal officials relentlessly questioned Native leaders about geographic 
boundaries and landmarks. In addition, representatives from each tribal nation agreed to 
allow limited access to their territories, including safe passage for settlers and military 
personnel.4 In accordance with the Fort Laramie treaty, the Arapaho, and their allies the 
Cheyenne, stayed in an area “Between the Rivers,” an expanse roughly from the Platte 
River to the north and the Arkansas River to the south, from the foothills of the Rocky 
Mountains to the head waters of the Republican River in the east.5 At the treaty council, 
the Arapaho and Cheyenne promised to refrain from attacking United States citizens 
and even allowed for the construction of military posts on their land.6  
Despite this treaty, white settlers encroached onto Arapaho territory. Settlers and 
miners flooded the area when gold was discovered near Pikes Peak in 1858, disrupting 
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game in an important Arapaho hunting locale. As the threat of violence increased, an 
irreparable crisis gripped the Arapaho tribal nation. Political differences eventually split 
the Arapaho into two factions, Northern and Southern. The two groups agreed to live 
separately, but still came together at certain moments of the year, mainly for religious 
ceremonies.7 Even this arrangement would not last, as turmoil between the factions, 
heightened by unpleasant encounters with unwelcome settlers, severed the already 
difficult relationship. The Northern Arapaho traveled north into Wyoming and 
Montana, further allying themselves with the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, while the 
Southern Arapaho stayed in Colorado and attempted to mediate encounters with the 
arriving settlers.8  
 The immediate ramifications of this decision profoundly affected the Southern 
Arapaho. Under the weight of an increasing non-Native presence in Colorado, the 
Southern Arapaho, with a few members of the Cheyenne, signed the Fort Wise Treaty 
in 1861, effectively rescinding their previous claim to the region. They accepted a 
reservation on the Sand Creek and relocated there in the hope of avoiding further 
confrontations. This treaty deeply upset the Northern Arapaho, as federal negotiators 
failed to recognize the divide between the Northern and Southern factions. By signing 
the treaty without consulting Northern Arapaho leaders, the Southern faction effectively 
surrendered all claims to the area. In response, the Northern Arapaho further 
disassociated themselves from the affairs of their Southern relatives, and strengthened 
their bond with the Lakota and Cheyenne, but trouble persisted. In 1862, the discovery 
of gold in Montana, led to increased clashes between the Northern Arapaho and Euro-
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American settlers, while the Southern Arapaho fared no better. Devastated by a brutal 
massacre at Sand Creek on November 29, 1864, they accepted a small reservation and 
moved to Indian Territory.  
By 1865, the Northern Arapaho faced an uncertain future. They held no 
federally recognized land rights on the Northern Plains, they could no longer subsist on 
unpredictable seasonal hunts, their Southern relatives relocated to Indian Territory, and 
the war against Anglo American settlers had taken its toll. Indian Agent for the 
Colorado Superintendency, S.G. Colley, reported to his superiors that in council with 
the Northern Arapaho, “they do not appear to have any definite plan…I do not know 
what to do with them. They are poor and hungry. I have given them something, and got 
for them what I could of the commanding officers, but it is beg, beg, all the time.”9 
Other signers of the Fort Laramie Treaty fared no better in the ten years following the 
council. Annuity compensation, promised in the treaty, trickled in slowly or failed to 
arrive entirely. Native leaders repeatedly requested their annuities, not handouts, but 
Indian Agents like Colley failed to distinguish the two and protested the appalling state 
of their Indian “wards.” 
In the late 1850s, Indian Agents at posts across the American West bemoaned 
the state of tribal nations. These reports, often embellished for dramatic flair, illustrated 
not only the often difficult living conditions of American Indians, but also nineteenth 
century racial attitudes toward indigenous peoples. Throughout the United States, 
government personnel frequently met with tribal nations and tried to implement federal 
policies. By the mid-nineteenth century, their guiding principle, articulated in the 1860 
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Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, divided tribal nations into two 
categories: those with whom the United States had treaties, and those without. 10 It was 
the Commissioner’s desire to maintain contact with those not bound by treaty 
negotiations. “Our intercourse with those tribes with whom we have no treaties,” he 
wrote, “is limited to impressing upon them the necessity of maintaining friendly 
relations with the whites, and assuring them that acts of violence and rapine will be sure 
to draw upon them severe chastisement.”11 Encouraging additional negotiations with 
indigenous peoples, the Commissioner sent Indian Agents across the Northern Plains to 
conduct a second wave of treaty councils, as he believed the outdated 1851 treaty failed 
to effectively contain Native peoples. In the 1860s, agents endeavored to narrow 
territorial boundaries through treaties, while strengthening ties with “friendly” tribal 
nations and extending the period of annuity payments and supplies over a period of 
fifteen years.  
With this policy direction in mind, Utah Territorial Agent Benjamin Davies 
traveled toward the Eastern Shoshone camp in 1860. By the time of Davies’s arrival, 
Washakie, a revered leader and powerful figure in the tribal nation, led the Eastern 
Shoshone. The precise details of Washakie’s birth and early life are lost to historians, 
but by 1843, it is clear that he was a prominent subchief in the tribal nation. The 
establishment of Fort Bridger that year, and the subsequent and long-lasting friendship 
between Jim Bridger and Washakie, furthered supported the young Shoshone’s rise to 
power. Bridger encouraged Washakie to develop relationships with federal agents and 
Mormon missionaries who passed through his trading post, and when treaty council 
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negotiators invited the Eastern Shoshone to participate in the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty, 
Bridger implored Washakie to attend. His presence at the treaty council favorably 
impressed federal agents and further solidified Washakie’s place among his own people. 
His advance to chieftain of the Shoshone did not remain uncontested, however. 
Internecine struggles for authority punctuate Shoshone history throughout the 1850s, 
but in the end, Washakie’s involvement in the Treaty of Fort Laramie, as well as his 
relationship with influential men including Brigham Young and Jim Bridger, ultimately 
secured his place as the leader of the tribal nation. 12 By the early 1860s, Shoshones and 
government officials both recognized his status and touted him as a valuable asset. 
As Davies travelled westward from Fort Bridger, a majority of the Eastern 
Shoshone lived in winters camps throughout the Wind River Valley. The area provided 
shelter from encroaching winter storms, as well as fresh water, and access to fish and 
wild game. Armed with federal Indian policy, two wagons driven by mules, provisions, 
clothing, and ammunition, Davies made his way to the Valley and sought an additional 
treaty with the Eastern Shoshone.13 In reporting to his superiors, Davies heroically 
described his role as the man who “saved hundreds of lives among the naked, wretched 
inhabitants of these desolate wilds.”14 But, the described – and most likely exaggerated 
– condition of the Shoshones must be put into proper context.15 At the time Washakie 
and his people met with Agent Davies, November of 1860, the seasonal snowfall and 
vicious Wyoming winds prohibited hunting and travel. They subsisted on relatively 
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scarce, but not deficient stores of food as their environment suggested frugality rather 
than poverty. Every winter, inhabitants of the Wind River Valley endured fierce winds, 
sub-zero temperatures, and even, as Davies reported, an “immense depth of the snow, 
which in some places was said to be as much as fifty feet.” This area, a wintering 
ground that the Shoshones seasonally inhabited and thrived on for many years, 
concerned and bewildered Davies.16 The brutal winter weather did not deter the agent in 
completing his mission, however.  
Washakie and his advisors openly welcomed Davies into their winter 
encampment, and actively pursued additional negotiations. By the spring of 1861, the 
tribal nation successfully secured a subagency, created specifically for the Shoshone, 
that would distributed the annuity goods, promised in the 1851 treaty, to the Shoshone, 
Ute, Paiute, and other regional bands.17 Despite the “deplorable” condition in which he 
found the Shoshone, Davies lived with them for several months, and positively 
reported, the “Indians are now all peaceable and entirely friendly with the whites, and 
are likely to remain so, unless the interference of white men causes disturbances to 
spring up among them.”18 This favorable report prompted additional treaty negotiations 
between the Shoshone and the United States government.  
In the fall of 1861, Henry Martin, Davies’ successor, reported his additional 
councils with Washakie to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  Martin indicated that 
Washakie, in addition to a few Ute leaders, “express their willingness to cede to the 
United States all the lands they claim in this Territory, with the exception of 
reservations necessary for their homes; and ask, in return, that the United States shall 
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make them annual presents of blankets, beads, paint, calico, ammunition, &c., with 
occasional supplies of beef and flour sufficient to make them comfortable.”19 
Washakie’s apparent desire to move his people onto a reservation requires a bit more 
analysis, however. First, during a period of rather intense struggle for leadership of the 
Eastern Shoshone, Washakie’s rivals appeared noticeably absent from this and other 
meetings with Agency officials. Anglo-Americans in the Utah Territory, including Jim 
Bridger, frequently elevated Washakie’s status, regardless of his actual rank, within the 
Shoshone tribal nation. This practice infuriated other leaders who vied for a position of 
authority and refused to participate in treaty negotiations. In response to Washakie’s 
ascension to power, the tribal nation fractured as a few leaders and their followers broke 
off from the larger group, effectively solidifying a more unified citizenry behind 
Washakie. In addition, Arapaho, Crow and Lakota encroachment onto the Wind River, 
a region coveted by the Shoshone, as well as several brutal raids perpetuated by these 
tribal nations, necessitated, in Washakie’s mind, additional treaty negotiations and, 
more importantly, federal protection.  
In order to maneuver into a more favorable negotiating position, Washakie 
befriended Indian Agent Luther Mann. Mann arrived at Fort Bridger in late December 
of 1861 and served as acting Indian Agent to the Shoshone until 1869, though it was not 
immediately apparent that the two would become friends.20 In his first report to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mann described the perilous position of those in the 
area “Large numbers of the Shoshones, in conjunction with the Bannocks…have been 
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committing upon the emigrants travelling to California and Washington some of the 
most brutal murders ever perpetrated upon this continent.” But Mann absolved 
Washakie and his followers of these heinous crimes, “Washakie, the head chief of the 
Shoshones, and his band, have abstained from any acts of violence or theft which have 
characterized a larger portion of the tribe.” Mann also indicated the potential for more 
violence, as “Large herds of stock have been stolen and driven off by predatory bands 
of Shoshones, during the present season, none of which have as yet been chastised for 
their stealing propensities, thereby emboldening them to commit further acts of theft 
and violence upon the whites living or travelling through this country.”21 This requisite 
report to his superiors benefitted Washakie and his Shoshones in a number of ways.  
First, Mann blamed other Shoshone leaders and additional tribal nations for the 
attacks, maintaining Washakie’s status as a peaceful leader and not a target for 
governmental retribution. Mann also elevated Washakie’s status by making him an 
informer, of sorts, as he successfully warned surrounding settlers of the potential for 
further acts of violence, based on information gathered through conversations with 
Washakie.  Finally, Mann attempted to reward the leader and his people with the first of 
many requests to establish a Shoshone reservation, “I cannot too strongly urge upon the 
department the necessity of placing the Shoshones upon a reservation to be located at 
one of the three points, viz: The Wind River valley, which is said to be one of the finest 
valleys in the mountains.”22 These factors, in conjunction with the established rhetoric 
of the Office of Indian Affairs, prompted additional treaty negotiations with the 
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Shoshone. Unfortunately, Mann and Washakie could not prevent the brutal escalation of 
Indian/American conflict in Utah Territory, however.  
In January 1863, Colonel Patrick Connor attacked the winter camp of Shoshone 
chief Bear Hunter and a mix of Bannock Indians near the Utah/Idaho border.23 The 
ensuing massacre, retribution for an attack against miners near Salt Lake City, 
decimated the Native population. At Bear River, aggressive forces, supported by 
militant federal policies and Civil War armaments, brutalized unsuspecting Native 
peoples. According to Indian Agent James Doty, surviving Bannocks counted a loss of 
225 men, women and children with nearly 160 captives.24 This number is certainly low, 
as historians today suggest a total of more than 300 dead in the attack. Like Sand Creek 
the following year, this episode illustrates the sheer brutality of American retribution, 
but this story is typically lost amid the numerous theaters of the Civil War era.25 In his 
official report, Doty brushed off the incident stating “Their camp was well filled with 
provisions, bacon, sugar, coffee &c. and various other articles, all of which had 
obviously been taken from Trains which they had robbed during the past season.”26 
Federal officials supported this overwhelming demonstration of violence, while women 
and children stood in the corpse-strewn field where their loved ones met their demise.27 
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The death of these “thieves” sparked periodic retaliation, but eventually halted 
persistent Indian raiding and further prompted additional treaty negotiations.  
Fort Bridger Treaty 1863 
 Above all else, an expanding Anglo-American population into the American 
West initiated the Fort Bridger Treaty. The Homestead Act of 1862 sparked an 
unparalleled migration of settlers onto Indian lands, and government officials reasoned 
that outbreaks of violence could not be tolerated if settlements were to develop. On July 
2, 1863, agents James Doty and Luther Mann met with various factions of the Shoshone 
and their leaders, nearly one thousand people in total.28 The two principal chiefs, 
Washakie and Wanapitz, declared perpetual peace with the United States, and agreed to 
allow telegraph and overland stage lines to pass through their territory.29 The treaty 
signers also permitted the future construction of a railroad from the eastern plains, west 
to the Pacific Ocean. For their inconvenience the Shoshone received $10,000 in 
annuities distributed over the course of twenty years, as well as immediate provisions 
and clothing in the amount of $6,000.30 Noticeably absent from this document is 
mention of a permanent Shoshone settlement. Instead, the treaty roughly designated 
Shoshone territory by geographic markers: the Snake River to the north, the Wind River 
Mountains and the north fork of the Platte River to the east, the Uintah Mountains to the 
south, and the western boundary left undefined.31 The Shoshone agreed to these 
geographical borders because they contained both sacred and utilitarian spaces 
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including the Wind River Mountains and western hunting grounds. Despite Agent 
Mann’s recommendation, and Washakie’s apparent willingness, the treaty did not make 
allowances for a reservation, however.  
Several factors inhibited reservation development, including numerous claims to 
the Wind River Valley. According to the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, part of the 
region belonged to the Crow, who inhabited the Valley infrequently, but maintained a 
presence in the area. The Cheyenne, Arapaho and Lakota also claimed hunting rights 
along the Bighorn Mountain range, and increasingly raided Shoshone settlements, 
asserting their military dominance. Additionally, the discovery of gold in the region 
sparked a sizeable increase in the number of miners and businessmen near the Wind 
River. Author of Crazy Horse: A Lakota Life Kingsley Bray explains the instability of 
the region, as Crazy Horse, “Loosely cooperating with the northern Arapahos, whose 
chiefs were pursuing a negotiated join-use zone on the Wind River…pressed raids 
against the Shoshones. They also harried new American mining settlements near South 
Pass.”32 The contested nature of the space complicated treaty negotiations, and 
generated considerable violence between conflicting interests. 
Despite their efforts, Indian Agents could not mediate the many conflicts 
between settlers and tribal nations. In the mid-1860s, the federal government, embroiled 
in a bitter Civil War, lacked the oversight and manpower to coordinate any large scale 
stabilizing efforts. Instead, they sent agents from the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA), 
armed with federal policy and very little money to arbitrate disputes. In response to the 
weakened federal presence in the American West, tribal nations, including the Arapaho, 
frequently raided fledgling white settlements and attacked their rivals’ camps with the 
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help of their Lakota and Cheyenne allies. In addition, settlers easily migrated onto 
Native lands at an alarming rate, violating treaties and aggravating Indians, in search of 
riches all but promised to them by land speculators and boosters. Many agents believed 
that the longer Indians remained outside of the reservation system the potential for 
violence would further escalate beyond their control. Luther Mann, a perpetual advocate 
for a Shoshone reservation, wrote in his 1864 annual report, of the impact of white 
intruders. The Shoshone hunting grounds, “being in a section of country where the 
whites, during the last year, have been in search of gold, their game is becoming 
exceedingly scarce, much of it having been killed and a great deal of it driven from the 
country; hence it will be absolutely necessary in the future to feed them during the 
winter months.” Mann rationalized that since the Shoshone gathered to receive rations 
during the winter, “some suitable measures [should] be taken to locate them upon a 
reservation where they might be protected by the government until they could be taught 
to take care of themselves.”33 Mann’s repeated requests to establish a permanent 
reservation for Washakie and his people originated not only from the increase in white 
settlers, but also from a paternalistic desire to “civilize” the Shoshone people.  
This policy did not originate with Mann, or even the OIA, but rather from a 
concentrated, nation-wide effort to do something with the indigenous population in 
America. Agent Mann embodied this ideology and acted accordingly, campaigning for 
a reservation on which “civilizing elements” could better influence the Shoshone. On 
September 28, 1865, he wrote, “If they are not provided with such a home, they are 
destined to remain outside of those influences which are calculated to civilize or 
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christianize [sic] them, as has been done in many parts of our country to tribes not one 
whit more susceptible of being rendered useful members of society.” He insisted that, 
“Wild Indians, like wild horses, must be corralled upon reservations. There they can be 
brought to work, and soon will become a self-supporting people, earning their own 
living by their industry, instead of trying to pick up a bare subsitence [sic].”34 These 
impassioned requests went unheeded, as several obstacles on the local and federal levels 
continued to block the path toward a Shoshone reservation.  
Turmoil abounded throughout the Northern Plains, wrought by three primary 
factors: trade, wealth and territory. Seeking access to northern trade centers in which 
Native people exchanged buffalo robes for guns and supplies, tribal nations migrated 
throughout the region, often leading to violent confrontations at both Native and non-
Native encampments. Second, Indians and Anglo-Americans alike wanted to increase 
their personal wealth. Anglo-American miners tore into the hills and valleys of the West 
in search of gold and other precious minerals, while Native people ransacked villages 
and counted coup, increasing their societal power and wealth. Finally, and most 
importantly, the process of defending or gaining hunting territories, as well as sacred 
and utilitarian spaces, perpetuated a state of near-constant battle, as tribal nations vied 
for access to the Wind River region.35   
In 1864, Lakota warriors, along with their Arapaho and Cheyenne allies, 
repeatedly sacked Shoshone winter camps on the Wind River. In October, Utah 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Oliver Irish, wrote to the Commissioner that a large 
number of Shoshone people sought refuge at Fort Bridger in response to the attacks. 
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After receiving their annual provisions, Washakie told Irish that his people would not 
start their fall hunt because “they are affraid [sic] of the Souixs [sic], and that they will 
leave their families in the vicinity of Ft. Bridger for safety, and will hunt in that 
neighborhood and do the best they can.”36 The Lakota did not limit their attacks to the 
Shoshone, however. Miners, overland travelers and anyone else who crossed their path, 
faced Lakota ire, as warriors attempted to reclaim a large portion of northeastern 
Wyoming. While the Shoshone fled to Fort Bridger, the Crow, who maintained treaty 
rights to the region, retreated to the west side of the Big Horn Mountains, under the 
threat of Lakota attack.37  
The Shoshone did not stay away from the Wind River for long, and once again 
they faced their rival’s aggression. In the summer of 1865, Lakota and Cheyenne 
warriors invaded Washakie’s camp near the Sweetwater River. As they raided the camp 
for horses, one of the warriors killed Washakie’s son, Nan-nag-gai (Snow Bird), and 
mutilated his body in front of his father.38 As they rode away, Washakie gathered his 
warriors for retribution, as this act of overt aggression negated any promises of peace 
stipulated in previous treaties. When Agent Mann witnessed Shoshone preparations for 
battle, he hastily sent a missive to Utah Superintendent of Indian Affairs, O.H. Irish, “I 
learned this morning that a large party of the ShoShonees [sic] are preparing to leave 
that Agency for the purpose of fighting the hostile Indians who are Engaged in 
committing depredations on the Overland Mail Line and Telegraph Lines. Shall I permit 
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them to leave?”39 Irish, who had recently bemoaned Lakota attacks to the area’s 
communication routes, quickly replied, “I am willing they should fight the bad Indians. 
Let them be good Soldiers that the Great Father may think well of them.”40 When the 
Shoshone returned victorious, Washakie’s willingness to “fight the bad Indians,” 
regardless of his ulterior motives, earned him the respect of area Indian Agents. Irish 
requested that a large medal be given to the chief for his service as “There is no more 
deserving Chief Among all the Indians.”41 But Washakie’s perpetual cooperation with 
Indian Agents earned him more than a large silver medallion, as the Shoshone inched 
one step closer toward negotiating for the Wind River. 42  
Agent Mann utilized this recent demonstration of good will in his 1866 annual 
report. As usual, Mann requested a reservation for the Shoshone, but painted Washakie 
and his people in a better light. Instead of destitute and poverty stricken, the Shoshone, 
in Mann’s estimation, were good people deserving of a home of their own. He simply 
stated, “The valley of the Wind River mountains is the territory which the tribe have 
selected for their home, and this is the place where such a reservation should be set 
apart and an agency established.” Mann closed his report with an impassioned plea for 
“Washakee [sic] and his tribe [who] deserve a permanent and exclusive reservation in 
the valley of the Wind river [sic], and I pray you let them have it at once.”43 Yet, the 
OIA once again ignored his request. Stalwart in his pursuit, Mann relentlessly sought a 
reservation again the next year.  
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Washakie and the Shoshone grew restless as they struggled to stay on the Wind 
River under the constant threat of brutal attack. They frequently implored Agent Mann 
to conduct treaty negotiations for the Wind River, as rival tribal nations continually 
threatened their home, and Washakie adamantly believed that treaties, not warfare 
against a far superior force, would best secure their place in the region. To Mann, a 
reservation for the Shoshone did not simply mean that they would hold title to the Wind 
River. It also meant it a major victory for the Agent professionally. Not only would he 
become a reservation agent, but Mann could also quit traipsing around the Rocky 
Mountains, risking life and limb to find Washakie and his people. The chief used this 
knowledge to his advantage, and much to Mann’s dismay, the Shoshone became more 
and more difficult to find as the plan to secure a reservation languished.  
By 1867, the Lakota and their allies, united under the leadership of Chief Red 
Cloud, gained control of a vast portion of the Northern Plains, as they attacked settlers 
and tribal nations in the area. The Crow no longer claimed the Wind River, as they were 
sufficiently pushed out by the Lakota. In response, Mann attempted a new strategy, and 
played off the fear of “hostile Indians” in some of his reports. If the Shoshones moved 
onto the Wind River, he reasoned, “Their occupancy of the valley, with suitable 
protection from the government, would prevent the raiding war parties of Sioux from 
interfering with the development of the mines just discovered and being open in the 
vicinity of South Pass, where, within a few days, a large party of miners were driven 
away by a small band of hostile Indians after three or more of their number had been 
inhumanely murdered.”44 In other words, if the Shoshone received their reservation, 
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they would serve as a buffer between hostile Indians and settlers in the region. 
Successfully persuaded by this rationale, the United States government treated with the 
Shoshone less than a year later.  
Fort Bridger Treaty 1868 
At the national level, Union Pacific railroad crews marched across the Nebraska 
prairie in the summer of 1867. By January 1868, trains ferried passengers to the new 
boom town of Cheyenne, Wyoming, and linking the West and the East became a 
tangible reality for government officials. Unwavering in their mission, Americans 
believed that violent skirmishes and free ranging Indians could no longer be tolerated. 
Accordingly, how to “civilize” the Indians became a major concern for the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. It was not good enough, in his estimation, to confine 
them on reservations of their own. Instead, the Commissioner insisted in his 1868 
annual report, that it was the government’s “right” and it’s “duty” to “solve the Indian 
question definitely and decisively.”45 In a self-serving and paternalistic manifesto, titled 
“Shall Our Indians Be Civilized? And How?” the commissioner outlined a plan in 
which Indian Agents should “proceed by the cheapest and nearest route to the desired 
end, and could, therefore, justify ourselves in ignoring the natural as well as the 
conventional rights of the Indians, if they stand in the way, and as their lawful masters, 
assign them their status and their tasks, or put them out of their own way and ours by 
extermination with the sword, starvation, or by any other method.” Commissioner N.G. 
Taylor also encouraged Agents to achieve this end through the “simplest, easiest, and 
most economical way possible.”46 At the heart of this policy, an emphasis on education, 
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farming and Christianity led the way to civilization, not extermination through war and 
starvation.  
Coinciding with this more forceful direction in Indian policy, the United States 
Congress established a different treaty making process in 1867. Headed by a newly 
created Indian Peace Commission, the group, comprised of army officers and civilians, 
met and negotiated with resistant tribal nations, as well as those still at peace with the 
government. As the Peace Commission traveled throughout the country in the summer 
of 1868, they sought not to define new boundaries, but remove Native people to 
reservations, or, if possible, to Indian Territory. In anticipation of treaty negotiations at 
Fort Bridger, Luther Mann invited Shoshone and Bannock Indians to the post in May of 
1868. After several days of feasting, ninety-six Shoshone lodges, in addition to nearly 
sixty Bannock families, met officials on July 3 to sign a treaty of peace with the United 
States. This treaty, by far the most important to the Shoshone people, secured the Wind 
River Valley as their permanent home. The document stipulated unconditional peace 
between the United States and the Shoshone. Additionally, the government agreed to 
provide annuity payments and clothing as well as a teacher, carpenter, miller, engineer, 
blacksmith and farmer, and the equipment necessary to assist the Shoshone in 
agricultural endeavors.47 In return, the Shoshone relinquished their claim to the area 
surrounding Fort Bridger. 
After nearly seven years of negotiation, the Shoshone finally secured their 
“beloved valley.” At the council Washakie proclaimed, “I am laughing because I am 
happy. Because my heart is good...When we want to grow something to eat and hunt I 
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want the Wind River Country.”48 Government officials hoped that this legal document 
marked the end of an era in which Indians enjoyed the unfettered ability to roam the 
plains, stalk buffalo herds and raise their families on the open prairie. Chief Washakie, 
and the generations of Shoshone leadership that followed him, however, recognized 
different opportunities provided through treaty negotiations. The creation of a Shoshone 
Agency and the establishment of treaty sanctioned leadership enabled them to express 
legal sovereignty over their land and resources.  
Federal officials wanted the Shoshone to relocate to their newly created 
reservation and begin farming as soon as possible. On the other hand, Washakie 
purposely delayed their departure from Fort Bridger, because the Shoshone used the 
Wind River primarily as a winter camp and seasonal hunting ground, not a permanent 
residence. In addition, the leader sagely recognized that the Lakota threat had not 
diminished with the signing of treaty documents. Washakie appeared quite adamant 
about this stipulation, reportedly saying to the Commission, “You have heard what I 
want. The Wind river [sic] Country is the one for me. We may not for one, two or three 
years be able to till the ground. The Sioux may trouble us. But when the Sioux are taken 
care of, we can do well…I want for my home the valley of Wind river and lands on its 
tributaries as far east as the Popo-aggie, and want the privilege of going over the 
mountains to hunt where I please.”49 The Commission conceded that the Shoshones 
could delay their relocation to the reservation pending the construction of agency 
buildings and other shops, but once they were built, Shoshone occupation was to be 
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immediate and permanent.50 One final provision of the 1868 treaty that greatly impacted 
the future of the Shoshone, was that the Shoshone Agency  
is set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the 
Shoshonee [sic] Indians herein named, and for such other friendly nations or 
individual Indians as from time to time they may be willing, with the consent of 
the United States, to admit amongst them; and the United States now solemnly 
agrees that no persons except those herein designated and authorized so to do, 
and except such officers, agents, and employees of the government…shall ever 
be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in this 
article for the use of said Indians.51 
This provision indicated that the Shoshone were to retain complete sovereignty over 
their land, effectively settling any contested rights of occupancy. In reality, it failed to 
do so. Less than ten years later, the Arapaho arrived on the Wind River and challenged 
the Shoshone’s claim to the area.  
The Indian Peace Commission actually hosted several councils on the Northern 
Plains in the summer of 1868, including a meeting with more than 150 Arapaho and 
Cheyenne lodges camped near Fort Laramie.52 In many ways, their allegiance with the 
Lakota had not been profitable, and the Arapaho and Cheyenne, anxious to sever their 
ties to the rebellious tribal nation, wanted to secure a treaty with the United States. 
Their previous involvement with the Lakota weakened their bargaining power, 
however, and the final agreement was not as favorable as the one made with the 
Shoshones. According to their treaty stipulations, if the Arapaho and Cheyenne agreed 
to unconditional peace, they would be rewarded with agricultural and education 
assistance, clothing and other provisions, as well as annuity goods and rations for those 
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who settled on a reservation.53 Perhaps the most distressing part of the treaty for the 
Northern Arapaho, was the condition that “within one year from this date they will 
attach themselves permanently either to the agency provided for them near the mouth of 
Medicine Lodge Creek, or to the agency about to be established on the Missouri River, 
near Fort Randall, or to the Crow agency near Otter Creek, on the Yellowstone 
River.”54 The Northern Arapaho found these possible reservation locations unsuitable, 
because they wanted to remain near the Wind River. Instead, tribal leaders looked 
toward army officers for help in securing a reservation on their old hunting grounds in 
west-central Wyoming.  
Creating a Reservation  
Even though the Shoshone now held title to the Wind River, their lifestyle 
changed very little in the year following the treaty. From July 1868 until the summer of 
1869, the reservation served only as a part time home. The Shoshone continued to 
practice cyclical nomadism, in which they gathered at the Wind River Valley in the late 
winter months (November to April) in preparation for travel to their buffalo hunting 
grounds in the Big Horn Basin. During the summer, the Shoshone dispersed. Some went 
to Fort Bridger to trade, while others scattered throughout the region to hunt and gather 
forage for the winter. With autumn’s arrival, the Shoshone slowly filtered back to the 
Wind River for the fall buffalo hunt and the establishment of winter camps.55 In the 
Wind River Valley, the landscape remained unaffected as the federal government 
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erected no agency buildings, houses, barns or other signs of development in 1869. In 
part, Washakie’s reluctance to settle permanently on the Wind River rested on this lack 
of activity. In addition, the Shoshone enjoyed the freedom of mobility, and wished to 
continue receiving their rations from Washakie’s old friend Jim Bridger. Their agent, 
Luther Mann, also continued to work out of Fort Bridger as he oversaw the 
development of the Shoshone Agency.  
Intense outbreaks of violence, perpetuated by the Lakota and their allies, also 
restricted the Shoshone’s movements and further complicated the creation of a Wind 
River reservation community. Agent Mann noted the frequent attacks against the 
Shoshone in his 1868 report, but rather than viewing these Indian raids as a competition 
over contested territory and resources, Mann noted the “enmity existing between them 
[the Shoshone] and the Nez Perces, Crows, Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes [which] 
is of long duration.”56 The agent tried to underplay the severity of the situation, by 
calling the raids a “temporary setback to the peaceful occupation of the reservation 
allotted to the Indians of this agency.”57 His report ultimately failed to illustrate how 
their enmity powerfully affected the region and did little to address the fears of white 
miners and settlers who often lived in a state of perpetual terror near the newly 
established reservation or the angst of frustrated Shoshones who attempted to reside in 
the area.  
The increasing dissatisfaction of Washakie and his people troubled Agent Mann. 
The establishment of a reservation for the Shoshone was a considerable personal and 
professional achievement for the civil servant. But, Mann often possessed few resources 
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and even less political power to curtail violence or resolve conflicts on or near the 
Shoshones’ land. He lacked an agency near the Wind River through which to operate, 
and to complicate matters further, the creation of Wyoming Territory in July of 1868 
altered the political structure of the entire region. Mann now reported to J.A. Campbell, 
the newly appointed territorial governor of Wyoming. Campbell, the ex-officio 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, was not a stranger to the volatility of the American 
West. Among the items addressed in his opening message to the first meeting of the 
territorial legislature, the new governor set his sights on ending violence in the Wind 
River.58 Mann, seeking powerful allies, joined Campbell to achieve this ambitious goal.  
Mann and Campbell initially met with area settlers, as frequent skirmishes with 
the Lakota and their allies indirectly tainted the Shoshone’s reputation. In 1868, Mann 
talked with South Pass miners and settlers, informing them that other hostile parties, not 
their Shoshone neighbors, instigated the many attacks. In doing so, he hoped to reassure 
“the miners that the best feeling existed between these Indians [the Shoshone] and the 
whites, and that their presence in the valley would be protection against any more raids 
by the Sioux, which proved true, all hostilities having ceased against the miners until 
after the Shoshone had returned to this agency.”59 This brief respite from Indian raids 
had very little to do with the Shoshone’s arrival. Rather, the Lakota and their allies had 
moved off of the Wind River in search of their own winter grounds, effectively halting 
the violence. Like clockwork, the raids began again in the spring of 1869. Still, miners 
in the Sweetwater region, and Agent Mann, recognized the convenience of a Shoshone 
buffer in the Wind River Valley.  
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Renewed attacks in the spring, prompted residents of local mining towns to 
demand more action of their new governor. They begged Campbell to send troops or 
militia protection to the region. The irony of this situation, of course, is that they also 
desperately wanted Indians to settle in their community, for their own, self-serving 
purposes. Governor Campbell chronicled the incredible changes taking place in the 
Wind River Valley in the summer of 1869 in a letter to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs. He wrote first of Agent Mann, who planned to leave Fort Bridger for the 
expressed purpose of establishing his agency, a project eleven months in the making. 
Additionally, General Christopher Augur, a territorial asset and witness to the 1868 Fort 
Bridger Treaty, set out for the Sweetwater mining district to protect the agency in its 
infancy, and the settlers in that region, from further Lakota depredations. Though many 
forces converged on the Wind River Valley, Washakie and his people did not visit the 
proposed agency that summer, and planned to return only for annuity goods and to set 
winter camps in late autumn. Campbell also addressed this pattern of behavior, as he 
laid out his plans for the Wind River. He insisted upon the Commissioner that “It is 
very desirable that these indians [sic] be induced to settle on this reservation, not only in 
order that they may be prepared to carry out their part of the treaty, but also because the 
presence of these indians [sic] will serve to assist in protecting the Wind river valley 
and the miners on the Sweetwater from the Sioux.”60 True to the plan, General Augur 
arrived with protection for the region and established a post, named Camp Augur, on 
the Big Popo Aggie River. But despite the presence of troops in the area, the attacks 
continued unabated.61 
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For Mann, establishing an agency proved far more difficult than he could have 
envisioned. Ultimately, constant raiding prevented the agent from creating a permanent 
settlement on the reservation that summer.62 Inadequate supplies undermined his report 
with Washakie and frustrated his ability to provide the provisions stipulated in the 1868 
treaty. He insisted that “Nothing but a strict and liberal fulfillment of the agreement 
with the Indians can secure their perfect quietude.”63 Mann also feared the fracturing of 
the Shoshone as a result of his inadequacies. He reported that the separation of some 
Shoshones, under the authority of a new leader, complicated the delicate power 
structure of the tribal nation. During this transitory phase, Washakie recognized that he 
was losing the confidence of his people, as relocation to the Wind River proved less 
satisfactory than promised. In 1869, the Shoshone also suffered several crushing defeats 
to the Lakota and other rival tribal nations, as they attempted to defend their homelands, 
further weakening Washakie’s authority with in the tribal nation. In response, a few 
younger warriors started to push in on his leadership position.  
According to biographer Grace Raymond Hebard, Washakie knew of the 
dissention within his ranks. In response to challenges of his authority, Washakie 
mounted his horse and left without telling anyone of his plans. After “two moons” he 
returned with seven scalps and told his challengers that he had come upon a band of 
“hostiles.” Seeking to defend his honor, Washakie took each scalp as a trophy, or a 
memento of the battle. In dramatic flair he supposedly shouted, “Let him who can do a 
greater feat than this claim the chieftainship. Let him who would take my place count as 
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many scalps.”64 As Hebard recounted the event, only an extraordinary display of 
military might and bravery ensured the chief his position among the Shoshone. While 
tantalizing, this apocryphal story belies the real relationship that Washakie shared with 
his people. By all accounts, the Shoshone citizenry revered their leader because of his 
ability to protect and provide for them. The alliances that he fostered with Jim Bridger, 
Indian Agents, and even the surrounding Anglo-American communities ensured their 
safety and their claim to the Wind River. Though they struggled in the years following 
the 1868 treaty, it is far more likely that a few young, rebel warriors dared to challenge 
his leadership position, rather than the full-blown crisis of authority that Hebard 
described. In the months that followed Mann’s departure, Washakie successfully 
reaffirmed his position within the tribal nation, as he negotiated their permanent move 
to the Wind River, though the process remained difficult.  
Following an unexpected change in OIA personnel, Washakie adamantly 
refused to permanently relocate to the reservation until the government built agency 
structures. The Shoshone leader told their new agent that “the Indians had carried out 
their part of the treaty, and by that treaty they were not compelled to go to the 
reservation.”65 In return, the new agent, J.H. Patterson refused, under Campbell’s order, 
to issue any gifts or rations. He told Washakie and other subchiefs that all annuities 
must be received only at Camp Augur until they fully established the Shoshone Agency. 
Washakie return to Patterson the next day and threatened that if “the United States did 
not comply with the treaty…he supposed that the only way to obtain any presents was 
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‘to steal a few horses and kill a few white men.’”66 Certainly, part of this conflict 
surrounded the dismissal of Agent Mann. Washakie and Mann maintained a strong 
relationship during the eight years he worked at Fort Bridger, and the leader considered 
him part of the Shoshone kinship network. They worked diligently to negotiate a 
settlement for the Wind River Valley, and the Shoshone credited Mann for the treaty of 
1868 and the successful acquisition of their homeland. Quickly, they found his 
replacement sorely inadequate, and refused to relocate until the new agent satisfied their 
demands.  
The Arapaho Challenge 
While the Shoshone lauded their claim over the Wind River, the treaty at Fort 
Bridger did very little to deter other tribal nations from entering the region. Beginning 
in May 1869, military personnel reported several Arapaho families camped near the 
Wind River Valley. They did not seem anxious to engage the Shoshone in battle, yet 
their very presence alarmed and annoyed Washakie and his people. The Arapaho, who 
also met with the Peace Commission in 1868, agreed to settle on a reservation within 
the next year. This time frame put Arapaho leaders in a predicament. The proposed 
reservation locations (near Medicine Lodge Creek, an agency near Fort Randall, or with 
the Crow at Otter Creek) sat outside the Arapahos’ pattern of cyclical nomadism. They 
were, of course, rather convenient places for Indian Agents, however.67 Arapaho leaders 
distanced themselves from their Lakota allies, and visited with military officials in the 
hope of securing a reservation closer to the Cheyenne on the Northern Plains.  
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Initially, Arapaho chiefs Medicine Man and Black Bear visited the commanding 
officer at Fort Fetterman. Eventually, they contacted General Augur at the Wind River, 
and offered to provide assistance in investigating attacks against troops and white 
settlements in the area. In return, the general agreed to help facilitate an arrangement 
between the Arapaho and Shoshone.68 He wrote to Agent Mann and J.A. Campbell, 
stating the Arapahos’ intentions, but preliminary attempts at securing a lasting peace 
ended poorly. First, Washakie refused to meet with the Arapaho to discuss the matter. 
He told Mann that “he could not understand why the Arapahoes, who had for years 
allied with the Sioux and Cheyennes against him, should now suddenly wish to join him 
– the weaker against their old friends.” Upon additional consideration, “He remembered 
[Arapaho Chief] Friday as a friend of his youth and seemed favorably impressed 
because the proposition had his name associated with it. He desire[d] to meet their 
delegation, and when he can see their faces, says he can understand their intentions.”69 
But Agent Mann left his post at Fort Bridger before the meeting could be arranged, and 
his successor Agent Patterson did not revisit the subject.  
In October 1869, Governor Campbell instructed Agent Patterson to organize a 
conference between Washakie and Arapaho chiefs Medicine Man, Sorrel Horse, and 
Friday. Patterson contacted General Augur who facilitated the transportation of the 
Arapaho into the Wind River Valley. But, Washakie failed to appear for the meeting. It 
is possible that he left in a sign of protest, unwilling to negotiate with the Arapaho. It is 
also likely, that Washakie left with a group of Shoshone men to conduct their last fall 
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hunt of the year in the Big Horn Mountains.70 Campbell came down from Cheyenne and 
conducted the meeting in Washakie’s absence. The Arapaho asked for clothing and 
provisions, as well as arms and ammunition to see them through the winter. Campbell 
believed that the Arapaho were “very humble, and complain of their poverty and 
neglected condition.” Above all else they expressed a desire to “join the Shoshone and 
go on the Reservation with them.”71 This was a surprising request, and perhaps a 
rhetorical flourish of Campbell’s. The Arapaho might have wanted to temporarily reside 
on the reservation with the Shoshone, but the end goal for the Arapaho had always been 
a reservation of their own near the Shoshone, not with them. Also, the Arapaho would 
have known that Washakie and his people would never agree to a jointly shared 
reservation, considering the years of torment that preceded this gathering. In all 
likelihood, Campbell either misunderstood the Arapahos’ intentions or he distorted 
reality in the name of convenience. Either way, the territorial governor inadvertently 
instigated the notion that the Arapaho and Shoshone could and perhaps even should live 
on the same reservation.  
 Arapaho and Shoshone leaders finally met at Camp Brown in February 1870, 
with little result.72 Washakie agreed to a lasting peace with the Arapaho, and even 
allowed them passage through Shoshone lands, but he absolutely denied them 
permission to settle on the Wind River permanently.73 Indian Agent Lieutenant G.W. 
Fleming (Patterson’s replacement), reported that “after a great deal of talk” he managed 
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to work out a temporary peace between the two tribal nations. He had hoped for a quick 
and easy solution, in which they would agree to share the Wind River, but the Arapaho 
wanted a reservation of their own, and Washakie passionately refused such a plan. 
Instead, Fleming “promised them [the Arapaho] nothing…knowing that it was the 
desire of the Government to settle them upon the [Shoshone’s] reservation.” 
Government officials believed that the placement of the Arapaho at the Shoshone 
Agency would be a perfect solution, because it eliminated the costly and painstaking 
process of creating an additional reservation. From the outside, it appeared as though 
the Shoshone had plenty of land, and since the Arapaho wanted to live in the area 
anyway, why not put them together? Washakie vehemently rejected this notion, because 
the Shoshone proudly claimed the region as their own and did not want to share it with 
their former attackers. Additionally, the Arapaho desperately wanted a reservation of 
their own, but they were running out of time. Settling with the Shoshone was not ideal, 
but it temporarily solved a pressing problem, as they refused relocation to the Crow 
Agency, or in South Dakota.  
For Washakie, the threat of Arapaho relocation lifted less than two months later, 
when the Arapaho attacked a mining camp near the agency. The Shoshone permitted the 
existence of nearly 5,000 white squatters on the southern side of the reservation. While 
skirmishes periodically occurred between the Shoshone and settlers in that area, for the 
most part, the two groups limited contact with one another, and remained on friendly 
terms. Following the arrival of the Arapaho, miners agitated for stronger protection, and 
in March, a restless group of young Arapaho warriors raided a mining camp near 
Atlantic City. In response to the March attack, a mob of more than 250 settlers, with the 
69 
help of a few Shoshones, brutalized two peaceful Arapaho camps on the road to Lander. 
This outbreak of violence, in conjunction with a feeble peace agreement with the 
Shoshone, prompted the departure of the Arapaho from the Wind River in search of 
safer accommodations.74  
Chiefs Medicine Man, Friday, Littleshield and Sharp Nose led their people to 
Fort Fetterman and later wintered at Fort Laramie in 1870. Scarcity of game and the 
absence of a reservation prompted an unwanted move to the Red Cloud Agency in 
South Dakota. The Arapahos’ stay with the Lakota was not a pleasant one. Chief Red 
Cloud and his people tried to dominate the Arapaho, who stayed away from the agency 
as much as possible. In 1872 and 1873, Arapaho hunting parties violently clashed with 
Anglo-American settlers, tarnishing their reputation with federal officials. Black Coal 
sought help from the agency and military officers in the region, to secure provisions and 
continue reservation negotiations. In turn, Governor Campbell worked with the 
Arapaho, and attempted to negotiate a position for them somewhere else in Wyoming. 
Campbell suggested to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that “Under the 
circumstances perhaps the only thing left to permit them to occupy is the country about 
Casper, provided a definitely ascertained portion of that country North of the North 
Platte can be set aside for them.” However, Arapaho leaders deemed this location 
unacceptable, as it was, in their estimation, far too close to their former Lakota allies. 
But as more settlers moved into the area, the Arapaho faced fewer and fewer options.75  
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As the Arapaho desperately sought a reservation of their own, the Shoshone 
continually resisted relocation to theirs. Washakie preemptively moved off the Wind 
River in anticipation of Lakota attacks in the spring of 1870. Until the government held 
up its end of the 1868 treaty, (i.e. agency buildings and proper provisions), Washakie 
insisted that he would not permanently locate on the Wind River. Agent Fleming’s 1870 
report indicated that the Shoshone “seem willing to remain on the reservation and farm 
whenever the Government carries into effect their treaty, and can give them the 
necessary protection. They insist that their agency is still at [Fort] Bridger until the 
promised buildings are erected, and farming implements furnished them to work 
with.”76 Once again, Washakie preferred the comfort of the established Fort Bridger 
over the remoteness of the Wind River. By November of 1870, the Shoshone Agency 
operated out of Camp Brown where the Shoshone returned to receive their annual goods 
and set up winter camps.77  
By the early 1870s, the Shoshone, with yet another new Indian Agent, 
successfully, but seasonally, inhabited the Wind River. Yet, the problem of reservation 
squatters persisted. After touring the region with General Augur, Governor Campbell 
reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that “Many complications are arising 
on account of the failure of the government to carry out the terms of the Treaty. During 
our visit to the Valley we found that settlers were and had been crowding onto it taking 
up claims and on some instances cultivating the soil and raising vegetables &c, to sell to 
the miners in the Sweetwater Gold Mines.” Campbell blamed the “fact that nothing has 
been done towards carrying out the Treaty – [which] has led to the assumption that the 
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Government did not intend to directly observe it and that settlers would be permitted to 
occupy the land.”78 In part, their existence relied upon the beneficence of Washakie, but 
mostly the illegal residents remained because of the ineptitude of military personnel at 
Camp Brown, and the resilient determination of the settlers. In February 1870, 
Campbell informed the Secretary of the Interior that only the use of military force 
would permanently remove the white miners and settlers from the area. At the same 
time, Campbell hoped that if he fulfilled the 1868 treaty obligations, (including the 
promised but not yet delivered annuities, rations, and agency buildings) that the 
Shoshones would be willing to make a land cession for the area already occupied by 
Anglo-American interests. 
Brunot Agreement 
On June 1, 1872, Congress authorized Felix Brunot, chairman of the Board of 
Indian Commissioners, to negotiate with Washakie and the Shoshone. Initially, Brunot 
attempted to arrange a trade: the southern part of the reservation which miners already 
occupied, for a section north of the reservation’s current boundary. Washakie rejected 
this proposal for several reasons. First, he believed that the land north of the reservation 
belonged to the Crow, and above all else, the Shoshone leader did not want to make 
additional enemies with the surrounding tribal nations. In addition, Washakie thought 
the land was unsuitable for hunting or subsistence farming, which negated its feasibility 
for long term residence. He also pointed to the unfulfilled promises of the 1868 treaty, 
and deplored the poor condition of agency buildings and the current state of reservation 
affairs. Expressing a desire for more agency structures, including homes in which his 
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people could live, Washakie explained, “I would like to have houses here. I do not like 
to live in lodges.” While bemoaning their transitory shelters, the leader also reminded 
federal officials of their necessity, “I am afraid of the Sioux. They come here and hunt 
for scalps in this valley.” By connecting permanent buildings with security, Washakie 
subtly reminded treaty negotiators of the ramifications of unfulfilled promises. As a 
show of good faith, Washakie agreed to reside more permanently on the reservation, if 
the government provided the Shoshone with more fortified structures and homes.79 
With regard to the proposed treaty, instead of an exchange, Washakie wished to 
“sell the land for cattle.” The Shoshone leader and his people planned to “corral them 
and milk them. We would herd them like we do our horses.”80 Brunot did not expect 
this response and protested that he only had the authority to exchange land for the area 
in question. To barter cattle for reservation acreage seemed, to Brunot, an unequal trade 
in favor of the government. To test Washakie’s resolve on the issue, Brunot offered 
$5,000 worth of cattle for five years, a pittance for the land.81 After consulting with 
other subchiefs, Washakie accepted. Stunned by this turn of events, Brunot asked the 
other leaders to voice their agreement. Still unsatisfied, he requested that treaty 
negotiations continue the following day to ensure that the Shoshone did not change their 
minds.82  
Brunot probably believed he had just negotiated the theft of Indian lands, but the 
Shoshone viewed the cession differently. They did not want the land north of the 
                                                 
79
 “Council with Shoshone Indians,” September 28, 1872, GRHC, Box 10, Folder 9.  
80
 Hebard, Washakie, 142.  
81
 In 1950, the Indian Claims Commission revisited this land cession and termed the price “inadequate 
and unconscionable.” The Shoshone won a considerable settlement, and each enrolled Shoshone received 
$377, net amount. Virginia Cole Trenholm, “The Shoshones and the Great Father,” Bits and Pieces 4, no. 
4 (1968): 1. 
82
 “Council with Shoshone Indians,” September 28, 1872, GRHC, Box 10, Folder 9. 
73 
reservation. While Brunot and other government officials viewed it as unoccupied, and 
therefore available, Washakie knew that the Crow claimed the land in question. Their 
peace with the Crow remained intact, and Washakie wanted to keep it that way. The 
Shoshone also needed cattle more than additional and unwanted territory. The 
acquisition of cattle allowed the Shoshone to raise food for their families and develop 
the reservation on their own terms. Pressure to farm the reservation appeared constantly, 
but ranching, a profession successfully adopted by white settlers in the area, proved a 
viable alternative to working the land. Finally, removing squatters from the reservation, 
or removing the reservation from the settlers as it were, reduced tension between the 
Shoshone and the surrounding community.  
In a powerful demonstration of political self-rule, Washakie negotiated his first 
land cession. On September 26, 1872, Felix Brunot, Washakie, his subchiefs Bazil and 
Norkuk, along with one hundred nineteen Shoshone men signed the “Brunot Cession.” 
In the agreement, the Shoshone ceded the southern portion of their reservation, nearly 
one-third their total acreage, in exchange for $25,000 in cattle to be distributed over a 
period of five years. In addition, Washakie received a salary of five hundred dollars a 
year for five years.83 This discretionary fund allowed Washakie to fulfill reciprocal 
obligations to his people, and oversee the establishment of cattle ranching on the Wind 
River. Unfortunately, the endeavor proved more difficult than Washakie originally 
envisioned. The Shoshone struggled to keep their livestock under control and on their 
reservation. Constant raids by Lakota and Cheyenne bands reduced the herd’s number 
and perpetually angered Washakie. By moving permanently onto the reservation and 
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securing his herd, the Shoshone leader finally committed his people to fulltime 
residency on the Wind River. But in order to assure the safety of his people, Washakie 
and his warriors dedicated their time to the establishment of military control over their 
new home.  
Bates Battle of 1874 
On the Wind River, the year 1874 started just like so many others. In the spring, 
a group of errant Arapaho warriors, joined by other Lakota and Cheyenne rebels, raided 
Shoshone camps for cattle and supplies. However, these raids, in conjunction with the 
arrival of General Philip Sheridan to the reservation, sparked a unique series of events 
that led to an epic clash between the Arapaho and Shoshone. Though sent to inspect 
Fort Washakie (previously named Camp Brown), Sheridan planned to relax and fish in 
the mountains over the Fourth of July weekend. But he arrived, just as word of the 
Arapaho’s proximity to the reservation reached the Shoshone Agency. Sheridan, a 
battletested general of the Civil War, had considerable experience brutally suppressing 
Indian uprisings, and upon hearing the news, he eagerly changed his holiday plans. 
Nelson Yarnall, a blacksmith for the agency, quipped that Sheridan cancelled the 
fishing trip “and suggested that it might be well instead to send out a scouting party, and 
try to fish up some of the hostile Indians who had been making so much trouble.”84 
Sadly, the Arapahos camped near the Wind River were not responsible for the recent 
attacks. In addition, Arapaho leaders adamantly denounced their former ties to the 
Lakota, but in a moment of extreme prejudice and patriotic fervor it did not matter. 
In late June, two Shoshone youths first spotted the unwanted camp, and stole 
away from the site with two Arapaho horses. Upon their return to the agency, the young 
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men reported the location of the Arapaho camps on the “No Wood,” a branch of the 
Bighorn River approximately 90 miles from Fort Washakie.85 In response, General 
Sheridan named Captain A.E. Bates commanding officer of the mission, and the agency 
prepared for battle. Bates enlisted Washakie’s help, and together they secured 
somewhere between 125 and 166 warriors. Twenty-five to thirty Shoshone men also 
enlisted as scouts for ninety days under the command of Lieutenant Robert H. Young.86 
The cavalry, with the newly recruited Shoshone warriors, travelled under cover of 
nightfall, and reached the Arapaho camp on July 3rd. From their vantage on the ridge 
above, Yarnall and the others could see tepees “close together and in a circle, between 
the open points of the ridge. The circle of tepees formed a sort of corral in which a great 
many of their ponies were picketed, in some instances 5 or 6 ponies being tied to one 
pin.”87 With their target in sight, the Shoshone prepared for war. 
Dr. Thomas Maghee, the post surgeon, later recounted the bustle of activity 
before the battle. The warriors hurried about “donning their war dresses and mounting 
their war ponies. Galloping to the immediate vicinity, the cavalry dismounted…The 
tumult was now getting beyond all bounds and, in order not to lose the advantage, a 
charge on the run was ordered. In the fated village all was silent as death, the 
inhabitants quietly sleeping.”88 Arapaho horses, startled by the attack, pulled free of 
their tethers and stampeded. The disorder that followed reached near pandemonium, as 
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the unsuspecting targets fiercely joined the fight. Bullets flew through the air, children 
and unarmed women fled as the gulch filled with smoke. Gunfire crackled through the 
stillness of the morning, as the Arapaho struggled to maintain a defensible position by 
climbing up the cliffs near the camp hoping to gain the advantage of firing down upon 
their attackers. 89 The battle lasted approximately four hours, and ended when Captain 
Bates and Washakie retreated from the area, as smoke signals, presumably to the Lakota 
or Cheyenne in the area, hastened the retreat.  
Though the Arapaho boasted nearly 200 warriors, the attack clearly damaged 
their camp. By army estimates, twenty-four Arapahos lay dead and two hundred horses 
captured. Bates and his men suffered far fewer losses, including the two Shoshones who 
died and three who lay wounded, as well as two cavalry privates dead, two wounded. 90 
Once the cavalry and Shoshone returned to camp, news of their victory spread 
throughout the region. Indian Agent, James Irwin, praised the bravery of the Shoshone 
warriors and justified the attack in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
Military commanders did not speak as highly of their Indian companions, however. 
General Edward Ord blamed the “partial victory” on the Shoshone because “their shouts 
and yells prevented a complete surprise of the enemy, and, with the exception of 
Washakie and his best men, [they] failed to co-operate with the troops.”91 Captain R.A. 
Torrey echoed this sentiment in his report. He placed the Arapaho’s survival with “the 
failure of the Shoshones to perform the part allotted, the enemy obtained possession of a 
high sandstone bluff…which made a most admirable position for defense and 
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commanding the village.” 92 In fact, nearly every ranking officer believed that the 
Shoshone performed inadequately.  
Upon further analysis, these negative remarks illustrate the divergent military 
goals of the Shoshone and the United States Cavalry. Washakie and his men eagerly 
trained with American military forces, learning defensive tactics and drills. This 
experience enabled the Shoshone to hone their military skills so that they could 
effectively defend their homelands, and earn war honors in battles against the Arapaho, 
Lakota and Cheyenne. Status earned in battle did not require total submission from their 
opponents, however, and Washakie sagely recognized that honorable behavior on the 
battlefield directly influenced the Shoshone’s relationship with surrounding tribal 
nations. The Shoshone did not press their advantage or attempt to crush their enemies, a 
practice that United States Calvary units in the American West frequently employed.93 
Indeed, the savage attacks at Bear River and Sand Creek, illustrate the brutality of some 
American military commanders, including General Philip Sheridan who once famously 
stated, “The only good Indian I ever saw was a dead Indian.”  
In their defense, Agent Irwin spoke highly of Shoshone warriors later that fall. 
After talking with Washakie, as well as looking over the reports of Bates, Torrey and 
Ord, Irwin wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “I would say with all respect to 
Capt. Bates who is a gentleman, and a soldier, that he did not give those Indians who 
did fight, and stood by him, the credit they deserved.”94 Recognizing their sacrifice, he 
noted “the fact that they lost in killed and wounded just as many as the white soldier 
did,” fully blaming the sloppy commanding style of Captain Bates. In the end, Irwin 
                                                 
92
 R.A. Torrey to the Assistant Adjutant General, July 7, 1874, GRHC, Box 60, Folder 4.  
93
 Shimkin, “Eastern Shoshone,” 325. 
94
 James Irwin to Edward Smith, CIA, September 18, 1874, GRHC, Box 60, Folder 4. 
78 
and Washakie determined that Bates failed to secure the trust of the Shoshone, who said 
“they became alarmed at Bates’ desperate charging and firing, and believed he would 
kill them as soon as Arapahos, as their man had no distinguishing marks between them, 
and that it was an up hill [sic] business to fight the Arapahoes, and watch their 
dangerous friend.”95 Local settlers in the area also praised the Shoshone for their 
contributions to the fight. An “eye witness” to the battle wrote a letter to the editor of 
the Cheyenne Daily Leader complimenting Washakie and his warriors.96 Another settler 
remarked that “it is rather an encouraging thing to hear that the vagabond Arrapahoes 
[sic] have been severely chastised by the Shoshone.” The author went on to encourage 
further military behavior in the hope that “we shall be able to chronicle more conflicts 
between these dusky nomads, and that victory may perch upon the medicine pole of the 
Shoshone every time they meet their red enemies.”97  Over the next year, miners and 
settlers in the area praised the Shoshone on a job well done and even encouraged more 
military pursuits. 
This decisive victory signaled the beginning of a new era on the Wind River. 
For a time, Shoshone military prowess, with the help of government personnel in the 
area, kept raiding parties at bay. In turn, citizens of the tribal nation finally agreed to 
settle on their reservation permanently, and began farming in fulfillment of their treaty 
stipulations. For the Arapaho, however, the defeat at Bates Battle devastated their 
immediate plans for a reservation in Wyoming. Disheartened by the attack, the Arapaho 
once again retreated from the Wind River, and made their way back to the Red Cloud 
Agency. Agent Irwin reported that for the Arapaho, “This is no doubt the worst 
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punishment they have ever received.” Failing to recognize the devastation of this loss, 
the Agent cast aside all responsibility for their wellbeing and callously added, “but they 
have brought it upon themselves and richly deserve it. It is hard to say what may follow. 
If they can get sufficient reinforcement they may give us a severe visit before snow 
files. I would respectfully suggest that in the interest of humanity and civilization those 
Indians be compelled to go and live on the reservation.”98 Despite his fears of 
retaliation, the Arapaho were in no position to strike. Indeed, the year 1874 is referred 
to, even today, as “The Year They Killed the Arapahoes” by their Cheyenne and Lakota 
allies. 99 In many ways the Bates Battle signified a turning point for the Arapaho, a 
moment of crisis, in which they adapted to their bleak situation and united under a 
common goal: a Wyoming reservation.    
A Temporary Solution  
 Over the next two years the Arapaho struggled to survive. Any alliance with the 
Lakota seemed out of the question, considering their increased attacks against military 
personnel and settler communities. Without a reservation of their own, and no 
remaining Native alliances, the Arapaho faced a bleak future. In 1875, depleted rations 
at the Red Cloud Agency could scarcely provide for the Lakota people, let alone the 
Arapaho. In a show of good faith, Arapaho chiefs joined military camps and avoided 
alliances with Cheyenne and Lakota rebels. During the stunning clash of United States 
and Native forces at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, the Arapaho distanced themselves 
from the fight. An Arapaho later told anthropologist Sister Inez Hilger, “We were afraid 
of the Sioux and Cheyennes. The Sioux fought Custer. The Arapahoes took up the cause 
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of Custer.”100 In reality, very few Arapaho warriors fought on either side. For the most 
part, the leadership of the tribal nation kept their people out of battle, in an attempt to 
foster a budding relationship with military personnel in the American West, and it 
worked. Their unwillingness to join the Lakota at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, 
considerably improved their standing with the military community.  
In the winter of 1876, the Arapaho secured a powerful ally, General George 
Crook. The military commander passed through the area, recruiting Indian scouts in an 
upcoming campaign against errant Lakota and Cheyenne rebels who refused to return to 
their reservations. Head chiefs Sharp Nose, Black Coal, Six Feathers, White Horse, Old 
Eagle and Yellow Bear eagerly joined.101 The position of Indian Scout afforded the 
Arapaho a place of good standing with the United States military, as well as a constant 
source of food and supplies. For their assistance, the scouts received clothing, 
provisions, guns, ammunition, and a secure camp near Fort Robinson, Nebraska. They 
also achieved an elevated status within the tribe, as both warriors and politicians, 
through their interaction with military officers.102 By working with, rather than against 
the military, the Arapaho avoided the threat of removal to undesired reservation 
locations, or to Indian Territory with their southern relatives. Arguably the most 
important benefit of working for Crook, however, was the opportunity to develop an 
alliance with the powerful general, and the face-time to negotiate for a reservation on 
their own terms. By autumn of the following year, the Arapahos achieved a modicum of 
success in their campaign for a reservation, as General Crook secured positions for a 
few Arapaho leaders, as part of a delegation to Washington D.C.  
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At the meeting, Black Coal and Sharp Nose, the two chiefs chosen to speak for 
the Arapaho, requested a reservation in Wyoming. The leaders resisted any attempts at 
removal to Indian Territory with their southern relatives, an increasing threat from 
Indian Agents as they failed to settle on one of the proffered locations. At the delegation 
both leaders spoke passionately for their people, as they emphasized the Arapaho 
commitment to peace with the United States, and a need to remain near their seasonal 
hunting grounds. Black Coal expressed his desire to remain on the Northern Plains, 
“The Great Spirit put us on this earth and gave us the ground to live on. I claim the 
country where I came from just as my friends here. I was born there and all that ground 
belongs to me the same as the property here belongs to your people…you ought to take 
pity upon us and give us good land, so that we can remain upon it and call it our 
home.”103 Both Black Coal and Sharp Nose recognized that they could no longer 
negotiate for the perfect location. They wanted to stop wandering the region without 
government support, and needed a reservation immediately. Given this pressing 
situation, the two leaders adopted a rhetorical strategy already articulated by Governor 
Campbell and numerous Indian Agents, as they requested permission to settle with the 
Shoshone. The long time ramifications of this strategy forever altered the 
Arapaho/Shoshone relationship. 
 At the delegation, both Black Coal and Sharp Nose expressed a desire to move 
onto the Wind River. Black Coal stated that the Arapaho “would like to join the Snakes 
[Shoshone] – the Snakes are a small tribe…We cannot talk their language but make 
ourselves understood by signs; after a while we will learn to talk their language a little; 
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and we will get along very well.”104 He recognized their recent antagonism, but insisted 
that the two tribal nations could live peaceably. Similarly, Sharp Nose praised the 
Shoshone as a “small tribe and friendly, and we desire to be with them. You ought to 
give me good land, where I can make my home…we are a small tribe, and what I want 
to join these Snakes for is that they are a small tribe and I am a small tribe.”105 The 
actual extent of their peacemaking efforts is questionable, given the Bates Battle just 
three years prior, but much can be learned from their requests. Sharp Nose and Black 
Coal both mentioned the relative size of the Arapaho and Shoshone tribal nations as 
justification for their position on the Wind River. The Shoshone possessed a rather large 
reservation in the 1870s. By pointing out the Shoshones’ population, the leaders implied 
that there would be plenty of room on the Wind River for the Arapaho. The chiefs also 
recognized the tarnished past between the Arapaho and Shoshone, but insisted that they 
could settle these difference. More importantly, the leaders avoided discussing the 
permanency of this request, as they bargained for more time to negotiate their final 
reservation location. On the other hand, federal officials believed that the tribal nation’s 
move to the Wind River could be a simple and final solution to the “Arapaho problem.” 
Arapaho oral histories indicate that Black Coal and Sharp Nose intended their 
time at the Shoshone Agency to be brief. Accordingly, they obtained permission, from 
Washakie and the Shoshone, for only a short stay on the way to their new home. 
Arapaho language instructor, Wayne C’Hair explains, that in 1877, “The Arapahos were 
brought here by the U.S. Calvary. But first we asked Washakie, Chief Washakie, if we 
could stay here for a while, until we got our own reservation and he said ‘Yeah that 
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would be good.’” 106 In fact, two delegations courted Washakie and the Shoshone. First, 
Arapaho chiefs Sharp Nose, Friday (a friend from Washakie’s youth) and Medicine 
Man first counseled with the Shoshone about the matter, and the Arapaho eventually 
secured temporary permission.107 Former Shoshone Agent James Irwin, then stationed 
at the Red Cloud Agency, also travelled to the Wind River and sought permission from 
Washakie. Irwin reported that, at first, he faced overwhelming resistance from the 
Shoshone about the Arapahos’ temporary placement, as they initially believed that the 
Agent simply wanted to secure peace between the two tribal nations. Irwin “told them 
[the Shoshone] distinctly that the President had not the remotest thought of placing the 
Arapahoes on the reservation of the Shoshones – that that was not the design of the 
government at all. That all that was desired was for the Shoshones to make peace with 
said tribe – and that the Department would have a piece of land, near the mouth of the 
Sweetwater set apart for the Arapahoes.”108 These assurances, along with the insistence 
that the Arapaho would starve to death if not located temporarily with the Shoshone, 
pressured Washakie into allowing the Arapaho onto the reservation.  
Agent Irwin then reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, regarding the 
situation. He explained, “They [the Arapahos] and the Shoshones both understand that 
the Arapahoes are to hunt this winter and be located on or near the Sweetwater in the 
spring.”109 Privately, Irwin expressed his distaste for this plan, in a letter to Shoshone 
Agent James Patten, “The Arapahoes should have a reservation but the government has 
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no right to filch it off the Shoshones and I would like you to tell the Shoshones to spurn 
any such proposition as an outrage upon them and their rights.”110 Irwin, who facilitated 
the Arapaho’s removal from the Red Cloud Agency, advised Patten to “protect the 
Shoshones from all incrochments [sic] in every direction.”111 In conducting his own 
investigation, James Patten confirmed his suspicions, as he located deception within the 
highest ranks of the OIA, including the fraudulent claims made by the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, Ezra Hayt, in his 1877 annual report. Hayt noted that “permission was 
given the Northern Arapahoes to join the Shoshones on the Wind River reserve in 
Wyoming. In a formal council held last month by Agent Irwin with the Shoshones, their 
consent to the arrangement desired by the Arapahoes was obtained, and the removal of 
the latter is now in progress.”112 Both Patten and Irwin denounced the Commissioner’s 
report as entirely fraudulent, as it implied the Arapahos permanent relocation to the 
Wind River. 
 Patten incredulously wrote to the Commissioner, “Now certainly there has been 
a mistake made some where as Dr. Irwin wrote to me personally,” about the Shoshone 
and Arapaho situation. In their correspondence, Irwin told Patten that the placement of 
the Arapaho onto the Shoshone Agency “must not be without the Shoshones are agreed, 
and even then it is not fair – The Shoshones Reservation belongs to them, as much as 
any man’s farm belongs to him.”113 Irwin warned the Commissioner that ill feelings 
existed between the Arapaho and Shoshone, and that their cohabitation would place 
unnecessary strain upon the two tribal nations. Showing very little regard for these 
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concerns, Commissioner Hayt ignored the repeated protests of Arapaho and Shoshone 
leaders, as well as the objections of Agents Patten and Irwin, believing that joint 
occupation simply, and economically, resolved the situation.  
Both Agent James Patten, and former Shoshone Agent James Irwin, recognized 
the criminality of the Arapahos “temporary” relocation to the Wind River. The language 
of the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, expressly allowed for cohabitation of the Wind 
River, but only “for such other friendly nations or individual Indians as from time to 
time they may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit amongst 
them.”114 In this case, the Shoshone refused to share their reservation and did not 
consider the Arapaho among their “friendly nations,” yet the government, driven by the 
simplicity of this plan, arranged to move the Arapaho to the Wind River. Today, 
Shoshone oral histories clearly recount the fraudulent claims made by government 
officials. Cultural historian, Reba Teran, iterates the remembered Shoshone perspective 
as one in which, “The Government was the one that pulled the trick on us. They were 
the ones who deceived us… they come along in 1878 and the Arapaho were coming 
through…and they asked if they could stop here.”115 The Shoshone remember Arapaho 
arrival as one of the most pivotal events in reservation history, as a time in which 
government interference and deception changed everything. Initially, agents pressured 
Washakie into allowing the Arapaho a longer stay than previously agreed upon, and 
slowly the hope of Arapaho relocation faded away. Though the number of claims upon 
the Wind River Valley diminished from 1851 to 1878, the region remained a fiercely 
contested space long after the Arapahos’ arrival. 
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Chapter 2 – Reservation Life 
On October 31, 1877, most of the Northern Arapaho, under the guidance of 
Chief Sharp Nose, moved to the Shoshone Agency.1  Before they arrived, Indian Agent 
James Patten refuted the practicality of the Arapaho’s temporary stay, and feared that 
violence would erupt as “a large majority of the [Shoshone] tribe, including Washakie 
the Chief, and nearly all the leading men…strongly object to their coming, and of 
dividing their reservation with any other tribe.”2 But still they came, forced onward by 
government agents and circumstance. On March 18, 1878, Chief Black Coal and the 
remaining Arapaho finally settled on the Wind River. First person accounts indicate that 
the later arrivals created quite an uproar among the Shoshone, as women secured their 
children and a few men even prepared for battle. Agent Patten noted, “The Arapahoes 
also became frightened at one time by observing demonstrations in the Shoshone 
village, at a distance, which they thought meant trouble. They believed it the more 
readily, as they had heard it rumored before they left home, that Washakie had said that 
if the Arapahoes came to the reservation without a proper escort, that he would fire on 
them, and everything considered it is remarkable that trouble was avoided.” 
Instrumental in deescalating the situation, Washakie and Patten rushed out to prevent an 
impromptu battle between the two parties.3 To avoid further confrontations, the 
Shoshone Agent located the Arapaho to an area near the junction of the Big Wind and 
Little Wind Rivers on the eastern edge of the reservation.4  
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This encounter lingered over the valley as a bad omen, however, as the two 
tribal nations negotiated their cohabitation. The Arapaho and Shoshone citizenry, 
unfamiliar with the complicated bureaucracy of the federal government, struggled to 
understand the necessity of their situation. Frontiersman Edward Farlow recounted in 
his memoir, “I was there when the Arapahos were coming in and it was hard for the 
Shoshone to keep from fighting them. Had it not been for the great Chief Washakie and 
his complete control over them, they would have driven the Arapahos off the 
reservation in a short time.”5 Rather than encourage violence, Washakie frequently met 
with Agent Patten, and forcefully objected to the presence of Arapaho people on his 
reservation. The chief pledged continual peace with the Shoshone’s former enemy, but 
denied the Arapaho any land rights to the Wind River, and became increasingly alarmed 
when they established settlements on the eastern edge of the reservation.6 Believing that 
the Arapaho would bring trouble to the Wind River, Washakie voiced his concerns 
about the actual length of the proposed, “temporary,” stay and requested that the 
“interlopers” be removed to their own reservation, as soon as possible.  
Complicating matters further, both tribal nations faced increased pressure to 
adopt a more “American” lifestyle. Assimilationist ideologies permeated the 
reservation, through their Indian Agents, in three general areas: agriculture, Christianity 
and education. These three foci, Office of Indian Affairs personnel believed, would 
break Native Americans of their “barbarous” ways and bring them into the fold of 
“American” life. In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment (or Dawes) Act, 
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adding private property ownership to the list of civilizing influences on the Wind River, 
and other reservation across the country. After years of indeterminate status on the 
reservation, the Arapaho accepted allotments, thereby securing their hold of reservation 
lands, a move that enraged Washakie and the Shoshone people. Only the inadvertent 
adjudication of the matter by federal officials during land cession negotiations in 1891, 
tempered, but did not permanently resolve the dispute.   
In general, Arapaho and Shoshone people struggled greatly during their first 
twenty years together on the Wind River, the darkest period in reservation history. 
During this era, the leaders of both tribal nations constantly negotiated with federal 
officials on behalf of their people, but it was the citizenry, at the behest of their leaders, 
who endured difficult reservation conditions, uneasy alliances and assimilationist 
policies. Unfortunately, the lives of these everyday inhabitants are almost completely 
lost to historians today. However, we can infer, from surviving stories of earliest days 
of the reservation, the overwhelming support that Arapaho and Shoshone citizens gave 
their leaders, as well as a glimpse of daily life for the members of both tribal nations. 
Throughout this early reservation era, people of the Wind River forged reservation 
communities, combatted assimilationist policies, and adapted to stark changes to their 
way of life. Though linked by these common experiences, the Arapaho and Shoshone 
also found that the instability of this era often placed them at cross purposes.  
From 1878 to 1891, the Arapaho and Shoshone employed a variety of strategies 
to combat reservation destitution. At times, the two tribal nations joined together, 
hoping that cooperation would better protect their interests. Often, however, the 
Arapaho and Shoshone instigated calculated campaigns against their neighbors, as they 
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competed over resources and land. Despite, or perhaps because of, the difficult history 
between them, the Arapaho and Shoshone relationship changed during this period. 
Facing dire circumstances, the rival tribal nations ultimately forged an uneasy alliance 
when faced with assimilation policies, starvation, and disease. Though the tenuous ties 
that bound the Arapaho and Shoshone together often frayed, the two tribal nations 
maintained a working relationship with each other, as they dealt with social reformers, 
negotiated with federal officials and developed a strategy for mutual survival.  
Farming  
In the 1870s, the Shoshone first attempted farming. Seasonal hunts ensured their 
subsistence, so the Shoshone farmed, not because they truly yearned to work the 
ground, but because they sought to fulfill their treaty obligations. Local men, including 
a frontiersman, Finn Burnett, accepted paid positions on the reservation to assist in the 
Shoshones’ agricultural endeavors. Burnett, the “boss farmer,” later recounted to 
biographer Robert B. David, the Shoshones’ first agricultural experiment. “The long-
awaited plows and harness arrived for the use of those on the reservation. On an 
appointed day, the Shoshoni began to arrive at the office of the agent to learn the white 
man’s methods of plowing. The entire proceeding was amusing to the Indians. Helped 
by white men, they finally had the horses harnessed to the plows, and all drove to the 
field where they formed a long line.” The Shoshone waited, tense with anticipation. 
According to the plan, as Burnett described it, the Shoshone held for a signal on which 
they would lead the plows down the field. But, as a great yell echoed across the open 
prairie, “There was pandemonium everywhere. Here, a pony balked; there, a plow bit 
too deeply. In another place, three teams came together in a crashing mess of flying 
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scraps and whirling handles, while beyond the mixup could be seen a dozen pairs of 
horses running away with broken harness flying, and plows leaping behind them.” 
Much to the dismay of their agency tutors, the Shoshone “were treating the spectacle 
with great amusement. Laughing uproariously, they were betting which team of 
runaways would be leading at the farthest limits of the field.”7 This ridiculous episode 
further convinced the Shoshone that farming should be left up to agency personnel.  
Despite the comedic start to the Shoshones’ agricultural experiment, certain 
lands proved quite fertile. With agency assistance and half wild ponies, the Shoshone 
harvested a bumper crop in 1872.8 Several factors limited Shoshone agricultural 
success, however. Infrequent attacks by Lakota, Arapaho and Cheyenne warriors, as 
well as unpredictable weather patterns, grasshoppers, and a waning desire for the 
venture, deterred agricultural efforts. In 1872, Agent James Irwin reported to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs that although Washakie wanted “to settle down to farm, 
raise stock and have schools as the government was to have him do so…it would place 
his people in a defenseless attitude and subject them perhaps to a massacre, and in 
parting with this really venerable Chief, he requested me to ‘talk protection all the 
time.’”9 Additionally, the limited Wyoming planting season interfered with Shoshone 
summer buffalo hunts. To the Shoshone, agricultural endeavors represented a 
contractual obligation with the United States government, not a new and exciting 
lifestyle. Seasonal hunts ensured Shoshone survival during harsh winters, while 
unpredictable reservation crops only supplemented their diet.  From an agency farmer’s 
standpoint, this seasonal practice seemed irresponsible, and Farmer Finn Burnett 
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watched the Shoshone “packed up their belongings, hitched their travois behind their 
ponies and departed in a body to pursue their annual summer hunting.”10 Indeed, for the 
first few years, agency staff ensured the success of the crops while the Shoshone left the 
region.  
The auspicious beginning of Shoshone Agency agricultural endeavors would not 
last, however. Just three years after their first successful harvest, Agent James Irwin 
noted in his annual report, that Wind River “agricultural prospects have been blighted 
the last two years by grasshoppers, but the determination of the Indians as a tribe to 
farm and raise stock is still firm.”11 Despite Irwin’s optimism, the Shoshones’ newly 
found dedication to farming actually stemmed from a shortage of food that plagued the 
reservation in the late 1870s. A vast decrease of buffalo on the Northern Plains, due in 
large part to extermination efforts promoted by the federal government, limited the 
success of Shoshone seasonal hunts. The once supplemental agricultural plots on the 
Wind River now ensured the survival of the Shoshone each winter. 12 The vast decrease 
of buffalo became especially evident during the 1880s, as the number of creatures killed 
by the Shoshone decreased from 2400 in 1882, to only ten by 1885. In recognizing the 
barriers to successful agriculture, the Shoshone also turned to cattle ranching in order to 
supplement their dwindling food plots.  
Like farming, Shoshone cattle ranching experienced several setbacks, however. 
From the time they received their herd in 1874, cattle mixed freely with animals from 
the surrounding non-Native communities. Without fences, the Shoshone herd trampled 
semi-permanent settlements and created considerable havoc for reservation inhabitants. 
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Despite Washakie’s insistence that the cattle could be herded “just like their horses,” the 
livestock appeared, to outsiders, beyond Shoshone ranchers’ control. In his annual 
report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Agent Sanderson Martin noted that the 
Shoshone’s cattle “were turned loose – improperly branded, if branded at all – into the 
charge of wild Indians who did not know the value of them, and, as a natural, if not an 
intended, consequence, were soon lost in the white man’s herd.”13 While thoroughly 
berating their stock grower skills, Agent Martin did not blame the Shoshone alone. He 
also noted that a number of rustlers, who lived near the reservation, undoubtedly stole 
some of the Shoshones’ cattle. Martin recommended that another herd be distributed to 
the tribal nation so that they could learn to become stock growers on the Wind River.14 
Dishonest cattlemen and thieves probably reduced the cattle herd, but in times of 
famine, hungry Shoshones also slaughtered the animals. Upon their agent’s 
recommendation, the Shoshone welcomed additional cattle, both to raise and to eat.  
The Arapahos’ arrival in 1878 further exacerbated food shortages already 
plaguing the reservation. Non-productive subsistence farming and the addition of 
another tribal nation, strained the Shoshones’ already insufficient supply of food. To 
remedy this increasingly difficult problem, government agents encouraged the Arapaho 
to immediately adopt an agrarian lifestyle. In doing so, they believed that Native 
farmers would curb the effects of poor ration distribution, while reinforcing their 
assimilation from “savages” to western farmers. The Arapaho welcomed the chance to 
farm at the delegation to Washington in 1877. Arapaho leader Sharp Nose stated, “I 
want to get now cows, plows and wagons, and I want to get my annuities sent there [the 
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Shoshone Agency], and my grub…I want a good piece of ground to raise a crop.”15  
Arguably, these desires reflected the negotiating strategies of Sharp Nose and Black 
Coal at the delegation, rather than a true yearning to farm. In part, they based their 
reticence to become yeoman farmers on the intermittent success of the Shoshone, but 
also the short growing season and limited access to water.  
Regardless, Arapaho citizens conducted their own agricultural experiments as 
soon as they arrived on the Shoshone Agency. In doing so, leaders of the tribal nation 
hoped to demonstrate their cooperation with government agents and be rewarded with a 
reservation of their own. But, because of insufficient Wyoming rainfall, the Arapaho’s 
initial attempts at farming failed.  In Wyoming, Anglo-American settlers, and later 
Wind River inhabitants, deemed crop production nearly impossible without the use of 
irrigation ditches, but this subject raised serious concerns about water rights issues on 
the reservation. Area settlers enjoyed downstream flows from rivers that passed through 
the Wind River Valley. Additional strain on the water supply, potentially threatened 
these non-indigenous communities.16 The 1868 Fort Bridger Treaty stated that the 
Shoshone (and by extension the Arapaho) held the right to use waters originating from, 
and those that flowed through, their lands. Without proper training and education 
however, these ditches were of little use to the Shoshone and Arapaho agricultural 
projects.17  
In many ways, cohabitation complicated life on the Wind River. Limited 
resources compounded an already strained relationship, and their Indian Agent, James 
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Patten, ignored repeated requests for additional supplies. In the summer of 1878, the 
Arapaho and Shoshone turned to Wyoming territorial governor, John W. Hoyt. On a trip 
across the state, Hoyt stopped on the reservation to better acquaint himself with 
Wyoming’s Native population, and addressed the grievances of the Arapaho and 
Shoshone people.18 In meeting separately with the leaders of the tribal nations, Hoyt 
assessed the state of the reservation and later reported the conditions to the Secretary of 
the Interior. At the meeting, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders expressed frustration with 
their agent, and the lack of provisions and services that government officials had 
previously guaranteed. Washakie reminded Hoyt that “The white man’s government 
promised that if we, the Shoshones, would be content with the little patch allowed us, it 
would keep us well supplied with everything necessary to comfortable living, and 
would see that no white man should cross our borders for our game, or for anything that 
is ours. But it has not kept its word!”19 Likewise, Black Coal expressed frustration with 
Arapaho living conditions, and questioned their agent’s qualifications, as he viewed 
Patten as “a good man, but he talks crooked and does not understand the Indian 
business. We fear he keeps for himself what belongs to us.” The Arapaho chief also 
professed considerable annoyance at the government, who “promised us a separate 
agency; but we are still under the Shoshone agent.”20 These requests for sovereign 
borders and, in the Arapaho case, a land base of their own, underscored the perpetual 
struggle between indigenous leaders and reservation agents, for the benefit of their 
citizenry.  
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In council with Hoyt, Washakie and Black Coal also demanded basic staples 
necessary for survival. First, the Shoshone leader reflected upon his tenure in the area, 
and protested, that despite all of his people’s hard work, the government,  
“does not protect us in our rights. It leaves us without the promised seed, 
without tools for cultivating the land, without implements for harvesting our 
crops, without breeding animals better than ours, without the food we still lack, 
after all we can do, without the many comforts we cannot produce, without the 
schools we so much need for our children. I say again, the government does not 
keep its word! And so, after all we can get by cultivating the land, and by 
hunting and fishing, we are sometimes nearly starved.”21  
 
Black Coal also pointed out the commitment of his people to work on the reservation, 
but only if the agreed upon resources arrived. He insisted, “My people are much hungry 
and must sell furs and even their ponies for food that was promised us. That is not 
right…We were to have farming tools and be taught how to till the land; but we have 
almost no implements at all, and there is no one to teach us how to work.”22 This 
meeting with Hoyt, allowed chieftain leadership to protest the plight of their people, but 
unfortunately the territorial governor did little to alleviate their situation. 
Starvation constantly plagued Shoshone Agency residents throughout the 1880s.  
Compounding this problem, the OIA permitted the allotment of half rations in times of 
shortage. Agent Irwin warned his superiors that the Arapaho’s arrival placed additional 
strain on his food supplies, creating a perpetual shortage. In fact, during their first year 
on the reservation, the Arapaho moved closer to the agency in a “famished condition.” 
To better accommodate the new arrivals, Irwin “called upon F.G. Burnett to 
furnish…an additional amount of fresh beef, equal to 20% of the whole quantity,” in 
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addition to twenty-five percent more flour for both tribal nations.23 Still, Irwin 
continued to receive insufficient supplies. In 1883, he issued a weekly ration of only 
four pounds of beef, one and a half pounds of flour, three ounces bacon, one and a third 
ounces of beans, two and a quarter ounces of coffee, two and three-quarter ounces sugar 
and three-fifths an ounce of baking powder per person.24 Arapaho elder Arlo Amos 
described to Loretta Fowler, the provisions given to the tribal nations on ration day, 
when “They’d go in a line and get a big slab [of] bacon, salt bacon…beans, and 
hominy, and tea, and sugar, salt, flour, baking powder – all of that.”25   
For the Arapaho and Shoshone people, these rations often meant the difference 
between starvation and survival. Leaders from both tribal nations recognized the 
importance of ration day, not only to their very existence, but also to their social 
networks. In times of famine, agency officials and reservation leaders distributed rations 
themselves, in an attempt to prevent outbreaks of violence between Arapaho and 
Shoshone citizens.26 Eventually, indigenous leaders cooperatively took charge of ration 
distribution entirely, to maintain peace on ration days. By distributing the supplies 
themselves, the leaders divided food equitably and provided additional care for the 
orphaned and elderly. This right of distribution, proved difficult to obtain, however, and 
only cooperation between the Arapaho and Shoshone ensured their control over the 
food distribution process.27  
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These measures alone did not curb starvation on the reservation. In 1883, 
Arapaho and Shoshone leaders addressed their concerns directly to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs. In protest, Washakie, Sharp Nose and Black Coal wrote “the amount 
of beef we are now receiving, about five pounds for each person a week, is not 
sufficient to keep our people from suffering with hunger…our Agent who says he is 
issuing all he is allowed to and for that reason we apply to you.”28 The leaders 
threatened to leave the reservation if their demands went unfulfilled, concluding, “we 
will be compelled to leave our gardens at least a number of us and subsist ourselves and 
families by hunting, leaving fewer people to live on the beef supplied at the Agency, in 
order that all may have enough to eat. But we all hope you will have pity on us and give 
us more beef.”29 This tactic worked, in part, because trips away from the reservation 
perpetually annoyed their Indian Agents, who insisted that Shoshone seasonal hunts 
reduced the number of able-bodied farmers for their crops. In addition, Shoshone 
Agency personnel accused some Arapahos, including Chief Sharp Nose, of venturing 
outside the reservation to pester settler communities. Residents in the nearby towns of 
Riverton and Lander constantly complained that rambunctious Indians moonlighted as 
cattle rustlers.30 Though unsubstantiated, Sharp Nose probably led many of these 
expeditions seeking additional food supplies as well as an outlet for the frustrations of 
Arapaho youth. Visitors from other reservations further complicated farming schedules 
and reduced resources. Agent Patten, fed up with these practices, recommended in his 
annual report “that Congress pass a law prohibiting all persons, including Indians, from 
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hunting and killing buffalo during the months of March, April, May, June, July, August, 
September, and October.”31 Needless to say, Congress ignored his request and the 
Arapaho and Shoshone continued to travel at their own will. 
Despite their best efforts, leaders could not avoid times of near starvation. The 
struggles of the 1880s, a period remembered as a time of great suffering by people on 
the reservation today, threatened to dismantle the Arapaho and Shoshone tribal nations. 
Male cultural and political identity, closely linked with military prowess and superb 
hunting skills, weakened under the reservation system. The vast reduction of buffalo on 
the Northern Plains and the near abandonment of the practice of raiding enemy tribal 
nations, prohibited men from demonstrating martial skills. Arapaho and Shoshone 
leaders recognized this crisis of masculinity, and secured wage work opportunities for 
men on the reservation. These jobs provided a meager wage, but allowed workers to 
express their male identity, and secure positions of hierarchical authority within the 
tribal nation. Agency officials selected chiefs as foreman to manage their workers. 
Although usually better paid, most leaders used their earnings to support others. 
Arapaho workers served as policemen, military scouts, general laborers, and farmers, 
and usually earned between $5 and $30 per month.32  
The Shoshone also engaged in wage work on the reservation. They served as 
military scouts, interpreters and farmers, but Washakie prevented his men from acting 
as policemen. According to Agent Patten, Washakie expressly “refused to engage in the 
service, claiming that the wages were too small and that the Shoshones did not need a 
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police force.” Patten then implied that Washakie believed that tribal leaders actively 
policed the Shoshone people, and doled out punishments, when necessary. Washakie’s 
refusal to participate in the force preserved the Shoshonean way of justice, and ensured 
a system of hierarchical authority on his side of the reservation. In the 1880s, the chief 
attempted to rid the entire Wind River of a police force, as he “endeavored to dissuade 
the Arapahoes from keeping up their force on their part, and says the ‘Shoshones are not 
white people.’”33 The barb against Anglo-American (and perhaps even Arapaho) justice 
systems indicated to Agent Patten that the Shoshone simply did not need a police force. 
At the same time, Arapaho chiefs continued to encourage the employment of certain 
Indian policemen, under close supervision.34  
During these early days on the reservation, agency officials believed that 
farming and reservation employment would imprint civilization upon Arapaho and 
Shoshone men. As such, women’s lives changed very little during their first few years 
on the reservation. In general, women were not as affected by the pressures of 
colonization, because reservation life afforded them similar lifestyles and 
responsibilities, including positions as indigenous healers, religious practitioners and 
keepers of the home.35 Initial assimilation attempts focused on male occupations, not 
necessarily women’s roles on the reservation, ensuring their place within Arapaho and 
Shoshone society. As assimilationist efforts escalated on reservations nationwide, 
Native women preserved cultural practices and defended their homes from Christian 
missionaries and educators, who sought to infiltrate the most intimate areas of their 
                                                 
33
 RCIA for 1879, 167-168.  
34
 Fowler, Arapahoe Politics, 85.  
35
 Julie Stidolph, “The Hand that Rocks the Cradle: Assimilation Policy and the Women of the Wind 
River Reservation, 1890-1930,” M.A. Thesis, University of Wyoming, 2008.   
 
100 
lives. Though they detested unwanted intrusions into their homes, the Arapaho and 
Shoshone also stood on the brink of starvation. Hoping to achieve more stable 
reservation conditions, leaders of both tribal nations eventually encouraged contact with 
missionaries and even advocated for reservation schools, hoping to secure powerful 
allies during such difficult times.   
Religion 
In the early 1880s, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders first turned to religious 
interests on the reservation for food and monetary support. This rather creative way of 
obtaining special provisions, ensured their peoples’ survival, but this generosity came 
with a price. Christian institutions expected Wind River Indians to adopt their faith, and 
renounce previous religious beliefs. The Arapaho and Shoshone befriended 
missionaries, but expressed hesitation about total conversion. Throughout the early 
reservation period, both tribal nations maintained a complicated balance between 
indigenous and Christian belief systems. Arapaho and Shoshone leaders convinced 
religious institutions that their people wanted to learn the ways of Christianity, and in 
return, the missionaries generously donated provisions. On the eastern side of the 
reservation, the Arapahos’ geographic proximity to Catholic missionaries prompted 
interaction, while in the west, the Episcopalian ministry placed Reverend John Roberts 
with the Shoshone.  
Father John Jutz, the first Catholic priest to live on the reservation, arrived in 
1884. Initially, Jutz hoped to secure a large number of potential converts by preaching 
to both Arapaho and Shoshone citizens. The geographical distance between the two, and 
John Roberts’ arrival a year earlier, and subsequent establishment on the western side of 
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the reservation, ultimately precluded sustained Catholic/Shoshone interaction. 
Undeterred, Jutz located near Arapaho leader Black Coal’s camp. He later recalled his 
first days on the reservation, “I began at once to pitch my tent and to put up an altar for 
Mass on the following morning. Chief Black Coal was my next door neighbor, so I 
invited him and his two wives and two children to watch me during mass.” Jutz noted 
the stark contrast of Catholic and Arapaho practices on the first night of his stay, as he 
“was awakened by the sound of a big bass drum and the ghostly incantations of the 
medicine men who were plying their skill at the home of a sick woman. I can hear that 
wierd [sic] incantation to this very day, it left such an indelible impression upon my 
memory.”36 It is perhaps this first encounter with the Arapaho faith that prompted 
Father Jutz to seek a better understanding of their culture. Accordingly, Jutz 
incorporated the Arapaho language into his religious services, and encouraged his 
successors to study the Arapaho culture, as they built their mission, St. Stephen’s.  
Over time, a unique relationship developed between the Arapaho and Catholic 
missionaries. The intense religiosity of Arapaho people did not weaken, despite their 
involvement with the priests.37 Rather, anthropologist Jeffrey Anderson argues, the 
Arapaho internalized the Christian message and developed a unique system of 
pluralism. They appropriated Christian symbols and practices, and placed them among 
their own traditions, without fully converting to the new belief system.38 In doing so, 
the Arapaho people ensured the survival of their own faith, as well as the continued 
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presence of missionaries at St. Stephen’s. Surprisingly, the missionaries did not pursue 
the idea of total conversion as part of their assimilationist campaign. Instead, Arapaho 
and Catholic leaders reinforced the syncretism of their cultures through religious 
services and the creation of a boarding school at St. Stephen’s in 1884. On several 
occasions, the mission hosted religious gatherings for the Arapaho, which included 
dinner and Indian dancing. While these celebrations ensured the continued melding of 
the Christian and Arapaho cultures, for members of the tribal nation, Catholic 
gatherings also lessened the burdens of starvation, while allowing them to participate in 
more traditional social activities, including dancing. On one such occasion, the Sisters 
of Charity, reported, 
“At 2 p.m. all were called to the large and handsome dining-room, where 200 
Arapahoe Indians were assembled to partake of a feast prepared by the untiring 
and devoted Sisters…the Indians requested to be allowed to show their 
appreciation and respect for the occasion by having one of their exceedingly 
picturesque dances in costumes…the Indian dance lasted for about two hours in 
the afternoon, to the delight of the Sisters, who had never before witnessed such 
as scene.”39 
 
While the scope of the Catholics’ support cannot be confirmed, an irritated Indian 
Agent, Thomas Jones, reported that the Arapaho received about $15,000 in cash, 
supplies and other provisions during the 1880s.40 These feasts served both Catholic and 
Arapaho interests, however. Catholic priests and sisters, in corroboration with Arapaho 
leaders, amassed a large number of followers and boasted high attendance at their 
boarding school. While for the Arapaho, the church sanctioned fantastic displays of 
their culture and reduced the threat of starvation.    
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Arapaho leaders actively pursued Catholic missionaries, not only as benefactors, 
but also as important allies in the fight for control over their part of the reservation. The 
Arapaho held the full attention of the priests, who worked and lived on the eastern side 
of the Shoshone Agency. By actively participating in the Catholic faith and boarding 
school education, Arapahos demonstrated their willingness to assimilate. However, 
leaders accepted assimilationist practices only on their own terms.  The syncretism of 
the Arapaho and Catholic faiths, as well as the tribal nation’s influence at St. Stephen’s 
boarding school, illustrates their control over the assimilation process. Additionally, 
Arapaho leaders recognized the importance of non-Native allies, and hoped that their 
relationship with the priests at St. Stephen’s would aid in the campaign for their own 
reservation.  
Unlike the Arapaho, Shoshone people initially avoided sustained contact with 
religious missionaries. Washakie recognized the necessity of forming relationships with 
men like John Roberts, but rejected the message of Christian conversion. In general, the 
Shoshone accepted the major tenants of the Christian faith, including humility and good 
will towards others, but they did not fully embrace a pluralistic religious system, like 
that of the Arapaho. Anthropologist Dimitiri Shimkin noted some instances, in which 
Shoshone and Christian beliefs merged, including alterations to the symbolism of 
certain indigenous dances. Shimkin suggested, for example, that the lessons of 
Christianity had permeated Shoshone society and led to the “profound re-orientation of 
the Sun Dance. Thus the center pole became a cross symbolic of Christ, the twelve 
poles of the twelve apostles, etc.” Besides this observation, Shimkin failed to note 
further instances of transference, and admitted that “Other institutions were much less 
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affected.”41 The Shoshone experience with Christian missionaries is markedly different 
than that of the Arapaho, and can be attributed, in part, to the differences in Catholic 
and Episcopalian practices.  
From the time of his arrival onto the reservation, John Roberts’ struggled to 
gather a following.42 The Episcopal Church, well aware of Catholic interest in the 
region, preemptively sent the reverend, ahead of Father Jutz, to secure a position for 
missionaries on the Wind River. Roberts reached the reservation during a particularly 
frigid winter in 1882-1883, as part of an eight day mail route from Cheyenne to Fort 
Washakie.43 Upon his arrival, Roberts befriended Agent James Irwin, to whom he 
submitted plans for a makeshift boarding school. Irwin, a staunch anti-Catholic, 
reinforced Episcopalian preeminence on the reservation. The agent positively reported 
of Roberts to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in August 1883, “He is a young, 
energetic man, and has rendered efficient service in the school of which he is now 
principal. A church building in the near future is prospect.”44 Despite his enthusiasm, 
Roberts struggled to gain Shoshone converts. His arrival in the dead of winter, 
precluded Shoshone travel, and though Washakie and his people professed interest in a 
reservation boarding school, they dismissed Roberts’ Christian message. He hosted 
several feasts and attempted to learn the Shoshone and Arapaho languages, but between 
1883 and 1890 he gained few converts.  
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In 1889, Sherman Coolidge, an Episcopalian minister with Arapaho lineage, 
arrived on the Wind River to assist Roberts. As a young boy, Coolidge, (his Arapaho 
name Runs-on-Top) lived with his family on the Northern Plains. When Bannocks 
attacked his village, he and his brother hid in the bushes to escape harm. Military 
officers eventually found the two boys and placed them with separate white families. 
Runs-on-Top’s adopted father, Lt. Charles A. Coolidge, and his wife Sophie, renamed 
their son Sherman, and encouraged his assimilation and education. As a young man, 
Sherman attended theological classes at Hobart College in Geneva, New York, and 
following the completion of his studies, he returned to the Wind River.45 Roberts, with 
Sherman’s help, hoped to attract more Arapaho converts, as well as increase Shoshone 
participation at the Episcopal mission. Initially, Coolidge attracted considerable 
Arapaho interest as his namesake, that of a famous great-grandfather, secured the 
attention of the Arapaho people. To better facilitate Arapaho Episcopalians, Coolidge 
moved away from Roberts Mission, and near the camps of Sharp Nose, White Horse 
and Black Coal. His success languished however, as the Catholic missionaries at St. 
Stephen’s maintained a powerful hold over the Arapaho people. Roberts remained 
stalwart in his mission to encourage Shoshone conversion, and fostered a stronger 
relationship with Washakie. By the 1890s, the elderly chief became more interested in 
Roberts’ message, and eventually he befriended the reverend. Roberts baptized 
numerous Shoshones, including Washakie, and in 1900, the reverend presided over the 
chief’s funeral.46 In later years, members of the Shoshone community increasingly 
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converted to Christianity, as Roberts’ religious message slowly infiltrated the Shoshone, 
and boarding school graduates assumed positions of leadership within the tribal nation.  
Education 
 Missionaries like Reverend John Roberts and Father John Jutz constantly 
reinforced their religious message with boarding school education. Reservation leaders 
supported these efforts for several reasons. During treaty negotiations with government 
officials, both Arapaho and Shoshone chiefs expressed a profound interest in the 
education of their children. In 1868, and again at the Brunot Cession in 1872, Washakie 
requested the establishment of government schools. At the 1877 Dakota Sioux 
delegation, Arapaho chiefs intimated similar desires. Sharp Nose voiced his support of 
education, “I want a good school house, and a good white man, to teach my children, so 
that they can learn fast.”47 For Arapaho and Shoshone leaders, education of their 
children ensured a better understanding of the dominant, non-Native culture, and further 
prepared the next generation of leadership. As part of reservation negotiations, their 
acceptance of education was conditional, however. Arapaho and Shoshone parents 
sought on-reservation government schools, which provided a solid education for 
children, near their homes. But, the procrastination of Shoshone Agency personnel in 
creating these schools frustrated the Arapaho and Shoshone.  
Desperate to prove their cooperation with government officials, Arapaho parents 
sent their children to the Carlisle Indian School in 1881. In council with Agent James 
Patten, chiefs Sharp Nose, Black Coal, Little Wolf, White Horse, Scarface and Wolf 
Moccasin stressed the symbolism of sending their children away from the reservation. 
Sharp Nose and White Horse gave their sons pipes of peace, which represented the 
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Arapahos’ intentions to live quietly on the reservation. These objects infused their 
children’s trip with meaning and purpose.48 Additionally, Black Coal wanted officials in 
Washington to understand the significance of the trip, as the Arapaho parents “have 
given our children, whom we love, into their hands. We wish also to assure you by this 
that we never more want to go on the warpath, but always live in peace.”49 Arapaho 
leaders believed that the act of sending their children to off reservation boarding schools 
reinforced their ties with government officials, and would help them secure their own 
agency. Tragically, several children died or developed illnesses while in Pennsylvania. 
Of the thirteen who left, only five children returned home alive.50  
Arapaho people, devastated by the loss of their children, strongly advocated for 
on-reservation boarding schools. Parents, who lost children or family members to the 
larger boarding school system, fully rejected further attempts to send their children 
away. Instead, the Arapaho and Shoshone welcomed missionaries, including Rev. John 
Roberts and Fr. John Jutz, because they provided an opportunity for safer, on-
reservation boarding school education. Upon his arrival, Jutz constructed a mission 
house with a chapel, kitchen, dining room and living quarters. Jutz, and later his 
successor, Father Paul Ponziglione, operated from this facility until 1888, when workers 
completed a more substantial convent.51 The Sisters of Charity opened a grade school in 
January 1888, on the site, and taught nearly ninety children, most of them Arapahos, the 
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first year.52 Likewise, John Roberts educated and boarded Shoshone children at a small 
log cabin in 1883. Three years later, completion of a new government school allowed 
for the accommodation of eighty-six pupils under Roberts’ tutelage.   
From these humble beginnings, the reservation education system grew. After a 
fire destroyed Roberts’ government school in 1890, Washakie donated one-hundred 
sixty acres of land for the purpose of establishing another, larger institution. Roberts, 
and agency personnel, encouraged both Shoshone and Arapaho students to attend the 
new, more modern facilities. The entire school campus consisted of classrooms, a gym, 
school offices, a large three story building that housed female residents, the kitchen and 
dining hall, as well as an additional building for male students, faculty and staff.53 
Shoshone Agent, John Fosher, noted in his annual report the tireless efforts of Roberts 
to educate Wind River youth, “The Government Boarding School at this Agency has 
been successfully managed by Superintendent Roberts, who has devoted his entire time 
and energy faithfully to the work.”54 Boarding school educators like Roberts, sought to 
create a learning environment in which Native children would not, and could not, return 
to their former, “uncivilized” existence. While life at the new government school, or at 
St. Stephen’s, did not traumatize children as severely as life at Carlisle, school officials 
on the reservation rigorously sought to assimilate, as well as educate their students.  
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Assimilationist educators hoped to expedite the cultural evolution of Native 
children through boarding school education.55 The first priority of Indian educators was 
to remove children from their “primitive” environment. Native children across the 
country relocated to off reservation boarding schools in places like Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, Geneva, Nebraska, and in Salem, Oregon. Boarding schools on 
reservations employed similar tactics, closer to home. On the Wind River, pupils lived 
at the school and attended classes five days a week. Some schools allowed children to 
return to their parents on the weekends; others did not, in favor of continually 
reinforced assimilationist education. Additional measures included cutting students’ 
hair, dressing them in “civilized” clothing, performing military drills and changing 
pupils’ names, all which served to reinforce the rejection of one lifeway and the 
embracement of another.  
Once at the school, educators constantly reinforced the importance of learning 
English. The adoption of the English language ensured that students heard and 
understood the dual foci of Christianity and American life. This task often proved 
difficult, as some Native children actively resisted using the English language. With 
much dissatisfaction, Agent Fosher lamented “the difficulty inducing the Indian 
Children to speak the English Language, many read and write well but will not talk yet 
understand what is said to them.”56 Boarding school graduate, Arlo Amos, vividly 
remembered the strict enforcement of English only education, “Kids never talked 
Indian. You’d get in trouble, you’d get whipped. Shoshones and Arapahoes; you 
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couldn’t have chance to learn Shoshone. And Shoshones didn’t have chance to learn 
Arapahoe. No Indian talk in school.”57 In this strictly enforced English only 
environment, educators taught the basics including reading, writing, arithmetic, science, 
and history.   
Beyond traditional elementary education, boarding school instructors sought to 
individualize Native children through work. Boys engaged in manual labor and 
developed skills including carpentry, masonry, blacksmithing, and farming. On the 
Wind River, educators taught male students dairy farming, ranching, and carpentry. The 
boarding school dairy farm became a self-sustaining facility, while the carpentry shop 
ensured the maintenance of school buildings.58 Female children also worked inside the 
school, cooking and cleaning, essentially developing the skills of a good American 
housewife. The purpose of this gendered education was to prepare Native children for 
life in an industrialized American society. Educators believed that these jobs would 
instill in their students the importance of individualism, and encourage them to seek a 
life beyond the reservation system. Few pupils left the reservation at the end of the 
nineteenth century, however, as most stayed and established homes near their families.  
Near the Wind River, several outsiders questioned the productivity of these on-
reservation boarding schools. Wyoming state legislator, Robert C. Morris remarked, 
“With but few exceptions, those Indians who have been educated at the schools here 
and returned to their homes are not an improvement on those Indians without 
education.” The schools ultimately fail to complete their mission, Morris declared, 
because “On their return to their parents they paint their faces and wear the blanket, and 
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do just what the other members of the family and tribe do.”59 In the end, Morris ignored 
the many Native benefits of on-reservation education, seeing instead, the digression of 
his state’s indigenous inhabitants. But this opinion, guided by nineteenth century racist 
ideologies, overlooked the fact that by1890, a considerable number of Arapaho and 
Shoshone children could read, write, speak and understand English. Additionally, their 
experience with non-Native educators enabled former students to effectively engage 
with their agency superintendent and government officials. Accordingly, at the turn of 
the twentieth century, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders relied heavily upon the skills of 
their boarding school educated population.  
Boarding school education on the Wind River also produced two unintended 
consequences. First, on-reservation boarding school education ensured the prolonged 
separation of Arapaho and Shoshone students. On the Wind River, the widespread 
segregation of Arapaho and Shoshone children existed, because they often attended 
different schools and lived in different regions of the reservation. As evidenced by 
Amos’ account, even those who attended the same school could not attempt to learn 
their neighbors’ language or culture. This distinct separation ensured the continued 
division of Arapaho and Shoshone people, and effectively precluded the creation of a 
unified reservation community. More importantly, instead of detribalizing the 
indigenous communities of the Wind River, this education system allowed the Arapaho 
and Shoshone to appropriate boarding school education as part of a larger campaign to 
manage reservation affairs. When tribal leaders disapproved of educational practices, 
they complained to agency officials, and pressured parents to withdraw their students.  
                                                 
59
 Robert C. Morris, Collections of the Wyoming Historical Society (Cheyenne: The Wyoming Historical 
Society, 1897), 99.  
112 
A strong friendship formed between Roberts and Washakie in the 1890s, which 
secured Shoshone cooperation at the Government Boarding School. Very few instances 
of dissention surfaced during his long tenure with the Shoshone people. The Arapaho, 
on the other hand, frequently meddled in their children’s education. In 1886, Arapaho 
parents protested the size of their school, and refused to send more students to St. 
Stephen’s until the missionaries could secure additional space.60 In 1887, Father Paul 
Ponziglione complained to his superiors that St. Stephen’s began the year with several 
boarders, “but the opposition shown against our school by our own [Arapaho] chief and 
his click [sic] has kept the parents from bringing in their children.” Arapaho leaders 
supported this show of force with the threat that they could easily enroll their children at 
the Government Boarding School. Ponziglione noted that “our Chief [Black Coal] is 
influenced by the party belonging to the Protestant School at the Agency, who as far as 
they can will not allow us to have any children at our own school.”61 Relations between 
the Arapaho and St. Stephen’s employees improved very little over the next five years. 
In 1892, the director of the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions instructed St. Stephen’s 
personnel that “rather than sacrifice the school and our interests among the Indians in 
your section, I would advise you to take immediate steps towards establishing friendly 
relations with the Indian Chief Black Coal.”62 Reservation leaders ensured the success 
or failure of boarding school educators, however, the threat of off-reservation boarding 
schools somewhat tempered this powerful hold. Additionally, the Arapaho desperately 
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sought advocates in the on-going campaign to secure their own reservation, and 
ultimately mended the rift at St. Stephen’s.  
“A Little Piece of Land” 
The Arapaho campaign for a separate reservation escalated between 1880 and 
1885, as they became increasingly impatient and disaffected with life on the Shoshone 
Agency. The Arapaho people, tired of the harassment they faced from the Shoshone, 
demanded that their leaders relocate the tribal nation to a new reservation. At the same 
time, Arapaho chieftain leadership faced an awkward position of authority, as they 
sought to secure the safety and wellbeing of their people, while at the same time 
appeasing federal agents. By adapting to reservation life, Arapaho leaders enjoyed a 
measure of maneuverability during negotiations, as attempts at farming, adoption of 
Christian religious practices and engagement with on-reservation boarding schools all 
demonstrated their willingness to work with government officials. In return, they 
expected to be relocated to the reservation promised to them by government 
representatives. With cunning and tenacity, Arapaho leaders worked within a highly 
bureaucratic system of political hierarchy and legal technicalities, while remaining true 
to their constituency, but during this period, the tribal nation also suffered the 
frustration and disappointment of several unsuccessful attempts to leave the Wind 
River. 
 From 1878 to 1885, Arapaho tribal leaders approached their campaign for 
autonomy from several angles. First and foremost, they projected a specific image to 
government officials. They wanted to be recognized as “good Indians,” who sought 
peace and easily adapted to non-Native practices. To outsiders, it appeared as though 
114 
they repeatedly accepted acculturation into modern America. Tribal leaders 
accompanied this “good Indian” image with the suggestion that although they 
maintained a well behaved and peaceful existence now, they once terrorized the 
Northern Plains. The Arapaho proudly remembered the dominance of their warrior 
society, one that promoted violence in protection of their families and homelands. In a 
letter to “President Washington,” the Arapaho used the juxtaposition of peace and 
violence against their Shoshone neighbors. Arapaho leaders expressed the necessity of a 
reservation of their own, because the Shoshone appeared belligerent, and a terrible 
influence on the Arapahos who remained “good Indians.”63 Additionally, the Arapaho 
leaders pointed to the increased propensity for violence between the Arapaho and 
Shoshone the longer they remained on the Wind River together. 
Both Indian Agents and the surrounding white community knew that the 
Shoshone posed little threat. When this strategy failed to prompt government action, the 
Arapaho played off Anglo-Americans fears of Indian depredations, particularly fear of 
the Lakota. Several Lakota and Teton Sioux visitors arrived in 1881, reuniting with 
their allies to recount war exploits of yesteryear and participate in cultural celebrations. 
Their presence sufficiently alarmed settlers in communities surrounding the reservation. 
The Arapaho maintained their willingness to adapt to reservation life and assimilating 
influences, but these visits served to sharpened their “good Indian” image by 
contrasting the Arapaho to the former behavior of their more rebellious friends. Much to 
the Arapahos’ good humor, these visits also infuriated Washakie. Mary Jackson 
English, the daughter of a military officer at Fort Washakie, remembered that “The old 
chief [Washakie] was furious when he heard that they [the Lakota] were coming again, 
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and that Red Cloud, his hated enemy, would be with them…The idea of having this 
detested tribe come up to be feted and made much of was too irritating to the Shoshone, 
and all they wanted was an opening which they would not be slow in taking advantage 
of.”64 Though angered, the Shoshone did not instigate episodes of violence during this, 
or other visits, from the Lakota or other tribal nations.  
Still, these visitors unsettled area communities. News of settler anxiety reached 
the territorial capital, and the Cheyenne Daily Leader reported that “It is hoped that Col. 
Jones [the Shoshone agent] will succeed in keeping the troublesome marauding Sioux 
off the reservation. They are a dangerous disturbing element and have several times 
caused trouble with the Arapahoes.”65 In retrospect, playing off settler fears of Indian 
depredations might have hurt, rather than aided, their cause. One could reason, that if 
the Arapaho attracted an unscrupulous element to their reservation, other Wyoming 
residents certainly would not welcome the Arapaho. In addition, settler land claims 
continued to gobble up available land in the state. The goal of securing a reservation in 
Wyoming grew increasing difficult to achieve. When these strategies failed to produce 
the desired result, Arapaho leaders turned toward General George Crook for support. 
Crook, a constant advocate for the Arapaho since their military service with him 1876, 
had promised Arapaho scouts assistance in securing a reservation. Arapaho leaders 
hoped that Crook would act as a witness to their good behavior, and use his influence as 
a military general to sway the OIA. Nearly two decades after his initial involvement 
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with the tribal nation, in 1884 Crook did not immediately rush to the Arapahos’ aid. As 
continued pleas for a reservation went unanswered tribal leaders grew desperate. 
At the same time, Shoshone Agency personnel, including Agent Colonel 
Thomas Jones, repeatedly thwarted Arapaho efforts. In his 1885 annual report to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Jones acknowledged the past history between the two 
groups, “The Shoshones and Arapahoes who occupy this reserve, being different in 
languages, habits and dispositions, and having been enemies in battle in the past, has 
rendered it absolutely necessary for me to study them closely, with the view of 
removing all obstacles in the way of their living amicably and in harmony together.” 
Noting the results of his hard work, he proudly stated “I am glad to report that this 
feeling has to a great extent disappeared, not only with the children but with the 
parents.”66 This view of the Arapaho and Shoshone relationship is only semi-accurate. 
On several occasions, during their first fifteen years together, the Arapaho and 
Shoshone worked cooperatively to achieve specific reservation goals. Yet, neither party 
had forgotten the long history between them, or wanted to permanently share the Wind 
River. Agent Jones, and other government officials, simply refused to address Arapaho 
demands for a reservation, preferring instead to boast of the harmony between the two 
tribal nations. Washakie’s frequent protests of the Arapaho presence also fell on deaf 
ears.  
In 1885, a large contingent of the Arapaho visited their new Indian Agent. 
Sanderson Martin, a former trading house operator in Philadelphia and special 
investigator for the Department of Justice, inherited the mismanaged and disorganized 
agency. Martin espoused very little patience for Arapaho and Shoshone requests, and 
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believed in guiding the reservation with a firm hand.67 After several attempts to 
persuade Martin to relocate them to a reservation of their own, Martin brutally informed 
the council chiefs that, “You can not [sic] go to Powder River. Here you must stay and 
die. So must your children.”68 Martin chided those Arapaho present, over one hundred 
in number, for their persistent behavior and instructed them to “go to work or starve.” 
The agent reminded the Arapaho, that at the delegation of 1877, they requested a place 
with the Shoshone, and then commanded them to go back to their fields, to “go to work 
and stop begging.”69 The brutal repression of their request deeply disappointed the 
Arapaho. Martin crushed nearly two decades of reservation negotiations with 
governmental officials and Indian Agents. The Arapaho returned to their fields, 
disheartened but not defeated. Their leaders regrouped and shifted focus towards 
securing federally recognized land rights to the Wind River instead.  
Allotment  
The General Allotment Act of 1887 dramatically changed life on the Wind River 
for Arapaho and Shoshone citizens. Author of the bill Senator Henry L. Dawes 
promoted the act with his faith in the civilizing influence of private property ownership. 
He once famously stated that to be civilized meant to “cultivate the ground, live in 
houses, ride in Studebaker wagons, send children to school, drink whiskey [and] own 
property.” This very narrowly construed vision of life tormented American Indians, as 
the Dawes Act (named for its sponsor) sub-divided lands, claimed by tribal nations. The 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs promoted the act as part of the continued assimilation 
efforts ongoing across the country. In his 1887 annual report, Commissioner Atkins 
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lamented that the “progress of the Indian towards civilization has been disappointingly 
slow…So long as tribal relations are maintained so long will individual responsibility 
and welfare be swallowed up in that of the whole, and the weaker less aspiring, and 
more ignorant of the tribe will be the victims of the more designing, shrewd, selfish, and 
ambitious head men.”70 The Dawes Act provided individual land ownership for all who 
qualified, but Atkins hoped that it would also lead to the individualization of Native 
peoples, and decrease the influence of chieftain leaders.  
The language of the act is fairly straightforward. All lands belonging to Native 
peoples on reservations would be allotted “in severalty to any Indian located thereon.”71 
Several different factors determined land plot distribution. Heads of households with 
families received one-quarter section. The act allotted single people over the age of 
eighteen, and orphan children under the age of eighteen, one-eighth of a section. After 
twenty-five years, a title could be issued for the land, and at that time, the owner would 
be held accountable to the laws and regulations of their state. With obtainment of title to 
the land, owners would also be offered United States citizenship.72 Commissioner 
Atkins believed that this particular facet of the act “should be a pleasing and 
encouraging prospect to all Indians who by experience or education have risen to a 
plane above that of absolute barbarism.”73 Clearly negating any notion of existing 
indigenous citizenship or belonging to a tribal nation, Commissioner Atkins and 
promoters of the Allotment Act ignored the deep roots of indigenous nationalism and 
the cultural ties which individual land ownership could not sever. At the same time, the 
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creation of Dawes Rolls, or the official census of indigenous peoples on reservations 
across the country sponsored by the Act, set a permanent record of citizenship, one 
based on blood quantum rather than indigenous qualifications, which forever altered the 
nature citizenship for tribal nations.74  
The Dawes Act did accelerate the assimilation process, however, as Indian 
Agents attempted to facilitate the disintegration of indigenous organizations. Under this 
new policy, Indian Agents purposefully interacted with individual Indians, rather than 
the collective tribal nation. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs noted that the allotment 
process would not immediately alter the character of Native peoples as the “distance 
between barbarism and civilization is too long to be passed over speedily. Idleness, 
improvidence, ignorance, and superstition cannot by law be transformed into industry, 
thrift, intelligence, and Christianity.” Rather, the Allotment Act aided the causes of 
missionaries, philanthropists, and government agents who conducted assimilationist 
campaigns on reservations across the country.75 The Allotment Act did more than 
simply reinforce assimilation policies; it devastated Native homelands. Once Indian 
Agents allotted land to each eligible member of the tribal nation, the “surplus lands” 
could then be sold to non-Native interests. All agricultural land, with or without 
irrigation, released to the United States government was held for exclusive purchase by 
“actual and bona fide settlers only in tracts not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to 
any one person.”76 The proceeds from these sales, held in trust by the United States 
Treasury at three percent interest, could be used for the welfare of the tribal nation, at 
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their Indian Agent’s discretion. More importantly, Native property owners could not 
sell their allotments. Only after an individual land owner held title for twenty five years 
could he then sell the land. Settlers from surrounding areas hungrily eyed prime grazing 
land on reservations, as Indian Agents surveyed areas across the country.  
Not all government officials supported this plan. Albert Kneale, a lifelong agent 
for the OIA, wrote of the many fallacies of the allotment process. For example, once 
surveyors arrived on reservations, they proceeded to mark land, in many cases, by the 
simplest methods possible. Kneale remarked that “Little pains were taken to ascertain, 
before a tract was allotted, whether some Indian had already taken possession of and 
was occupying that particular tract…The allotting agent could easily have acquainted 
himself with the facts and made the allotments in harmony with the existing conditions. 
But as has been said, that would have entailed labor.”77 Surveyor ineptitude in mapping 
plots also plagued Indian lands, including the Uintah and Ouray reservation, where 
Kneale witnessed allotment first hand. “Little regard was given to the value of the tract 
being assigned,” he explained, “on paper, one tract looked much like another. As a 
result, tracts were allotted that had no soil. Other tracts were allotted that were highly 
impregnated with alkali.”78  These practices frustrated honest Indian Agents and 
defrauded thousands of Native people.  
On the Wind River, several factors dictated where the Shoshone and Arapaho 
sought their allotments. The security of Fort Washakie, the water supply of the Big 
Wind and Little Wind Rivers, as well as close proximity to agency buildings, made the 
southern and western portions of the reservation more desirable. The northeastern 
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portion of the reservation, or the “surplus” area remained relatively free of Indian 
residents. Arapaho leaders viewed the Allotment Act as both an opportunity to secure a 
federally recognized claim to the Wind River, and an attempt by the United States 
government to limit their sovereign rights. Arapaho ranch owner Gary Collins explains, 
the Allotment Act,  
“was a ploy or an effort to divide up lands to go to each tribal member head of 
household, similar to a homestead, like the Homestead Act…the intent on paper 
I believe officially was to provide segments of land to have tribes have 
ownership over a portion of the earth which was totally contrary to tradition. We 
own everything together, no one owns just those elk, or the sky or the water, we 
all participate in using that resource.”79  
 
Though the Allotment Act conflicted with Arapaho patterns of ownership, chieftain 
leaders recognized the opportunity that allotment provided. By accepting individual 
parcels of land, the Arapaho would hold a federally recognized claim to a part of the 
Shoshone Agency, thereby securing their sovereignty over half of the Wind River. 
Accordingly, Arapaho leaders wasted no time in accepting their allotments and 
encouraging their citizenry to do the same. Chiefs Black Coal, Sharp Nose, Eagle Head 
and White Horse requested that the allotment process begin immediately. Through 
negotiations with government agents in 1888, the Arapaho not only received title to 
parcels of land, but also additional cattle and cash incentives for agreeing to the process 
so quickly. Surprised and probably naïve to the motivation of the chiefs, the 
government gladly allotted land to Arapaho people. Former Arapaho councilman Scott 
Dewey explained the importance of the allotment process, “When that [allotment] 
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happened we were considered full-fledged owners of this reservation.”80 Previously 
squatters, the Arapahos now claimed half of the Wind River.  
News of Arapaho allotment enraged Washakie and the Shoshone people. 
Quietly, the Shoshone leader and his men counseled with their Indian Agent in an 
attempt to oust the Arapaho from the reservation, but Agent Thomas Jones informed 
them, that since the Arapaho now held land allotments, they would be nearly impossible 
to remove. The Agent suggested instead, that the Shoshone quickly secure their own 
allotments, lest the Arapaho claim prime Shoshone grazing lands.81 Disheartened by 
this news, the tribal nation grudgingly met with the Arapaho and “after mature 
deliberations,” they petitioned for “both tribes of Indians to have our lands allotted 
under the existing acts and laws of Congress.”82 Privately, Washakie abhorred this plan, 
viewing all of the Wind River as Shoshone land. At the same time, the leader 
recognized that his people desperately needed the cattle and cash incentives that 
accompanied allotment. The Shoshones saw the Arapahos’ movements as underhanded, 
while the Arapaho believed they had narrowly averted an attempt to be forcibly 
removed from the reservation. Between 1887 and 1891, the Arapaho and Shoshone 
fought bitterly about their land claims on the reservation. The Shoshone sought just 
compensation for the Arapahos’ allotments, while at the same time, the Arapaho 
justified their existence on the Wind River with promises that they received at the Sioux 
delegation in 1877. Finally, land cession negotiations in 1891, temporarily adjudicated 
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the contested nature of Arapaho land ownership, as government officials recognized 
both Shoshone and Arapaho sovereignty of the Wind River.  
1891 Cession 
In 1891, the matter of Arapaho allotment still troubled Washakie. To begin the 
year, the Shoshone leader wrote a scathing letter of protest to the President of the 
United States, regarding Arapaho claims to part of his reservation. He emphatically 
stated: 
     This Reservation belongs solely to the Shoshone Indians and we do not 
concede that the Arapaho have a right to one foot of the land on this 
Reservation. We are willing to sell a part of this Reservation to the Govt for the 
Arapahos but until such arrangements are made we protest against any 
improvements that will in any way give the Arapahos a right to any of the land. 
     At the time the Arapahos came to this Res. we did not tell them they could 
come here and to stay nor did we give them any land. They and the Sioux had 
been fighting the soldiers and got whipped; they came up here and we have 
allowed them to live here since, thinking they could not hurt the land by living 
on it, we do not think that this would give them any right to the land.83 
 
Washakie and his advisors closed their letter of rebuke with the affirmation that “We do 
not object to the Arapahoe having an agency of their own, near to us, but we do 
seriously object to them having an agency or anything else built on our land that will 
give them any right to any land on this reservation.”84 Still bitter about the measures 
taken by Arapaho leaders during allotment, Washakie repeatedly protested their 
occupancy on the reservation.  
In fact, the subject of a separate Arapaho agency appeared frequently in letters 
to government officials that year, as the Arapaho also voiced concerns about their 
treatment at the Shoshone Agency. As full-fledged members of the Wind River 
community, Arapahos sought agency buildings closer to their allotments. Black Coal 
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and several subchiefs protested that his people “are supplied with small rations at the 
Shoshone Agency, only beef and flour, nothing else. For this, we have to travel 60 miles 
once a week, to go and come back. This kills our ponies, and takes up 4 days of the 
week of our time.”85 To remedy this problem, Arapaho leaders negotiated with 
Shoshone Agency personnel to establish an Arapaho sub-agency on the eastern side of 
the reservation. Ultimately, the arrival of government agents to conduct land cession 
agreements in 1891, problematized the Arapaho and Shoshone relationship, but 
provided a vehicle through which leaders from both tribal nations could voice their 
grievances. 
Land cession negotiations provided the perfect forum for the Arapaho and 
Shoshone to address their numerous complaints about the reservation. Cession meetings 
began in October of 1891, with three commissioners and several reservation leaders 
present. In separate councils with Shoshone and Arapaho leaders, federal agents 
attempted to secure a large land cession, nearly half of the Shoshone Agency. In 
general, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders considered this proposed land deal for several 
reasons. First, during negotiations, commissioners reminded both tribal nations that 
their treaty annuities would soon expire, in 1899 for the Arapaho and 1900 for the 
Shoshone. Commissioners also assured treaty participants that trespassers would not 
pester them, if the reservation were smaller. This guarantee held considerable appeal, as 
the permeability of Shoshone Agency borders perpetually frustrated both tribal nations. 
Recognizing this problem, United States military personnel at Fort Washakie constantly 
monitored the border regions of the reservation, with little result.  
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On at least one occasion, Shoshone citizens failed to appreciate the military’s 
half-hearted attempts to patrol the reservation and took matters into their own hands. 
Arapaho elder Arlo Amos recounted an instance in which “[The] Shoshones… made a 
raid on the settlers, homesteaders; I don’t know how many they killed. ‘This is Indian 
land,’ they said, ‘you get the hell out of here,’ they said, and they kill them.”86 Though, 
greatly exaggerated in this case, outbursts of violence certainly occurred on both sides 
of the reservation, as settler communities and their livestock ignored the boundaries of 
the reservation. Additionally, a number of non-Native residents illegally occupied land 
on the Shoshone Agency. In 1890, Indian Agent John Fosher recorded thirty two non-
Native occupants who claimed land that was the “best on the reserve.” One year later 
that number had increased to thirty-five.87  
After brief negotiations with land cession agents, Washakie agreed to a proposed 
land cession of the northeastern portion of the reservation. But, the leader also insisted 
that this cession would be his last. Washakie remarked that in 1872, he “sold Lander, 
and all that part south. I now sell that big piece [pointing to the land north and east] I 
want the government to now let me alone. After a while I’ll have no land for my 
children.”88 In large part, the Shoshone chief agreed to this land reduction because only 
Arapahos lived on the northeast section of the reservation. Washakie also recognized 
that the well needed windfall of cash and cattle, could prevent another decade of 
starvation.  Additional ration distribution would curb the effects of non-productive 
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subsistence farming and meager seasonal hunting, on which his people currently 
survived.  
The Arapaho proved far more recalcitrant in their negotiations. In their initial 
communication with land agents, Arapaho leaders denounced the cession and instead 
listed a series of complaints. Chief Black Coal insisted, “The Indian Department sent us 
here, and we always thought we had as much right as the Shoshones. Now, Washakie 
claims that we have not as much right as the Shoshones. We did not come here of our 
own accord, the Department sent us here…The Arapahoes want the Reservation divided 
between them and the Shoshones.”89 In addition, leaders wanted more plentiful rations, 
the ability to slaughter their own cattle, and payment in full for previous treaty 
agreements. Commissioner J.D. Woodruff protested that he did not have the authority to 
legally divide the reservation, or remedy their other grievances, but rather he sought the 
permission of Arapaho leaders, as residents of the Shoshone Agency, to cede the land in 
question. 
After looking over the proposed the land cession, the Arapaho initially rejected 
the entire agreement outright, as many Arapaho families lived on the proposed section. 
Chief Plenty Bear blatantly stated, “We don’t agree with the east boundary. We won’t 
sell that land.”90 Woodruff insisted that the Shoshones already accepted the terms of the 
land cession, and that the Arapahos should reconsider the proposal. After a lengthy 
discussion with other Arapaho leaders, Black Coal announced that “The Arapahoes 
were sent here by the government, and we now claim that we have as much right here as 
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the Shoshones. We are willing to sell the land north and east of the Wind River but 
don’t want to sell any more.” In signing the land cession, the Arapaho and Shoshone 
agreed to reduce the Shoshone Agency from two million acres to 700,000, more than 
half of their total area. For their land, the Arapaho and Shoshone would receive a sum 
of $600,000 to be distributed in annual payments. Congress denied ratification of the 
land cession, however, on the grounds that the area ceded was too small. Undaunted 
commissioners pressed for larger land cessions throughout the 1890s.  
During their first two decades on the reservation, the Arapaho and Shoshone 
people forged reservation communities, established a measure of self-rule, and 
preserved their cultural heritage, while adapting to reservation conditions. Under the 
guidance of their leaders, the Arapaho and Shoshone citizenry attempted to develop 
agricultural plots to curb the effects of poor ration distribution and starvation. They also 
sent their children to reservation boarding schools, and participated in religious services 
with Catholic and Episcopalian missionaries. These efforts ensured a measure of 
comfort and stability on their reservation, and ultimately guaranteed their survival. On 
several occasions, the two tribal nations joined together, as increased cooperation better 
protected their interests.  
At the same time, instability plagued the reservation. After government officials 
refused to relocate the Arapaho to their own reservation, citizens of the tribal nation 
accepted allotments on the Wind River to better secure their land holdings. In response, 
the Shoshone bitterly resented Arapaho allotment, and demanded that the “interlopers” 
pay for their portion of the reservation, or be removed. By taking allotments, the 
Arapaho secured their place on the reservation and expected to be recognized as joint 
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occupants of the Wind River. During land cession negotiations in 1891, government 
officials inadvertently adjudicated the dispute, as they acknowledged both Shoshone 
and Arapaho sovereignty over the reservation. Disagreements between Arapaho and 
Shoshone people continued, however, as government officials pressed for additional 
land cessions in the 1890s. The death of chieftain leadership and the establishment of 
business councils at the turn of the twentieth century, further complicated interactions 
between Arapaho and Shoshone leaders. As the two tribal nations entered the twentieth 
century, the Arapaho and Shoshone citizenry increasing relied upon their leaders to 
protect their families and homes, cultures and rights. 
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Chapter 3 – Political Authority 
Hidden amidst the catchy tourist slogans, modern facilities and steamy mist, is a 
nearly forgotten symbol. At the Bah Guewana, or “Smoking Waters,” near present day 
Thermopolis, a Shoshone emblem stands resolute against the ever modernizing tourist 
destination.  In the image, the crossed poles of a tepee contain within its familiar lines 
six symbols: an eagle, a tree, a buffalo, the sun, a cloud of moisture and a set of twelve 
lines. According to the Sh’oshone, each component represents a cardinal direction, as 
well as a portion of their worldview. In explaining the image, Shoshone historian 
Herman St. Clair wrote that the eagle represents migratory birds that leave the north in 
the fall and return each spring. The green tree in the east symbolizes Mother Earth and 
the food that she provides. In the south, the Shoshone placed a red buffalo, a staple food 
source and provider of shelter and clothing, while in the west the white sun stands for 
purity.  
Alone, these four elements depict the basic necessities of life for the Shoshone 
people. They also surround the icon for the springs, or the additional twelve lines and 
cloud of moisture in the middle of the tepee. St. Clair explained, the top four lines “are 
green for Mother Earth and the pure water which springs from her…The red bars 
signify that the buffalo and other meat animals drank of the water and were very 
healthy… [and] The yellow lines recall that the birds use the water below the springs to 
stop on during their migration, because it never freezes.”1 While these colored lines 
further illuminate the importance of the four elements, their shape also implies a deeper 
meaning. The cone-like formation of the lines “signifies the belief…that the water 
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comes from deep in the earth and brings to the surface health giving elements that can 
be transferred to man or animal to give him health and relief from pain.”2 Shoshones 
remember that more than a century ago, the eagle, tree, buffalo, sun and hot springs 
coexisted near the Owl Creek, making it a popular destination for them, as well as other 
Native visitors.  
As non-Native settlers pushed into the region and bison herds dwindled, the 
Shoshone, and their Arapaho neighbors, visited the hot springs less frequently, but still 
touted their healing powers. Though not constant occupants, the two tribal nations still 
claimed the Bah Guewana and surrounding area, but by the end of the nineteenth 
century, an onslaught of homesteaders and policy changes from the Office of Indian 
Affairs threatened this hold. By the 1880s, Wind River residents struggled to survive 
harsh Wyoming winters with meager rations and reduced kills from seasonal buffalo 
hunts. Allotment further challenged Arapaho and Shoshone control over their 
reservation lands. Once each eligible member of the tribal nations received an 
allotment, federal agents began to sell off the “surplus land.” Additionally, during the 
1890s, agents repeatedly sought land cessions of various pieces of the Wind River, 
further reducing the Arapaho and Shoshone land base, and in 1896, they came for the 
hot springs. 
The proposed land cession appeared quite small to federal agents, only ten acres. 
The value of the land in question however, played a critical role in the agreement, as 
government officials wanted the tribal nations’ healing waters. The Arapaho and 
Shoshone believed that the coveted land, a portion of the far northeastern side of the 
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reservation, held spiritual and medicinal powers and were reluctant to cede the region. 
At the same time, this land cession meeting marked a unique shift in reservation 
business, because rather than negotiating with Arapaho and Shoshone chiefs, Indian 
Agents met organized business councils. In fact, negotiating the cession of the hot 
springs became one of the first orders of business for the newly formed Arapaho and 
Shoshone governing bodies. The meeting signified a clear departure from previous 
interactions between the Office of Indian Affairs and the two tribal nations, yet 
historians often overlook this relatively small land cession.  
While reminiscent of previous negotiations, at this meeting twelve men, six 
Arapaho and six Shoshone, sat at the table. By organizing themselves in this way, the 
twelve councilmen became equal partners in the decision to cede the hot springs to the 
United States government. At the same time, their staging represents yet another 
anomaly. In the past, the Arapaho and Shoshone demanded separate council with OIA 
personnel, but at this meeting they agreed to sit together as one. Though prominent 
leaders, including Shoshone Chief Washakie and the Arapaho Chief Sharp Nose, acted 
as spokesmen, participants from both councils contributed during negotiations. 
Members of the new governing bodies did not always interact naturally with one other, 
and the transition from chieftain leadership to business councils was not seamless. The 
instability of the business councils became particularly evident, when disagreements 
arose during negotiations. At one point, the meeting devolved into a brief verbal battle 
between the Arapaho and Shoshone, during which bickering ensued and councilmen 
cast out malicious accusations. But in the end, members of both councils set 
inexperience and rivalries aside and represented their tribal nations, conducting a 
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critical land sale. Each councilman realized the importance of the ten acres at stake. 
They knew of the legends, the water’s healing powers and the cultural significance of 
the region, yet both councils also recognized that their people suffered from starvation. 
The proceeds from this land sale would ensure that the Arapaho and Shoshone received 
additional rations and cattle to supplement their dwindling herds. Despite the difficulty 
of the decision, the tension within the councils and the awkward adjustments in 
leadership practices, Arapaho and Shoshone councilmen sat together and effectively 
negotiated the land cession in 1896.  
From 1893 to 1907, both tribal nations radically transformed the nature of 
political authority on the Wind River. While Arapaho and Shoshone people revered, and 
vested authority in, political, military and cultural leaders, the death of powerful 
chieftain leadership and the increased need for self-determination, in an era of 
assimilation programs and allotment, tested indigenous forms of governance. In the 
wake of these challenges, the Arapaho and Shoshone adapted their leadership styles to 
better accommodate and operate within the bureaucratized system of the federal 
government. By forming business councils, the Arapaho and Shoshone hoped to better 
manage new challenges in the twentieth century. Members of these councils negotiated 
land cessions, curbed the brutal effects of starvation and assimilation, and effectively 
handled reservation affairs. As the first expression of the new political authority on the 
reservation, the hot springs agreement demonstrates a clear shift in leadership styles, 
and hints at the many challenges of reservation governance.    
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Healing Waters  
Known as “The World’s Largest Mineral Hot Springs,” the Bah Guewana has 
attracted visitors for many centuries, probably even millennia. The water of the springs 
flows at an astounding 18,600,000 gallons every twenty four hours, at a temperature of 
approximately 135˚ F. Originating from a thermal artesian basin, filled by the snow 
melt from the Owl Creek Mountains, the water is heated deep within the earth. After 
experiencing the waters, countless Native and non-Native visitors have touted the 
springs’ medicinal powers. In addition to the hydrotherapy of the warm churning water, 
the springs contain at least twenty-nine minerals, including iron, calcium, magnesium, 
sodium, potassium, chloride, and hydrogen sulfide. This combination soothes the pain 
of arthritis and rheumatism, though some have touted other possible uses. Suggested 
applications of the springs include ingesting the waters to cure ulcers and other 
digestive problems, while a select few believe that, if applied topically, the minerals in 
the hot springs might even cure acne.3  
Arapaho visitors to the region believe that the springs were a gift from the Great 
Spirit, or Hóuu, to heal and sustain their people.4 In July 1903, an Arapaho elder 
recorded the legendary story of the Owl Creek hot springs for the Thermopolis Record. 
In describing the old man, the newspaper reported that “The snows of nearly five score 
winters had whitened the locks of the old Arapahoe, and the wild winds of many 
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autumns had colored his face…but time had not bowed his head nor stooped his 
shoulders, nor diminished the fire of his eye.”5 In giving his account, the storyteller sat 
with several Arapaho children who wanted “to hear one of the legends of their people 
that the old medicine man knew so well.” According to the elder, Hóuu stood on a 
mountain top and overlooked the land below. He saw large herds of buffalo grazing 
lazily on hillsides, antelope wandering the plains, and big horn sheep on the craggy 
mountain cliffs, all there for the Arapaho. In surveying the breathtaking scene, “His 
heart swelled with pride for he loved his people. But a sadness overcame him. Nature 
had done much for them but they had many physical ills that human skill could not 
cure.”6  
To help his people, the Great Spirit called together a council of deities, who 
decided to create a special stream whose waters would cure mankind’s afflictions. In 
creating the spring, Hóuu found a cave, “whose depths had never yet been reached. In 
its hidden chambers he placed the things that will cure the ills of men…He kindled the 
mysterious fires that water will not quench, and he caused a living stream to issue from 
the cavern.” The Arapaho heard of their Great Father’s generosity, and rushed to the 
spring to witness the power of the healing waters. In closing his story, the Arapaho 
elder explained, “The tradition of our people tells us that, though human eyes can not 
[sic] see him, the God of the Medicine forever stands guard on the flat topped hill that 
shelters the spring where he had used the most subtle of his arts.”7 Though not always 
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permanent residents of the region, the Arapaho visited the hot springs, when possible, to 
harness the power of the healing water and give thanks to the deity who helped heal the 
sick and wounded.  
According to Shoshone legend, the hot springs are part of a great ocean that 
once covered the Big Horn Basin. Ancient Shoshones visited the shores of the sea to 
fish and hunt, but the animals were too clever, and the water too deep. The tribal nation 
prayed to the Great Spirit, or Apo, to save them from starvation and “Suddenly the 
waters of the great inland sea began to lower. Down they went, with the Indians 
following, until they were so low the fish were piled on top of each other. It was easy 
then to eat fish.”8 The Shoshone stood in awe of the river that roared through a crack in 
the mountain, the last remnant of the great sea. Unbeknownst to the Shoshone, Apo 
saved another part of the magnificent ocean, deep within the recesses of a cliff. One 
day, two lovers walked near the rushing river as a gust of wind blew an eagle feather 
out of the woman’s hair. The couple chased the feather down a deep canyon and when it 
finally fell softly to the ground, they picked it up and looked around. At once, “They 
saw steam and other wonders, but knowing then that the Great Spirit had led them there 
for that very purpose they feared not to investigate. The water of the springs were hot 
but smelled clean and they bathed in one of the springs…The whole tribe presently 
moved down there where they became famous for their strength and endurance.”9 In 
negotiating for the Wind River, Shoshone leadership ensured the acquisition of the hot 
springs at the far northeastern edge of their reservation. Once permanently positioned 
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on the Wind River, Shoshones visited the hot springs frequently, and boasted of their 
“healing waters.”  
By the 1870s, the Shoshone people made fewer pilgrimages to the region, but 
still touted the medicinal powers of the scalding water. Arapaho settlement on the 
eastern edge of the reservation limited Shoshone mobility to a certain extent, as did the 
day long excursion to the waters, and increased pressure from agency officials to utilize 
reservation doctors. In 1875, Thomas Maghee, the post surgeon at Ft. Washakie, 
travelled to the springs after hearing about their healing qualities. Maghee followed a 
well-worn trail to the mouth of the Owl Creek and saw a large spring which gushed 
from a butte. Though the mineral deposits sounded hollow under his horse’s feet, 
Maghee found the area solid enough to bear considerable weight. On two sides of the 
spring, high cliffs surrounded a large pool of hot churning water. The sulfuric smell and 
acidic taste suggested to Maghee, that the waters originated from a subterranean geyser. 
The post surgeon collected water samples at the springs, and later confirmed the 
plentiful mineral qualities in the “healing waters.”10 Following the publication of 
Maghee’s report, in addition to increased non-Native tourism into the region, federal 
agents attempted to wrest the hot springs out of Native hands.   
Accordingly, in 1891 commissioners proposed a substantial reduction of the 
reservation at a land cession council.11 Officials sought the relinquishment of nearly 
half of the Shoshone Agency, including a large portion of the northeastern side, which 
contained the Bah Guewana. During cession negotiations, Chief Washakie adamantly 
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stated, “I do not want to sell the Owl Creek hot springs.”12 Despite Commissioner J.D. 
Woodruff’s assurances that if the Shoshone ceded the springs, “every one [sic], whites 
and Indians, shall be free alike to bathe there,” Washakie remained steadfast, as he 
recognized the intrinsic value of the land.13 Arapaho chiefs Black Coal and Sharp Nose 
also protested the sale. When asked by Black Coal who would eventually occupy the 
area, Commissioner Woodruff replied, “The Great Father told us to reserve a section 
around the hot springs a mile square, that is to be free to everybody. This goes in with 
all the rest of the Reservation that is sold.” Chief Sharp Nose objected, “That is a great 
spring, and worth a great deal of money. No other Indians [have] sold as much land as 
this, and that is worth a great deal of money. We had a talk about the north part, but we 
did not hear or understand about that on the east.”14  Eventually, Arapaho and Shoshone 
leaders agreed to the land cession hoping that cash and cattle incentives would ease 
reservation starvation, but Congress failed to ratify the agreement, and the Shoshone 
and Arapaho retained the hot springs and surrounding area.  
Undeterred, the Office of Indian Affairs sent James McLaughlin to negotiate the 
sale of the Owl Creek hot springs five years later.15 Before conducting cession 
negotiations, McLaughlin suggested that Arapaho and Shoshone representatives ride out 
to the hot springs, and examine the region they considered selling. The agent later 
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reminisced, “All through the magnificence of the Red Cañon [sic] I went with the 
Indians, and promised them that if the agreement was made, the right should be 
reserved to them and their children forever, of bathing in the thermal baths that their 
forefathers had used. I separated from them at the mouth of Owl Creek, and returned to 
the agency by another route, appointing to meet them at the agency in council on the 
following Monday.”16 Returning from his journey, McLaughlin described the springs 
and the surrounding area to his superiors, “This spring is truly wonderful; the surface is 
about 30 feet across, circular in form a seething, boiling cauldron, with a temperature of 
132˚ F…The water of this spring is said to possess wonderful curative properties and to 
be very beneficial for rheumatic and other ailments, and although the temperature is 
132˚ it is not unpleasant to drink, and with salt and pepper added tastes very much like 
fresh chicken broth.”17 Culinary appeal aside, the springs attracted men like 
McLaughlin because he saw the area as one of several untapped natural wonders in the 
American West.  
In closing his report, McLaughlin specifically noted the tourist potential of the 
region, “It is really such a grand work of nature that I believe, when the transportation 
problem has been solved in that country, it will rival the Yellowstone Park and the 
Grand Cañon [sic] of the Colorado as an attraction for lovers of scenic grandeur.”18 
Settlers from the surrounding community also acknowledged the potential tourist 
venture, and diverted some of the water through crudely designed ditches and 
surrounded them, creating makeshift tent walled spas. These, water thieves, squatters 
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and amateur entrepreneurs advertised their version of the hot springs baths with names 
like “Hotel de Sagebrush,” and lured unsuspecting visitors, in search of cures for their 
physical ailments, to the region.19  
In council with the Arapaho and Shoshone, McLaughlin argued that the land 
around the hot springs held little monetary value. Other than the springs’ healing 
properties and cultural significance, the Agent insisted that they could not subsist on the 
land. Little game roamed for the Arapaho and Shoshone to hunt, and the proposed 
region was not arable for farming. With these limitations in mind, McLaughlin 
acknowledged the medicinal and spiritual value of the land to Wind River residents, and 
proposed an agreement in which the federal government held title to the land, but 
allowed all who visited it unrestricted use. In selling the land, McLaughlin argued, the 
Arapaho and Shoshone would help the government to improve the area surrounding the 
hot springs and make it a destination for all people, Native and non-Native alike. As 
part of his pitch, McLaughlin revealed that the government had authorized him to offer 
$50,000, but upon visiting the springs, he believed that the tribal nations deserved 
$60,000 for the ten acre section. Though perhaps under fair market value, the proposed 
payment for the Owl Creek hot springs marks a considerable improvement from other 
land negotiations. 20  
As part of McLaughlin’s offer, the Arapaho and Shoshone would share $10,000 
a year for six years. But instead of getting cash in hand, Shoshone Agency personnel 
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would spend the money for the “civilization, industrial education, and subsistence of the 
Indians.”21 The Arapaho and Shoshone agreed to these terms, but Washakie argued that 
the two tribal nations should each immediately receive $30,000. McLaughlin refused. “I 
can not [sic] negotiate with you for this tract as separate tribes,” he argued, “but as one, 
as you are known to the Great Father as one people. I came to negotiate with you as one 
people, and you must agree among yourselves.”22 In this case, McLaughlin may not 
have had the authority to treat separately with the two tribal nations, or, as in the past, 
he might have refused as a matter of bureaucratic convenience. Either way, this land 
cession established an unfortunate precedent in which government officials negated the 
cultural and political distinctiveness of the Arapaho and Shoshone. Indeed, throughout 
most of the twentieth century, the Office of Indian Affairs grouped the two tribal 
nations together, treating them as monolithic Indians because they lived on the same 
reservation. 
Unable to negotiate separately, Washakie and Sharp Nose briefly bickered about 
their payment for the springs. Sharp Nose suggested that their first year’s payment 
should be distributed in cattle, not rations. Washakie grumbled “I am afraid it will be as 
it was in former times. The two tribes would fail to agree…I was the first to come here, 
and I think I ought to be the first to get what I want.” Sharp Nose replied “All my 
friends are here. We are going to make this treaty all good…The first year $5,000 in 
cash to the Shoshones and $5,000 to the Arapahoes. Our cash to be paid to the agent, 
and he to buy cattle for the tribe with it.” With this compromise, Washakie, Sharp Nose 
and McLaughlin agreed to the terms, and upon signing the land cession the Shoshone 
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leader stated, “I have given you the springs; my heart feels good.”23  Overall, the 1896 
land cession marked a new beginning in reservation politics. While the Arapaho 
presence on the Wind River remained contested, from this moment on, government 
officials, and even the Shoshone, treated the Arapaho as equal partners on the 
reservation. The use of councils at the 1896 land cession also represented a shift in 
leadership practices, one away from chieftain leadership. Though Washakie and Sharp 
Nose acted as spokesmen, a council of leaders made the final decision regarding this, 
and subsequent, land cessions. During the next ten years, these councils developed, as 
they accommodated traditional leadership practices and thwarted detribalization 
attempts.  
Death of Chieftain Leadership and the Rise of Tribal Councils 
 Initially, reservation leadership weakened, however, as prominent Arapaho and 
Shoshone chiefs died. During their impressive tenures, Washakie, Black Coal and Sharp 
Nose witnessed the extraordinary transformation of the Northern Plains, as 
homesteaders encroached onto their lands, buffalo herds neared extinction, and new 
technology rapidly spread across the American West. These leaders facilitated their 
people’s transition to reservation life, adapted to assimilationist pressures and 
negotiated shared cohabitation on contested ground. In the decades prior, Wind River 
residents struggled to survive the damning effects of starvation, assimilation and 
detribalization. Strong chieftain leaders preserved a sense of cultural identity and 
maintained the unity of their tribal nations in these difficult times. As their health 
declined, chieftain leaders feared the total deterioration of the Arapaho and Shoshone 
tribal nations. While others leaders consulted and assisted these men, Black Coal, Sharp 
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Nose and Washakie retained a powerful hold over the Wind River and the respect of 
agents from the Office of Indian Affairs. The death of Black Coal first heralded the 
impending changes to the structure of political authority on the reservation.  
On a cold December day in 1893, Reverend John Roberts presided over Black 
Coal’s funeral. At the service, Roberts remarked that the chief “deserves the name of 
‘The Unknown Hero.’ He was always a staunch supporter of the government and 
accompanied several expeditions of U.S. Troops against the hostile Sioux and 
Cheyennes.” The reverend remembered Black Coal as a “man of unusual stature and 
strength, of superior intelligence and sterling worth.”24 Even the Cheyenne Daily 
Leader, who heard of his passing, eulogized the Arapaho leader as a man who “was 
much beloved by the whole tribe and had the respect and confidence of all the whites 
who knew him.”25 Reservation doctor, Julius Schuelke, attended to Black Coal and in 
his last moments, and “When informed that his end was approaching, he asked to be 
taken back to his home on the reservation, where he might die among his own people, 
whom he loved as his own children.”26 The Arapaho buried Black Coal at the tribal 
cemetery, about eighteen miles from Fort Washakie, and an obelisk erected on the site 
marks his grave. Sharp Nose retained leadership of the Arapaho, and subchief Plenty 
Bear assumed a stronger position with the tribal nation. 
Following Black Coal’s death, the Arapaho began to restructure their style of 
leadership, yet the link between authority and culture remained. Arapaho constituents 
still expected their leaders to be courageous and formidable, and heroic deeds in battle 
earned an individual respect. Leaders at the turn of the twentieth century needed to 
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demonstrate these character traits, as well as the ability to successfully fight battles with 
words not with weapons. In creating the first council, six subchiefs, Sharp Nose, Plenty 
Bear, Eagle Head, Tallow, Old Man Elk, and Bull Gun, formed a coalition, known as 
the “Chief’s Council,” to lead the Arapaho people. These men, all aged and respected 
members of the tribal nation, had previously served as scouts and possessed the proper 
credentials to lead in the Arapaho’s age graded society.27  
Government officials wholeheartedly encouraged the creation of this, and of 
other councils. Addendums to the Allotment Act in 1891 and again in 1894, allowed for 
the formation of such business councils that would make decisions on behalf of the 
entire tribal nation.28 Indian Agents believed that these small, representative councils 
would be easier to negotiate with, and even control. In meeting with a few select 
individuals, federal officials believed that the members could be persuaded to act in 
certain ways, without the pressure of the larger tribal nation. Likewise, these councils, 
without the guiding influence of a strong chieftain leader, appeared more susceptible to 
coercion. In selecting members for their councils, constituents often chose individual 
councilmen by majority vote, a process also promoted by reservation agents for several 
reasons. First, as elected officials, their decisions represented the desires of the larger 
tribal nation, thereby ending prolonged negotiations and feasts with the entire group 
during councils with representatives from the Office of Indian Affairs. Additionally, 
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government officials believed that a small business council would effectively detribalize 
indigenous peoples. For many, small democratic organizations comprised of elected 
officials, symbolized the fruition of the assimilation process. For the Northern Arapaho 
however, the Chief’s Council replaced chieftain leadership in title, not in practice.  To 
outsiders, Black Coal and Sharp Nose acted as the authoritative leaders of the tribal 
nation, but in reality, both men frequently counseled with other individuals and while 
acting as representatives for the entire tribal nation. The formation of a Chief’s Council, 
then, represented an effort by Arapaho leaders to meld a non-Native governing style 
within a familiar manner of leadership.  
The voting patterns of the Arapaho clearly demonstrate this process. Members 
of the first business council, who served from 1893 until 1897, were all between the 
ages of forty-two and fifty-eight, all boasted impressive feats in battle, and maintained 
reputations as courageous and generous individuals.29 These men, already natural 
leaders in Arapaho society, easily adapted their practices to form a business council of 
representatives. Once elected, members of the Arapaho business council served long 
terms until illness or death prevented their participation, and only those worthy of the 
position earned the votes for the office. An Arapaho councilman in the 1970s, Arlo 
Amos, explained that to become a business council member, a man illustrated that he 
was a “brave man and do all things that protect…Well, then the first council – 
councilmen – they elect, like Sharp Nose.”30 Already established leaders, Sharp Nose, 
Plenty Bear and other subchiefs received a large percentage of the Arapaho votes and 
easily transitioned into the role of business council member.  
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Sharp Nose’s declining health complicated this conversion, however. The 
councilman maintained a working relationship with government officials, and while 
other Arapaho leaders earned the respect of the tribal nation, they struggled to establish 
a foothold in the complicated bureaucracy of the American political system. 
Compounding this problem, Indian Agents manipulated the inexperience of certain 
leaders, exacerbating the impact of Sharp Nose’s decline. Sensing the end, Sharp Nose 
called upon his friend Sitting Eagle and passed along his final words of wisdom, “My 
friend, I am dying of my battle wounds. Watch out for our children and yourselves, stay 
together, as the Arapahoe have always been together since our beginning – beware of 
the stranger and his strange ways.”31 With these departing words, Sharp Nose died at his 
home on the north side of the Little Wind River, on June 12, 1901.32 The Laramie 
Boomerang reported his death and burial “according to ancient Indian custom in a rocky 
gorge near his home,” and though the chief could lead no more, the advice he gave 
Sitting Eagle endured.33 The Chief’s Council mourned the loss of two charismatic 
leaders, but remained committed to Arapaho unity in the face of non-Native 
interference, a guiding principle of the Arapaho business council well into the twentieth 
century.34  
The Shoshone also felt the impact of weakened leadership, as Washakie’s health 
declined. The elderly chief, in his nineties at the end of the nineteenth century, struggled 
to mount his horse or travel about the reservation. Compounding his reduced mobility, a 
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sandstorm permanently blinded the old leader on a trip to visit his friend and reservation 
post trader, J.K. Moore, at Fort Washakie.35 A prolonged illness, possibly a series of 
strokes, further deteriorated the chief’s health, and on February 20, 1900, Washakie 
died. Clough Overton, a 1st Lieutenant at Fort Washakie, issued a General Order 
reporting the loss and announced the chief’s funeral. Overton said of Washakie, “His 
countenance was one of rugged strength mingled with kindness. His military service is 
an unbroken record for gallantry…Washakie was a great man, for he was a brave man 
and a good man…he will never be forgotten so long as the mountains and streams of 
Wyoming which were his home, bear his name.”36 A great procession followed 
Washakie to his final resting place as mourners, Shoshone and Arapaho, military and 
civilian, attended the service. 
The Lander Clipper reported the solemn occasion as “the remains of Chief 
Washakie were laid to rest in the cemetery at Fort Washakie with full military 
honors…Troop E, First cavalry, U.S.A., formed and began the march to the late chief’s 
residence…and when the casket was carried out the troops presented sabere [sic]. A 
stripped wagon was used to carry the remains in lieu of a casion [sic], and the coffin 
was placed thereon with a large American flag over it, and the procession started for the 
cemetery with Troop E. under command of Lieutenant Clough Overton acting as 
escort.” Reverend John Roberts presided over the service with Reverend Sherman 
Coolidge’s assistance. Following the memorial, “the coffin was lowered into the grave 
and the troop fired three volleys over it and Bugler Veirbloom blew taps and the last 
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rites were over.”37 Nearly two thousand people paid their respects to the man who 
served as the authoritative leader of the Eastern Shoshone for more than fifty years.  
A chasm remained in the wake of the great chief’s death. Indeed, Washakie’s 
leadership of the Shoshone was so strong that he left no clear successor to fill his 
position. Washakie’s son, Dick Washakie seemed to be the heir apparent, however, a 
period of factionalism consumed the Shoshone, and leadership remained contested. Five 
months after the venerable chief’s death, one hundred and twenty Shoshones petitioned 
the Office of Indian Affairs to choose a new head chief. “We are now left without a 
head to look to,” they wrote. “It is now with us like a man with many tongues talking at 
once.”38 In the months that followed, profound sadness and bitter infighting deeply 
unsettled the Shoshone community. Former Arapaho councilman Scott Dewey 
remembered, “As far as we know there’s no [chief], after Washakie died in 1900, there 
was no subsequent chiefs. The chieftainship died with Washakie.”39 In the absence of 
chieftain leadership, the Shoshone attempted to form a business council, similar to that 
of the Arapaho. 
This move was not unprecedented or surprising. In 1893, the Shoshone briefly 
formed a business council, with Washakie as their spokesman. The elderly chief, joined 
by Muyahooyal, Bahugooshia, Tonevook, Hebah, and Wahwannibiddie comprised the 
council to negotiate the lease of unoccupied grazing land on the reservation.40 Three 
years later, Washakie led a different collection of Shoshone members during the hot 
springs land cession in 1896. The revolving list of Shoshones who acted as “council 
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members” indicates that the tribal nation placed primacy on Washakie’s ability to guide 
reservation affairs. At the same time, different members provided the necessary skills 
and/or experience for a given situation. The supporting roles of other Shoshone 
councilmen only tangentially affected negotiations, however, and also established a 
pattern of short tenures in office. While Arapahos served long periods as business 
councilmen, the Shoshone exchanged members frequently, even replacing 
dissatisfactory participants with mid-term elections. Additionally, the Shoshone utilized 
elders, as well as younger males, in the formation of political decisions, preferring a 
variety of perspectives to the unanimity of the Arapahos’ age-graded system.  After 
Washakie’s death, council leadership, and even membership qualifications caused rifts 
within the Shoshone tribal nation. Two dominant factions challenged the legitimacy of 
certain members, and periods of violence frequently disrupted reservation business.  
Disputes regarding leadership qualifications bitterly divided the Shoshone 
people. Dick Washakie, son of the former chief, garnered considerable support. 
Tradition and family lineage legitimized his ascension into a leadership position, 
however, George Terry, the son of a Mormon missionary and Shoshone woman 
challenged the younger Washakie’s authority. Terry, an educated Shoshone, grew up on 
the Wind River and in Draper, Utah, where his father, Joshua Terry, served as a 
Mormon missionary and confidant of Brigham Young. The elder Terry arrived in Utah 
in 1851, and acted as a liaison between the Mormon Church and indigenous peoples of 
the Great Basin. While working with the Eastern Shoshone, Joshua Terry befriended 
Chief Washakie and received permission to marry a Shoshone woman, Ann 
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Greasewood, George’s mother.41 Joshua Terry ensured his son received an education in 
Utah and on the reservation, fully supporting a bicultural heritage. Throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, the Terry family remained in close contact with 
Washakie, and by 1890, George became one of Washakie’s advisors. 
As an adult, George Terry became a valuable asset to the Shoshone. He worked 
as a storekeeper and trader on the reservation, he married a Shoshone woman, Kate 
Enos, and he acted as a close friend and advisor to Washakie. Terry spoke eloquently to 
Indian Agents and government officials at the 1891 and 1896 land cession councils, and 
was one of the first Shoshones to sign the 1896 land deal. (Washakie and Dick 
Washakie were the first two to sign.) Following Washakie’s death, Terry filled a 
position on the loosely organized Shoshone business council, and almost immediately, 
assumed the role of council spokesman. This move effectively subverted Dick 
Washakie’s ascension to the position and angered numerous Shoshones who believed 
the great chief’s son should lead the council. Terry’s qualifications certainly ensured 
him a position on the Shoshone business council, but not the spokesman, according to 
many Shoshone citizens. Ultimately, Terry successfully maintained his superior role by 
forming a relationship with Shoshone Agent H.G. Nickerson (1898-1902) who 
propelled Terry’s political career.  
At the same time, complaints and dissatisfaction marred Nickerson’s term as 
Indian Agent on the Wind River. Disruption within the Shoshone Council provided 
Nickerson with a perfect opportunity to ensure that a more “progressive” leader 
remained in office, namely Terry. During his four years as Agent, Nickerson attempted 
to augment the authority of men like George Terry, who appeared more willing to make 
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drastic alterations to the reservation, and subvert the control of men who opposed the 
agent’s aggressive plans. George Terry recognized the necessity of allies like 
Nickerson, but did not always support the agent’s agenda. In July 1901, Terry wrote to 
the Indian Rights Association in protest, asking the organization to investigate 
“crooked” activities at the agency.42 This inquiry did not uncover illegal activities, and 
eventually the accusations faded away. Though he sometimes disagreed with 
Nickerson’s practices, the Shoshone leader and his council developed a mutually 
beneficial relationship with the Agent. Arapaho leaders, on the other hand, constantly 
attracted Nickerson’s ire.  
The Chief’s Council galled Nickerson, as he recognized the many similarities to 
previous styles of Arapaho leadership. The Agent, had a penchant for annoying 
Arapaho tribal leaders whom he believed refused to convert to a more “civilized” 
political organization, and tried, on several occasions, to undermine the council’s 
authority. The Arapaho did not take this matter lightly, and enlisted religious allies in a 
campaign to oust Nickerson from office. In February, 1902, officials of the Bureau of 
Catholic Missions protested to the Office of Indian Affairs about Agent Nickerson’s 
allegedly unethical practices. Catholic leaders “set out as reasons why he should not be 
retained in office his ungovernable temper, his harsh and tyrannical treatment of the 
Indians, and his abusive and profane language both to man and woman, causing 
turbulence and friction all through his term of office, with the result that this 
management of Agency affairs has been anything but a stress.”43 Undeterred, Nickerson 
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continued to aggravate reservation leaders, as they prepared for a delegation to 
Washington D.C. later that year.  
 In addition to his surly temperament, Arapahos protested his seemingly close 
relationship with the Shoshone business council. In selecting individuals for a 
delegation to Washington, D.C., for example, Nickerson prevented the Arapaho from 
choosing their own representatives. Instead, he picked members that he believed should 
act for the tribal nation. St. Stephen’s personnel also relayed this aggravation to their 
superiors, as Nickerson delayed the Arapahos’ departure because he “got permission to 
take along a delegation of Shoshone Indians. I understand that the 3 chosen are 
friends.”44 Nickerson selected George Terry, Charles Lahoe, and Shoyo as Shoshone 
representatives, two of whom were not actually councilmen. Terry’s relationship with 
Nickerson reaped benefits, but also enemies, during the Agent’s time at the Wind River. 
While not always Nickerson’s supporter, Terry clearly benefitted from his relationship 
with the corrupt agent, in this case, securing a last minute delegation to Washington 
with the Arapaho. Despite his relative success at the position, Terry attracted several 
enemies, as Shoshone factions contested the leader’s legitimacy and repeatedly 
questioned his qualifications and authority. In 1902, the Office of Indian Affairs 
replaced H.G. Nickerson with H.E. Wadsworth, who espoused a far less aggressive 
political agenda. 
With a new Agent, the Arapaho council once again operated harmoniously, 
while conflicts on the Shoshone side of the reservation intensified. In 1903, Agent 
Wadsworth explained the volatile situation in a letter to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, “Ever since the death of that grand old man, Washakie, Chief of the Shoshoni, 
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there has been a continual struggle in that tribe between the two principal factions 
thereof, for supremacy in the affairs of that people. Although Chiefs are no longer 
recognized by the Department, the Indians still consider certain ones as such, and this 
distinction is eagerly sought and hardly fought for.”45 Wadsworth believed that given 
the disruption following the chief’s death, this practice was to be expected, however, 
more recent outbreaks of violence placed all reservation inhabitants in harm’s way. The 
agent noted that strife among the Shoshone “assumes a more serious phase as time goes 
on. Two severe encounters took place just before I took charge of this agency, and two 
weeks afterwards, a pitched battle between the two factions occurred right at the 
agency, lasting nearly all night, and resulting in the pounding of two of the combatants, 
one nearly fatally. This has, of course, stirred all members of that tribe to a fever heat, 
and the final outcome is uncertain.”46 Wadsworth concluded that only additional troops 
to Fort Washakie could ensure the safety of Wind River people.  
During the transition from chieftain leadership to business councils, the 
instability of reservation affairs complicated the Arapaho and Shoshone relationship. 
The volatility of the Shoshone council, especially the constant infighting, disrupted 
reservation business and perpetually annoyed Arapaho leaders. Though each tribal 
council managed their own affairs, the shared status of the reservation necessitated the 
infrequent meeting of both councils to make larger, reservation wide decisions. Indian 
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Agent James McLaughlin’s reappearance in 1904 further complicated the transition in 
political authority, as land cession agents sought more than half of the Wind River.   
Land Cession of 1904 
In 1904, James McLaughlin returned to the Wind River to negotiate another 
cession of reservation land. Like the previous agreement in 1896, McLaughlin 
professed a commitment to treating the Arapaho and Shoshone fairly, but indicated that 
a recent Supreme Court decision limited their negotiating power. The case to which he 
referred, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, involved a Kiowa leader, Lone Wolf, who claimed 
that under the Medicine Lodge Treaty, the United States defrauded Native Americans of 
land. The Supreme Court ruled against Lone Wolf, and declared that the United States 
held plenary power, or nearly unlimited federal authority, to alter a tribal nation’s land 
base.47 This ruling affected Native peoples across the country, as Indian Agents 
unilaterally sold the “surplus lands,” created by the General Allotment Act of 1887, for 
non-Native homesteading. On the Wind River, McLaughlin’s presence, and the 
proposed land cession, was little more than a courtesy extended to the Arapaho and 
Shoshone, as the 1904 negotiations merely allowed councils to help the Office of Indian 
Affairs decide which surplus sections to sell, and when to open Arapaho and Shoshone 
land for settlement.   
In mid-April of 1904, Arapaho and Shoshone camps formed near their agency to 
discuss the land cession. Though councils now guided the majority of reservation 
business, a decision of this magnitude required the participation of nearly all reservation 
inhabitants. As they gathered together, Agent H.E. Wadsworth issued double rations, 
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with which the two tribal nations hosted a great feast before the land cession council. 
Edward Farlow, a Wyoming settler, later recalled the scene, as Shoshone and Arapaho 
people first gathered near the agency that spring. “While the negotiations were going 
on,” he wrote, “the entire personnel of both tribes were camped around the agency and 
the young folks had a good time.”48 Following the great feast, McLaughlin outlined the 
proposed land cession on maps of the reservation, and Arapaho and Shoshone leaders 
carefully considered the region in question. Farlow witnessed the great council, “The 
proceedings went on very slowly. The first day or so was spent in getting the boundaries 
of the land they proposed to sell laid out. Many very solemn speeches were made by the 
leading Indians who wished to impress upon the rest of the tribe that the Indians should 
not be hasty and should give the matter very grave study before acting.”49 With the 
proposed boundaries clearly demarcated, James McLaughlin explained the land cession 
terms to council participants. 
First, the Indian Agent insisted that the Arapaho and Shoshone could not 
possibly maintain their large reservation, as numerous white settlers clamored for arable 
land. With this assertion in mind, the agent recommended the sale of 1.48 million acres 
of “surplus lands,” created by allotment, on the northeastern side of the Wind River. In 
1891, the Arapaho and Shoshone had agreed to cede the land in question, but Congress 
refused to ratify the agreement on the grounds that the area was too small. 
McLaughlin’s proposal in 1904, added 180,000 acres to the previously approved 
cession, but the agent maintained that the Arapaho and Shoshone would still hold title 
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to “the garden spot of that section of the country.”50 For their signatures, the United 
States government would compensate the tribal nations with nearly one million dollars 
in cash and supplies. McLaughlin told the councils that in formulating the agreement, 
he ensured that Wind River inhabitants retained prime farming and grazing land “three-
fourths of which is irrigable land, [and] allows 490 acres each for the 1,650 Indians now 
belonging on the reservation.”51  
When given an opportunity to speak, Arapaho leaders initially objected, not only 
to the quantity of land, but also of the area in question. Lone Bear, acting spokesman for 
the Arapaho, gave a brief comment and then deferred to the rest of his council in 
making the final decision. In his opening speech, the leader simply stated, “I understand 
what he comes for, and I will let him know what I think of it, and I will tell what part of 
the Reservation I want to sell.”52 The leader left the cession council shortly after this 
statement, as he received news that his wife had fallen ill and returned home to tend to 
her care. In Lone Bear’s absence, Reverend Sherman Coolidge and the remaining 
Arapaho councilmen ineffectively negotiated their position. They expressed disapproval 
about the region to be ceded, because several Arapaho families lived in the northern 
country. McLaughlin countered this resistance, protesting that “by including any portion 
of the lands north of the Big Wind River or east of the Big Popo-Agie [sic] River in the 
diminished reservation it would only be a short time until the whites would be 
clamoring to have it open to settlement.”53 Frustrated with their unfavorable negotiating 
position, many Arapaho leaders refused to participate, and left the land cession council. 
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In Arapaho political culture, when a councilman abandons his post, the action 
symbolizes his dissatisfaction with the subject matter or atmosphere of the meeting. In 
doing so, departing council members break the quorum, thereby halting negotiations. At 
the 1904 land cession council however, leaders vacated their positions and government 
officials simply sought signatures from the remaining Arapahos present, a move that 
rankled the Arapaho business council.  
Probably unaware of this Arapaho custom, McLaughlin continued negotiations. 
In his memoirs, the agent noted an apparent disparity in the caliber of spokesmen who 
participated in the council, however. “The Arapahoes were as strong numerically, as the 
Shoshones,” he wrote, “but the latter had the advantage of a spokesman whose gift of 
language and acquirements made him a man to be regarded with some respect. His 
name was George Terry, a mixed blood, an elder of the Mormon church and a talker of 
some ability.”54 The Arapaho boasted several loquacious speakers, however most of 
them left the council before given a chance to comment on the proposed land deal. 
Practically running the show, the Shoshone leader proved far more willing to negotiate. 
In presenting his opening comments, Terry eloquently stated the business at hand, 
Major McLaughlin, our worthy Agent, Ladies and Gentlemen: This is no little 
bargain we are entering into. It is not like selling a wagon, a horse, or something 
of that nature, but it is something we are parting with forever, and can never 
recover again. These lands that we are about to dispose of have been our lands 
for ages. They have been our lands by inheritance for many, many years before 
the white man came this way. These same lands have been our lands by 
conquest. Our fathers fought with every nation that came near them and came 
off victorious, and from that day to this, they held this land as their own. These 
lands are our lands by treaty stipulation. We have given up vast tracts for the 
little tract of land called the Wind River Reservation.55 
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Terry indicated that the Shoshone council recognized the opportunities presented by 
Agent McLaughlin, but fully appreciated the magnitude of their decision. After 
considerable negotiation, the Shoshone approved of the land cession, because they did 
not live on the area in question and recognized that McLaughlin and government 
officials adamantly sought control of the region. Above all else, approving parties 
believed, as McLaughlin did, that in ceding the land, they would reduce the crushing 
weight of non-Native settlers that squeezed in around the unmarked boundaries of their 
home. According to the treaty, the Big Wind River now acted as a clear line of 
demarcation between reservation inhabitants and the surrounding non-Native 
communities.  
 On April 21, 1904, McLaughlin secured the signatures of 282 council 
participants, the necessary majority of men older than eighteen years. A considerable 
disparity of voters existed, however. Of the 247 eligible Shoshones, 202 signed the 
document, while only 80 of the 237 Arapahos signed. In agreeing to the land cession, 
the Shoshone and Arapaho received $50 per capita for each member of the two tribal 
nations, $150,000 to build an irrigation system, $50,000 in livestock, $50,000 for a 
school fund, and the Office of Indian Affairs placed the remainder of the settlement into 
a newly created general welfare fund.56 Government agents planned to sell Wind River 
land at $1.50 an acre for the first year, $1.25 an acre for the four years after the first, 
and no less than $1.00 an acre after five years. During negotiations the Arapaho gained 
few concessions, except for a promise that individuals currently living on the ceded 
portion, or “diminished reservation” would receive adequate payment for their land.  
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In a speech approving the land cession, one of the remaining Arapahos, Sherman 
Coolidge, pointed out possible benefits of the agreement. Coolidge stated, “I am glad 
that Major McLaughlin has come to us to purchase a portion of our reservation. The 
proposed ceded portion has not been used by us except for grazing purposes, and I think 
the cash money will be of more value among the Arapahoes and Shoshones.” Above all 
else, Coolidge thought that the funds from the land cession would prove invaluable to 
reservation development, “We need the money that we will get from the sale of these 
lands for improvements on the unceded portion, and to feed and clothe our poor people 
and children. I think the sooner the deal is made and completed, the better for all.”57 
Many Arapahos did not share Coolidge’s sentiments, and denounced his unsanctioned 
actions for the tribal nation. After the council, Arapaho leaders wrote scathing letters to 
the Office of Indian Affairs, protesting McLaughlin’s dishonest negotiating practices, 
which secured so few Arapaho votes.58 
On the other hand, the Shoshone thanked government agents for the chance to 
negotiate the terms of sale for their “surplus lands.” Though McLaughlin called these 
types of negotiations “bread and beef treaties,” George Terry wanted all government 
officials present to be aware of a new age in the political leadership of the Wind 
River.59 Terry concluded his land cession remarks by telling McLaughlin, “Now, Major, 
We all thank you very much for the feast, but we want it understood, that we do not 
give our consent to your agreement because you have filled us with beef, bacon, sugar, 
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flour and coffee. It has gone upon record that all the white man has to do, to get the 
consent of the Indian to anything he desires, is to fill him up with what he likes. I want 
it to go on record, that notwithstanding the fact that we have been feasted, we have 
considered this bill in a sober and thoughtful manner.”60 In concluding the cession 
council, McLaughlin returned to Washington, D.C., and less than a year later Congress 
ratified the agreement, effectively preparing the way for non-Native settlement. 
 The Natrona Country Tribune reported the treaty on April 28, 1904. The 
newspaper announced that upon its approval, the agreement released “to public 
settlement one million four hundred and eighty thousand acres of land in the Wind 
River Reservation in Wyoming, the opening to occur in June 1906.”61 Though relatively 
excited about the news, the Tribune warned that potential settlers must choose their 
homesteads wisely, “As a very little of the land is valuable without irrigation it is not 
expected that there will be a great rush to secure the land but rather to get water 
rights.”62 As one might expect, once homesteaders rushed onto the region, even the 
most willing councilmen and their constituents began to regret the land cession.  
Troubles 
Complaints surfaced almost immediately after the land cession council. While 
most of the Shoshones approved of the land sale, many Arapahos believed that 
McLaughlin deceived them, and deplored his underhanded tactics to secure the 
necessary signatures. When Congress approved the land cession the following March, 
Lone Bear, who was largely absent from negotiations, immediately objected. On March 
6, 1905, he wrote, “We think treaty ratified by Congress not agree with original treaty 
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signed by tribe.”63 Indeed, Arapaho business councilmen repeatedly protested the land 
cession to their agent. Wadsworth funneled their complaints to the Office of Indian 
Affairs, but dismissed their significance to his superiors. “Very little attention is being 
paid to the complaints and kicks of these old men,” he wrote on August 9, 1905. “I am 
very much gratified to see that their influence is rapidly dissipating. The sooner these 
peoples are made to understand that progress is the order of the day for the individual 
without reference to their wishes or to the influences of the tribe, the better it will be for 
all, and the more strength will be given to the efforts being made by these young men 
who are now trying to follow the white man’s way.”64 When their efforts to address the 
land cession failed to instigate serious change, Arapaho councilmen sought the aid of 
St. Stephen’s personnel and renewed a familiar request - they wanted off of the Wind 
River. 
The Shoshones’ seemingly unabashed willingness to surrender half of the 
reservation further infuriated the Arapaho. Facing the dual aggravations of the 
Shoshone’s blasé attitude and their agent’s cavalier behavior, Lone Wolf turned to 
Father J. B. Sifton, of the St. Stephen’s mission, for help. Sifton agreed to translate a 
letter for the Arapaho council, requesting a separate reservation, away from the 
Shoshone. The priest reported to his superiors, that although their actions might be rash, 
Sifton did communicate the Arapahos’ desire “to be transferred to some other section of 
Wyoming, the ‘Powder River,’ where they might have an agency of their own. 
Incidentally they made some very bitter remarks and complaints against their present 
agent, Maj. Wadsworth… [including] accusations of ‘thief,’ ‘liar,’ ‘enemy of the 
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Indian.’”65 Compliant in their request, Sifton sensed an impending reprimand for his 
part in their campaign to leave the Wind River. Preempting the rebuke, Sifton explained 
to Wadsworth that since “I am able to converse with the Arapahoes in their own tongue, 
they very frequently apply to me to write their letters for them, and I always make it a 
point to accommodate them as much as possible.”66 On this particular occasion 
however, Father Sifton attracted considerable ire from Agent Wadsworth as the 
Arapaho protested his leadership of the Wind River and requested their own 
reservation.  
The Office of Indian Affairs forwarded a copy of the offending correspondence 
to Wadsworth, who attempted to contradict their depiction of the reservation. The Agent 
wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “The suggestion made by them [the 
Arapaho] that they have a separate reservation and another agent, meets with no favor 
whatever with the very great majority of their tribe, and such a proposition would meet 
no support whatever outside of their own coterie.”67 Invoking a supposed generational 
gap between Arapaho leadership and their constituents, Wadsworth remarked that the 
Arapaho “have become established here, they have become allotted and the younger 
members of the tribe are going ahead and improving their farms with the understanding 
that this is to be their permanent home. They are perfectly satisfied, as they have the 
best part of this state for their reservation.”68 Undeterred, the Arapaho remained on the 
Wind River, but sought a meeting with Inspector McLaughlin to adequately address 
their grievances regarding the land cession council. 
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In 1906, Agent Wadsworth continued to agitate Arapaho councilmen. At the 
same time that homesteaders greedily rushed onto Native lands, the provisions allocated 
to the Arapaho and Shoshone failed to arrive. Compounding these problems, 
Wadsworth drastically reduced rations in an attempt to encourage production from 
Arapaho and Shoshone farmers. In the summer of 1906, the agent wrote, “The most 
important innovation, namely, that of withholding rations from all able-bodied Indians, 
has been in my opinion, the greatest incentive to individual effort that has ever been 
brought to bear upon these people.” In reducing the number of inhabitants receiving 
rations from more than 1500 to 450, Wadsworth only allowed assistance to “the old and 
infirm, and the women and children who have no other means of support.”69 By that 
December, elders Runs Across River and Stone Breaker joined council members Lone 
Bear, Little Wolf, Tallow and Yellow Calf in demanding a delegation to Washington 
and a meeting with McLaughlin.  
Justifying their need for a delegation, the Arapaho business council outlined the 
many fallacies with the 1904 agreement. They angrily protested that several Arapahos 
had not received their $50 per capita payments. Additionally, Arapaho leaders objected 
to the development of the Riverton Township on the eastern border of the reservation, a 
provision they vehemently disagreed with while present at the land cession. Council 
members believed that a non-Native border town so close to their side of the reservation 
spelled disaster, and insisted that they meet with McLaughlin to address these 
grievances. In passing their objections on to his superiors, Wadsworth tried to minimize 
Arapaho dissatisfaction with the 1904 land cession. The agent insisted, “Practically all 
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of the Shoshoni and a large majority of the Arapaho, including all the younger and 
progressive members of the tribe, were heartily in favor of such a treaty, and signed the 
same.”70 With regards to the establishment of Riverton, Wadsworth blamed the 
Arapaho council that contained, “A few of the old Arapahos, who had opposed the 
allotment of land in severalty [and] also opposed the ratification of this treaty, finally 
withdrawing from the council…. These disaffected Arapaho have had much to say 
about the treaty, and some of them refusing to accept their allotments when the allotting 
agent was engaged in that work, have been compelled to see white men file on lands.” 71 
Despite these assurances, the Office of Indian Affairs finally agreed to meet with the 
Arapaho council, and a delegation of leaders left for Washington in 1907.72   
Notwithstanding the near constant Arapaho protest, homesteaders pushed 
toward the reservation. Boosters marketed Wind River land with an array of fantastic 
claims. The Norfolk Daily News published a “Homeseeker’s Map and Guide of the Rich 
and Famous: Shoshoni Reservation in Wyoming,” that contained a fair bit of fiction, as 
well as fact. For a mere thirty-five cents, the reader could acquaint herself with the best 
land open for settlement, including some of the “richest area of varied wealth 
undeveloped and unclaimed in the world.”73 The authors touted several very real 
benefits of reservation lands, including exceptional grass for stock grazing, miles of 
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coal and oil deep within the earth for extraction, the majesty of the Wind River range 
and an unrivaled view of the Rocky Mountains. At the same time, the authors ignored 
the less attractive aspects of central Wyoming – the weather, miles of un-arable land, 
and unpredictable seasonal rainfalls – making even the most skeptical financier willing 
to invest in the Wind River.   
In doing his part, Agent Wadsworth prepared the way for incoming 
homesteaders by attempting to secure a continued military presence at Fort Washakie. 
The War Department placed the post on a “temporary list” at the conclusion of the 
Indian Wars, because it was difficult to transport supplies into the region. In addition, 
Fort D.A. Russell in Cheyenne and Fort Mackenzie in Sheridan provided the necessary 
protection to Wyoming residents. In 1905, pending serious intervention, the War 
Department planned to evacuate Fort Washakie, leaving the Wind River without 
military support. Wadsworth sought to retain the troops’ service, not only for the 
protection of the agency, but also because military personnel were the primary 
purchasers of Native-made wares and surplus food. The agent reported that “During the 
present fiscal year [1905], the Indians have supplied the post with all of the farm 
produce necessary for its consumption, and only a small number, comparatively of the 
Indian farmers have begun to properly cultivate their lands.”74 Wadsworth feared that if 
the War Department vacated Fort Washakie, he would be unable to ensure fair market 
value for the crops that the Arapaho and Shoshone harvested. In addition to these 
concerns, Wadsworth noted the impending flood of homesteaders to the region, and 
reminded the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “These Indians have lately signed a 
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treaty with this Department, throwing open to settlement about one million and a half 
acres of their reservation lands. This will result in thousands of land seekers inspecting 
and overrunning this section for many months, and if no other protection is afforded 
than the half-dozen Indian police now available, it is hard to even approximate the 
lawlessness which must follow.”75 Fort Washakie remained on the list of “temporary” 
posts, but in accordance with Wadsworth’s requests, the War Department continued its 
military presence at the Shoshone Agency.  
Just as Wadsworth predicted, lawlessness increased as settlers moved near the 
reservation. In September 1906, the agent explained in his annual report, “On account 
of the rapid settling up of lands lately ceded, of this reservation, new towns are 
springing up near Indian settlements and the troubles resultant from the illicit sale of 
whiskey to Indians promises to assume serious proportions, unless additional police 
force may be authorized.”76 As it was, Arapaho and Shoshone policemen relied heavily 
on Fort Washakie personnel to investigate reported crimes on the reservation. The 
increasing crime rate, fueled, in part, by liquor consumption and Native dissatisfaction, 
troubled reservation inhabitants. Of particular alarm, a band of vigilantes, targeting land 
cession signers and their families, arose on the reservation. Their actions, including 
stalking and threats of violence, concerned Agency personnel and Arapaho and 
Shoshone business councilmen, as the mob sought retribution for the relinquishment of 
Wind River lands.  
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 On December 20, 1906, the vigilantes came for George Terry. In the early 
morning hours, neighbors spotted the light of a raging fire on the Terry homestead. 
Chief Clerk E.E. Eisenhart arrived on the scene, investigated the fire and later reported 
the incident to Agent Wadsworth who was away on holiday at the time of the incident. 
The clerk stated, “Last night about 1 o’clock fire was seen at George Terry’s place. It 
was then under such headway that it could not be stopped.”77 Among the charred 
remains, “Two stacks of hay, the barn, 4 horses belonging to Mr. Terry, [and] the tribal 
stallion was also burned so badly as to make it necessary to shoot him.” Thankfully, the 
Shoshone councilman and his family were not home when the unknown person or 
persons set the fire, though the damage was extensive. In assessing the situation, 
Eisenhart suggested that the agency make “up a purse for Mr. Terry as we feel that he 
has had more than his share of hard luck.”78 Though no hard evidence connected the 
vigilantes to this crime, rumors swept the reservation. While Terry had escaped bodily 
harm in this attack, many believed that he was a targeted man. 
 Only a short time later, tragedy struck George Terry again, this time fatally. On 
the night of January 11, 1907, Terry and the Shoshone business council met to finalize 
plans for a delegation trip with the Arapaho to Washington D.C., for which they would 
leave later that week. At the meeting’s conclusion, Terry exited an agency building, 
when at least three people overpowered the councilman and repeatedly struck him with 
an iron bar until he died. They then cut his body into several pieces and fled the scene. 
A passerby found Terry’s body shortly after the attack and called for help. Chief Clerk 
Eisenhart notified Wadsworth, and then called upon the agency physician to conduct an 
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autopsy. The physician/coroner later released the body to Terry’s wife, Kate, who 
promptly took him to Draper, Utah for burial.   
Letters poured into the agency from across the country, as news of Terry’s death 
spread. Newspapers from Buffalo, New York to Los Angeles, California reported the 
attack, and predicted an impending uprising on the Wind River.79 In part, the paranoia 
of a Native outbreak of violence stems not just from the murder of George Terry, but a 
mainstream American understanding that reservations supposedly tamed and pacified 
wild indigenous peoples. As Philip Deloria explains, “The outbreak to be feared, then, 
was not so much the promise of widespread violence, as it was the eruption of resistant 
forms…both old and new.”80 While radically overstated in the national press, tension on 
the reservation did escalate in the days following Terry’s murder. Reverend John 
Roberts experienced the armament of the Wind River first hand, when returning home 
from a funeral in an adjacent town. On the road to the reservation, the reverend 
encountered a sentry of four Wind River Indians.81 Upon a given signal they started to 
close in around his buggy, and, scared for his life, Roberts turned around and headed 
back to town. He later wrote to his superiors, “I feared for Mrs. Roberts and the children 
who were alone at the Mission. And remembering from what had been intimated to 
me…I feared for the safety of my family.”82 Roberts contacted Agent Wadsworth, who 
sent troops to the mission and issued an armed escort from Fort Washakie to bring the 
reverend safely onto the Wind River.  
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In a state of heightened security, reservation inhabitants all desperately wanted 
to know who killed George Terry. Immediately after his body was discovered, wild 
accusations spread across the reservation. The Shoshone initially suspected 
unscrupulous Arapahos, especially those who resented the land cession, of the brutal 
crime, as did several members of the Agency personnel and Wyoming media outlets. 
The Wind River Mountaineer boldly claimed on January 18, “Action of Indians Cause 
Uneasiness” and “Terry was Murdered Because He Favored Treaty, and Others Will 
Probably Follow Him.”83 In the article, the Mountaineer reported, “the murder of 
George Terry at the Agency last week was but the beginning of the extermination of 
those on the reservation who were instrumental in the [1904] treaty.”84 In light of this 
news, Agent Wadsworth received several telegrams from messengers on his return to 
the Wind River, “urging [him] not to return to the reservation, as Terry had been 
murdered by those who had opposed the treaty, and that I, with others who had been 
concerned in the matter, had been slated for the same fate.”85 Undeterred, the Agent 
returned to the reservation to sort out the matter, but cautiously left his family behind.  
In speaking with several Arapahos, both Reverend John Roberts and Agent 
Wadsworth dismissed accusations of Arapaho culpability. Roberts reported to his 
superiors, “The disaffected ones among the lower Arapahoes, whom I especially feared, 
on account of the Treaty, disclaim all sinister purposes.”86 Similarly, Wadsworth 
dismissed Arapaho guilt, even though the Shoshone, “Believing that the Arapaho were 
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responsible for the death of their head councilman…were anxious to fight it out at once. 
From my knowledge of the case I am not of the opinion that the murder was committed 
by Arapahos at all.” Positing a different scenario, the Agent suggested, “The more 
reasonable theory, to me, is that some personal enemies of Terry’s did the deed, and to 
divert suspicion from themselves contrived to throw it upon those who were known to 
be unfriendly to Terry and others who favored the treaty above mentioned.”87 
Distrusting the inexperienced Wind River police force, or even Fort Washakie 
personnel, to investigate, Wadsworth called for additional help. 
In mid-January, Agent Wadsworth notified the Department of Justice of Terry’s 
death, and requested the help of a special investigator to solve the murder. Though the 
crime rocked the stability of the Wind River, the Department of Justice drug its feet in 
assigning a special investigator. Finally, Special Agent Jesse E. Flanders, from the 
Office of Indian Affairs, arrived on the Wind River on April 13, 1907, three months 
after George Terry’s murder. Wadsworth, eager to assist in the criminal investigation, 
passed along “the impression that no clues of value have been found and that the 
perpetrators will never be discovered.” He proudly reported, “I am satisfied that the 
parties responsible for the killing have now decided that no effort will be made to locate 
them, and if a total stranger is sent here to look into the matter I feel sure that the task 
will be a comparatively easy one.”88 By the time Flanders arrived at the Shoshone 
Agency, potential clues and evidence appeared long gone, but the violent murder 
lingered, fresh in the minds of Wind River residents. 
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It took Jesse Flanders only one week to solve the murder and secure a 
confession from the guilty parties. Though his final report did not indicate specific 
investigation and interrogation tactics, Wadsworth and other agency personnel seemed 
pleased with Flanders’s expedited methods, which purportedly closed the case. On 
April 20, 1907, Flanders and Wadsworth announced the successful arrest of two 
Shoshone brothers, James and John McAdams. Flanders later told his superiors, that 
John McAdams made a confession “to the sheriff of this county and several other 
parties, including myself, that he held Terry while Bat Enos, George Enos and Charlie 
Meyers…beat him to death with an iron bar.” When the investigator inquired into John 
McAdams’s motive for killing Terry, he stated, “that Terry had threatened to kill him 
while at a dance sometime before the murder and for the further reason that Terry had 
recently been elected delegate…to Washington to expedite the disbursement of the first 
installment of funds due them for the sale of land recently ceded by them.”89 Flanders 
questioned the supposed coconspirators, but each had a strong alibi for the night in 
question.  
With a confession, the case appeared solved however, new evidence 
complicated Flanders’s findings. A witness stepped forward, and told the investigator 
that he saw the two McAdams brothers, with an unidentified woman, near the agency 
just minutes before Terry’s death. Suspicious of this report, Flanders investigated 
further and revealed that James McAdams and Kate Terry, the deceased’s wife, were 
having an affair. Flanders believed that Kate Terry was the unidentified woman spotted 
by the witness, however, he could not prove this suspicion. Since John McAdams did 
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not implicate his brother in the murder, and the investigator had no crime with which to 
charge James, Flanders eventually released the suspected murderer.90 News of the 
affair, and of course the confession, convinced Wadsworth of John McAdams’ guilt. 
The agent commended Flanders’s hard work and expressed hope that peace would 
return to the reservation. Wadsworth told the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “In my 
opinion Mr. Flanders has shown judgment and ability in his investigation…The clearing 
up of this case will go a long ways towards controlling the lawless element in this 
section, and will be a wholesome object lesson to prospective evil-doers.”91 The case 
was far from over, however.  
At the United States District Court in Cheyenne, a Grand Jury indicted John 
McAdams indicted and held him over for trial in November. His family secured 
council, who immediately questioned the legality of McAdams’ confession. Assistant 
District Attorney, Edward T. Clark, regretfully reported to Flanders and Wadsworth in 
October, “the only evidence against McAdam[s] was that of a confession of the 
perpetration of the crime, made by him and involving three other parties.” Since the 
three coconspirators maintained legitimate alibis, “it will be readily understood that the 
confession cannot be substantiated in that regard at least, and it would appear that 
unless corroborating evidence may be secured against McAdam[s] there is very little 
likelihood of an indictment being obtained.”92 Flanders and Wadsworth watched as their 
case disintegrated on November 15, 1907, when the U.S. District Court in Cheyenne, 
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Wyoming, found that the case of U.S. v. John McAdams lacked sufficient evidence, and 
released the defendant.93 On December 14, 1907, John McAdams returned to his family 
a free man. His brother James, his new sister-in-law Kate, his wife and children as well 
as numerous other supporters celebrated his release with a party at his home.94  
Today, the brutal death of George Terry remains an unsolved crime. The likely 
perpetrator, a cold and calculating housewife, charmed her lover and his brother into 
beating her spouse to death. Yet, so many questions remained unanswered, so many 
leads left unexplored. Perhaps the most compelling facet of his death is the immediate 
and overwhelming suspicion that the Arapaho committed the crime, and that their likely 
motivation was Terry’s participation in the 1904 land cession. Clearly the 
relinquishment of half of the reservation deeply unsettled the Wind River community, 
but would the disaffected parties resort to murder? And if so, why stop with the death of 
George Terry? In today’s modern era of forensic investigation, one can suggest at least 
ten other possible suspects, each with their own motivation for wanting George Terry 
dead. Yet in 1907, the case seemed simple, the evidence scant and the conviction 
botched. Today, the nagging question remains, what if the McAdams brothers did not 
kill George Terry? Perhaps will we will never know, but the mystery still lingers on the 
reservation and as Agent Wadsworth predicted, “It will be a long time, however, before 
these Indians will get over this affair.”95 
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During the period from 1893 to 1907, the transition from chieftain leadership to 
business councils did not occur immediately or easily. For the Arapaho, the death of 
revered chief Black Coal in 1893 necessitated a change in political authority. Though 
Sharp Nose retained the position of spokesman, other prominent figures in the Arapaho 
community joined the ranks of the first business council. On the other hand, the 
Shoshone continued to rely heavily upon the leadership of their elderly chief, Washakie. 
They formed a loosely organized council for the 1896 land cession, and periodically 
utilized these council members, but Washakie fully managed reservation affairs. After 
the chief’s death in 1901, the Shoshone faced a crisis of authority. Rival factions fought 
for control of the Shoshone business council, and intimidation and brutality marred the 
western side of the reservation, as powerful Shoshone men attempted to command the 
political organization. Only the spectacular murder of Shoshone spokesman George 
Terry, in 1907, stymied the vicious cycle and stabilized the reservation. In Terry’s 
absence, the Shoshone business council elected a new spokesman, and continued to 
conduct reservation business with the Arapaho, promoting a new era in reservation 
politics. Though they often struggled, these councils expressed sovereignty over their 
land and resources. They incorporated traditional leadership practices into a democratic 
form of governance, and after nearly forty years on the Wind River, the Shoshone and 
Arapaho achieved a considerable measure of self-determination. 
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Chapter 4 – Language of Politics 
On a cold winter’s night in 1908, nearly one hundred and ten Arapaho and 
Shoshone people gathered to watch their tribal councils in action. The subject of the 
evening’s meeting, an oil lease to a non-Native businessman, troubled council members 
and their constituents. Curious spectators filled an agency meeting room, and awaited a 
decision on their reservation’s future. Earlier in the week, Arapaho and Shoshone 
leaders met individually to discuss the proposed lease, and the evening meeting allowed 
council members of both tribal nations to come together and question the hopeful 
speculators and negotiate leasing terms. Their agent, H.E. Wadsworth, believed that the 
meeting would be short, and that the council would vote favorably for natural resource 
leasing, as they had done, earlier that year. But Wadsworth underestimated the tenacity 
of Arapaho and Shoshone councilmen that wintery night. The meeting lasted for two 
days, as the councils questioned how their agent spent leasing revenues, debated the 
merits of continuing land leases, and reaffirmed their position of reservation authority to 
their agent, their constituents and prospective businessmen. 
In his opening remarks, Arapaho councilman Sitting Eagle set the tone for the 
two day event. Pointing to their impatient agent and prospective business associates, 
Sitting Eagle said “You are the white men and we are the Shoshone and Arapaho, we 
are not children and we are not playing.”1 Indeed, reservation land holdings were not 
the playthings of the Arapaho and Shoshone business councils. But more than 
emphasizing this point, Sitting Eagle’s words also clearly defined the parameters of 
reservation business negotiations, as he rhetorically placed the “white men” in direct 
                                                 
1
 Joint Business Council Minutes, December 11, 1908, NARA-VIII, RG 75, AR, Entry 8, GAR, 1890-
1960, Box 5.  
175 
opposition to the Arapaho and Shoshone. This discursive strategy, frequently employed 
by Wind River councilmen at subsequent meetings, generated an “us versus them” 
mentality that effectively drew Arapaho and Shoshone leaders closer in the goal of 
reservation development. Though councilmen from both tribal nations espoused 
different cultural practices, social systems, and even political mindsets, the desire to 
solve reservation problems surpassed their lingering animosity. That December, 
business councils denied Wadsworth’s repeated requests for a vote on the land leases 
until each member agreed to the terms and locations of the new venture. The councils 
eventually reached full consensus, after two days of negotiation, fully illustrating 
Arapaho and Shoshone dedication to the management of reservation lands. This council 
meeting, one of the first conducted by the newly created Joint Business Council, 
demonstrated the shifting political mentality and rhetoric employed by Wind River 
leaders. 
Perhaps more than any other time in reservation history, at the turn of the 
twentieth century, language – not just the dialects that council members spoke but the 
words they employed – played a key role in political negotiations. At council meetings, 
long standing Arapaho interpreter, Thomas Crispin, spoke for elderly councilmen when 
they requested his services, as did Shoshone councilman and interpreter Charles Lahoe. 
But, by the early 1900s, a growing number of Arapaho and Shoshone leaders were 
bilingual. Facilitated by the half century of sustained contact with English speakers and 
assimilationist pressure to participate in boarding school education, the increased use of 
both indigenous languages and English, influenced reservation business in three ways. 
First, when councilmen like Sitting Eagle wished to powerfully demonstrate a point, the 
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use of well-crafted English phrases illustrated both competency regarding business 
decisions and clarity of thought. In addition, when councilmen needed to speak 
privately, the Arapaho and Shoshone languages, of which their agents exhibited little 
knowledge, provided the perfect cover of secrecy. Finally, bilingualism allowed Wind 
River leaders to walk in both worlds. They could utilize their English skills, honed 
while in attendance at reservation boarding schools, to communicate and conduct 
business with non-Native peoples. At the same time, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders 
spoke their native languages with their families, when storytelling or during cultural 
ceremonies, and applauded educators who fostered such bilingualism in their schools. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, assimilation and necessity inadvertently created a 
flourishing bilingual culture on the Wind River. 
At the same time, the federal government also adopted a new discursive strategy 
in the twentieth century, one of guardianship rather than assimilation. Earlier attempts 
to “kill the Indian to save the man,” failed to rid the nation of indigenous people. In 
turn, policy makers of the early twentieth century extended guardianship over tribal 
nations and their land holdings, in the hope of finding the “proper place” for American 
Indians.2 Of course, the doctrine of guardianship was not new. As early as the 1831 
Supreme Court ruling in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the federal government viewed 
its relationship with tribal nations as “that of a ward to his guardian.”3 However, several 
decades of assimilation tempered this guardian mentality. Allotment, or more 
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specifically the land rights and citizenship that accompanied allotment, also 
problematized the official guardianship role of the Office of Indian Affairs. 
Reestablishing this policy doctrine, the federal government employed the rhetoric of 
Native backwardness, and asserted their guardianship over tribal nations through a 
series of court cases at the turn of the twentieth century.4  
The Arapaho and Shoshone, like other tribal nations, did not need a guardian. 
Rather, they wanted an ally who could help them maneuver the complicated 
bureaucracy of the Office of Indian Affairs. Instead, Wind River business councils 
found that their government appointed agents actively attempted to subordinate their 
authority, and sought only to stabilize, not revitalize, reservation communities. Corrupt 
agents, in bed with non-Native businessmen, further complicated Arapaho and 
Shoshone affairs. In facing these challenges, Wind River business councils of the early 
twentieth century employed the language of politics to generate several critical 
developments. First, councilmen sought more control over reservation land, particularly 
in the form of land leases for natural resource extraction. Additionally, Arapaho and 
Shoshone leaders sought to maintain sovereign borders, as well as improve living 
conditions on the reservation. This meant, above all else, a reassessment of the 
reservation’s education system and of the care given to the infirm and elderly. As a 
powerful current of political expression enveloped the Wind River, reservation leaders 
facilitated the rejuvenation of their communities, paid for, in part, with land leases and 
the extraction of oil from the earth by non-Native businessmen 
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Nature’s Bounty 
 Many Wind River inhabitants knew that oil flowed through the underground 
veins of their reservation. Even before permanently settling in the region, both tribal 
nations travelled to the oil fields of central Wyoming and used nature’s bounty for fuel 
and medicinal purposes. The journey, however, could be difficult, as craggy mountain 
bluffs and roaring rivers deterred fainthearted visitors. Indeed, the surface oil pools and 
deep mineral beds of the Wind River mountain range lay untapped for most of the 
nineteenth century. Explorer of the American West, Benjamin Bonneville, became one 
of the first Anglo-Americans to see the Wyoming oil fields in the 1830s. Bonneville 
heard of the oil beds while travelling through Wyoming, and located one after a 
considerable search through the Wind River foothills. Travelers in his party collected 
samples from the pool “to use as an ointment for the backs of their horses, and as a 
balsam for their own pains and aches.”5 The explorer made note of the find, but 
remained steadfast on his trailblazing expedition to Oregon Territory. Others soon 
followed Bonneville, however, as hunters and trappers increasingly passed through the 
area. In the 1860s, industrious pioneers sunk crudely made test wells in central 
Wyoming, and successfully marketed the oil to the Union Pacific Railroad.6 After the 
railroad’s completion, a wild variety of entrepreneurs became interested in the mineral 
wealth that could be found on Arapaho and Shoshone lands.  
Wind River leaders acknowledged the potential profitability of their resources, 
but lacked the wherewithal to extract the minerals themselves. At the same time, non-
Native companies appeared reticent in working with the tribal nations. Rather than 
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negotiating for oil leases, most aspiring businessmen simply set up shop illegally, on or 
near the reservation. As early as 1890, the Shoshone, concerned by the increasing 
presence of unwelcome speculators, implored Chief Washakie to meet with their 
reservation agent, John Fosher. Washakie told the agent that he had recently travelled to 
a flowing oil spring, a few miles from the agency, to find a non-Native settler 
occupying the land. The chief requested that the Office of Indian Affairs take immediate 
action in removing the squatter, and that they reserve the land for Shoshone 
occupation.7 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in consultation with Agent Fosher, 
agreed to remove the non-Native interloper from the site and decided, “If the spring can 
be utilized for the common benefit of the tribe, it should not be awarded to any 
particular Indian, but if it can be used for the benefit of an individual only, Washakie 
may be permitted to select it.”8 This favorable decision by OIA personnel, in 
conjunction with steadily increasing non-Native interest in the mineral wealth of the 
reservation, encouraged Shoshone and Arapaho leaders to begin a lasting foray into the 
oil business.  
 In 1891, Shoshone and Arapaho chiefs agreed to grant their first oil lease.9 The 
leasee, a Dutch immigrant named Asmus Boysen of Gray, Iowa, dutifully worked the 
claim, but did not give his full attention to the prospect.10 The Arapaho and Shoshone 
                                                 
7
 This particular oil spring, like most on the Shoshone Agency, is located on the western side of the 
reservation where a majority of the Shoshones live.  
8
 T.J. Morgan (CIA) to John Fosher, March 25, 1890, GRHC, Box 60, Folder 4.  
9
 This is one of many decisions that had to be made jointly, despite the location of the lease on the 
Shoshone side of the reservation. This practice of joint decision making, often detested by both councils, 
became increasingly common during the 1890s, as government agents refused to negotiate with the two 
governments separately.  
10
 Boysen later traded in his lease for 640 acres near the mouth of the Wind River, on which he attempted 
to build a hydroelectric dam. Like his previous wildcat ventures, Boysen underestimated the amount of 
time and money the dam would require. Though it powered his copper mine for several years, an 
accidental flood destroyed the Burlington Northern tracks nearby. The railroad empire sued Boysen and 
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received meager financial returns from Boysen’s lackluster work, and expressed to their 
agent considerable frustration about the leasing process. Specifically, Arapaho and 
Shoshone chiefs frequently questioned their agent about the skillset of the men to whom 
they leased ground, what natural resources reservation speculators extracted, and how 
their Indian Agent spent the royalties. Despite the minimal success of their first venture, 
reservation leaders agreed to lease land to additional prospectors in the late 1890s.  
Often, these leases proved at best difficult to manage, and at worst unmitigated 
disasters. Following the approval of the Boysen lease in 1891, reservation leaders 
adopted a standard formula to their leasing agreements, but one that yielded few returns. 
Under contract, the leasee held extraction rights to the area for ten years, and paid the 
tribal nations ten percent of their net earnings. The Arapaho and Shoshone required the 
lease holder to work the claim diligently, and employ Wind River workers for all 
possible tasks. Finally, to gauge the progress of the claim, they required the leasee to 
submit reports to the Secretary of the Interior every three months.11 Several non-Native 
lease holders buried nearly all of their profits within expense reports for machinery and 
labor, effectively stemming the tribal nations’ windfall. In addition, businessmen 
typically refused to hire Arapaho and Shoshone workers, insisting that they lacked 
experience. As profits from land leases failed to materialize, the Arapaho and Shoshone 
initially refused to renew certain leases and denied the requests of additional 
prospectors. At other times, they indiscriminately granted oil leases in the hope of 
striking it rich, but in general, the sporadic granting of oil leases mirrored the turmoil of 
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the newly organized business councils, as the failing health of elderly chiefs 
complicated reservation business, and inexperience plagued rising leaders. 
The death of chieftain leadership at the turn of the twentieth century forever 
altered the ways in which the two tribal nations conducted reservation business. Within 
a decade, Shoshone Chief Washakie, as well as Arapaho chiefs Black Coal and Sharp 
Nose, succumbed to old age.12 In response, respected members of the Arapaho and 
Shoshone communities formed six member councils, which convened regularly to 
discuss matters related to the affairs of the individual tribal nations. While effective in 
handling the concerns of the Arapaho and Shoshone people, land leases and other 
reservation-wide issues increasingly necessitated the participation of representatives 
from both tribal nations. As a result, members of the Arapaho and Shoshone councils 
created the Joint Business Council, or JBC, in 1907. Though similar councils had 
assembled infrequently during the 1890s, the JBC became the first permanent entity of 
its kind.  Above all else, this new council endeavored to address larger, reservation 
concerns, especially the leasing of land for coal and oil extraction. Initially, historical 
rivalries and vast cultural differences problematized the council’s rapport. But, by the 
early 1910s, a unifying desire to gain control over reservation affairs alleviated some of 
this tension. The addition of common business goals, as well as shared enemies in the 
form of a corrupt Indian Agent (H.E. Wadsworth) and dishonest lease holders, further 
improved their relationship.  
 
                                                 
12
 Black Coal died in 1893, Washakie in 1900, and Sharp Nose in 1901. The death of these three men left 
an indelible imprint on Arapaho and Shoshone reservation communities. The three chiefs witnessed vast 
changes to their way of life in the 19th century, established reservation communities on the Wind River, 
and negotiated numerous federal policies, including assimilation and allotment. The void left by their 
deaths proved difficult to fill, especially in Washakie’s case. Please see Chapter 3 for more details.  
182 
“They May Strike Something”  
In the spring of 1907, the newly formed Joint Business Council suspended all 
land leases and requested legal advice from the OIA. By May, a familiar face arrived on 
the Wind River to help the JBC modify their land lease contract. Agent James 
McLaughlin, negotiator of the 1896 and 1904 land cessions, greeted the Arapaho and 
Shoshone councilmen as old friends. At a gathering of the JBC, the agent applauded the 
tribal nations on their commitment to reservation development, and spoke of the 
countless possibilities provided by natural resource extraction. McLaughlin briefly 
discussed the Osage of Indian Territory, who experienced unparalleled success from 
their oil wells, and expressed hope that the Arapaho and Shoshone would witness the 
same fortune.13 On the subject of leasing contracts however, McLaughlin provided little 
assistance. He recommended that the councils require their businessmen to supply a 
preliminary report detailing their projected findings, as well as sufficient financial data 
to assure the councils that the leasee held enough capital to successfully operate a 
producing oil well or coal bed. Like earlier contracts, new Wind River agreements 
required the employment of Arapaho and Shoshone labor whenever possible, quarterly 
statements to the Secretary of the Interior, due diligence to the claim and ten percent of 
the profit. On this final point, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders eagerly proposed an 
addendum increasing their profit margin to twenty percent of the output, but 
McLaughlin balked at the idea and argued that businessmen simply would not pay a 
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higher rate of return. After considerable debate on this issue, council members 
grudgingly accepted ten percent.  
 This meeting also clearly revealed the divergent business approaches embraced 
by the two tribal nations. In general, the Shoshone enthusiastically supported the leasing 
process, and did so for several reasons. First, as Councilman Edmore LeClair excitedly 
proclaimed “I think it will be a great thing for us to be getting money from a thousand 
or two thousand feet under the surface.”14 The notion that financial prosperity, no 
matter how great, resided just under the soles of their feet encouraged the council 
members, and for good reason. By the early twentieth century, Wind River residents 
faced financial destitution. Bad weather, low crop yields and non-existent reservation 
employment burdened the Arapaho and Shoshone people. Compounding these difficult 
conditions, their Indian Agent, H.E. Wadsworth, held tightly to the limited 
congressional appropriations that the two tribal nations received, and provided only 
meager assistance to needy families. With few economic opportunities available in 
central Wyoming, both tribal councils recognized that the badly needed funds from oil 
and coal revenues could support Wind River development and reduce the lingering 
effects of reservation poverty. Councilman LeClair further hoped that “When they get 
to prospecting this country there will be a great deal of work for all of our young 
people.”15 Both Shoshone and Arapaho councilmen welcomed additional employment 
opportunities for Wind River residents, as a way to gain valuable jobsite training. These 
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positions not only gave the workers with a steady income, but provided the tribal 
nations with members who possessed expertise in the coal and oil businesses.  
The Arapaho acknowledged these potential benefits of natural resource 
extraction, but were far more hesitant to revisit the land leasing issue. Previous 
encounters with Agent McLaughlin, specifically the 1904 land cession, tempered their 
enthusiasm and called into question the necessity of giving non-Natives land use and 
rights. Additionally, their perpetual nemesis, Agent H.E. Wadsworth, strongly 
advocated for the tribal nations to support land leasing, which in turn further distanced 
the Arapaho from the venture. Ultimately, Arapaho council member William 
Shakespeare reported to Agent McLaughlin that though many on his council disagreed 
with the plan, they would support a few land leases on the Shoshone side of the 
reservation.16 Shakespeare indicated that several Arapaho leaders believed that they 
“cannot get anything out of this coal, oil, gas, etc., ourselves, [but] if anyone comes here 
and wants to lease it, it will be all right with us.”17 The lukewarm approval by the 
Arapaho council most likely developed with the understanding that after McLaughlin 
left, the issue could be revisited.18 With a more defined contract in hand, the JBC 
resumed granting land contracts. 
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In 1908, there existed no shortage of eager applicants for reservation leases. In 
fact, the decision to lease reservation land nicely coincided with a rush of settlers into 
the area ceded by the Shoshone and Arapaho in 1904. By late summer, the Joint 
Business Council had agreed to lease more than 50,000 acres of reservation land for oil 
and coal development. Agent Wadsworth prophesized in his annual report that “While it 
is possible and even probable that some of these leases are entire speculative in 
character, I think a large majority of them are boni fide [sic]…From present indications 
a prolific oil field will be developed upon the reservation within the next few years.”19 
The agent estimated that the income from the existing leases would equal at least eight 
thousand dollars, a vast increase from years prior. But in many ways, the intensification 
of land leasing on the reservation further complicated the lives of Arapaho and 
Shoshone councilmen. Learning from their previous lease experiences, Wind River 
leaders reasoned that to fully mediate the increased natural resource production on their 
lands, they needed to take a more active role as land holders and entrepreneurs. In doing 
so, they demanded access to reservation account books and sought to control the 
distribution of their oil royalties. In response, Agent Wadsworth attempted to thwart 
their efforts at handling reservation finances. When he inadequately addressed their 
concerns regarding oil revenues, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders questioned the 
trustworthiness of their agent.  
In the fall of 1908, a JBC investigation into reservation finances uncovered the 
unscrupulous behavior, and abuses of federal authority, perpetrated by Agent 
Wadsworth. In part, the scandal stemmed from the unsystematic practice of leasing 
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individually held land plots. The tribal nations, as a whole, owned most of the land 
leased in 1908.20 Accordingly, the JBC mediated nearly all of the reservation land 
leases for coal and oil production, and encouraged individual land holders to consult the 
JBC before signing land leases. Wadsworth, on the other hand, strongly advocated for 
the detribalization of the Arapaho and Shoshone, and believed that individual land 
holders should partake in the economic opportunities provided by non-Native 
businessmen. He contradicted the advice of Arapaho and Shoshone councilmen, and 
facilitated several individual land leases. Once Arapaho or Shoshone families leased 
their land, however, Wadsworth held the money in a trust account instead of paying 
them in cash. When reservation members demanded payment for leasing their 
allotments, the agent issued script, a legal tender redeemable only at non-Native 
stores.21  
Additionally, Wadsworth promoted a lease agreement that required no annual 
payment for land usage, only a percentage of the net profit. Many entrepreneurs who 
worked Wind River claims successfully buried profits in expense reports, effectively 
reducing Arapaho and Shoshone earnings. This contract, with Wadsworth’s assistance, 
also allowed unscrupulous speculators to lease Wind River land for free. Instead of 
working the claim themselves, these dishonest businessmen subleased their plots to 
larger, more established companies. The speculator earned a handsome fee for his part, 
as did agency employees complicit in the deal for their insider information, while the 
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tribal nations received none of the revenue. Arapaho and Shoshone frustrations reached 
a breaking point in late 1908, after each enrolled member received a meager six dollar 
per capita payment from the more than 50,000 acres leased for natural resource 
extraction. Council leaders suspected that Wadsworth diverted a majority of their oil 
revenues to the salaries of “agency employees,” including payments to some, who never 
actually worked on the reservation.22    
Tribal leaders combated these exploitative practices by sending a delegation to 
Washington, D.C. In a meeting with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Arapaho and 
Shoshone councilmen protested their lack of control over reservation finances, 
specifically lease revenues, as well as the inadequate wages paid to Native employees 
on the reservation and the fiscal irresponsibility of their agent. The delegation secured a 
one dollar raise in employee wages, but failed to otherwise sway the Commissioner, 
who supported Wadsworth’s guardianship over reservation income, as well as his 
position of authority on the Wind River. In December 1908, Wadsworth and the JBC 
bitterly clashed, as the agent pressured the tribal nations to grant a large number of land 
leases. In response, the Arapaho forcefully suggested that the JBC temporarily halt land 
leases in order to stabilize reservation affairs, and passionately argued for changes to the 
leasing system. They suggested that the next generation of educated Wind River leaders 
would be in a far greater position to handle the business of coal and oil extraction. “We 
have made many leases and we may be doing wrong,” Yellow Calf insisted, as he listed 
Arapaho concerns. “Our children will be brighter than we are and when they are all the 
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land we have [will be] leased away.”23 When Arapaho councilmen recited this familiar 
argument, the Shoshone countered their hesitance with the immediate benefits of natural 
resource extraction.24  
Shoshone chairman Joe Lejeunesse protested, “They may strike coal, they may 
strike oil, they may strike gas, they may strike copper. There is all kinds of things like 
that and they may strike something.”25 In doing so, the Shoshone leader knew that the 
enthusiasm for resource extraction often proved contagious. The potential uses for oil 
revenues, including better educational facilities and monetary assistance to the infirm 
and elderly, usually persuaded the Arapaho to approve or renew leases, regardless of 
their concerns. At this particular meeting, however, the Arapaho remained unconvinced. 
As the JBC endured a very long day of negotiation,  Shoshone councilmember Dick 
Washakie reminded his Arapaho peers, that “There is none of us on this reservation that 
have money enough to buy the machinery to work that mine with and get money out of 
it.”26 Both the Arapaho and Shoshone councils knew the oil leases held the promise of a 
better future, but the complications of the past year deterred immediate approval of 
additional leases. Agent Wadsworth dismissed the councilmen’s grievances and agitated 
for a quick vote. His impatience further aggravated the council, who knew that their 
agent wholeheartedly supported tribal leases because oil companies called upon him to 
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act as their reservation liaison, and paid the agent handsomely for his assistance. 
Making a stand before their agent, their constituents, and their prospective business 
associates, JBC members negotiated every finite detail of the land leasing process, 
extending their winter meeting for two long days. Finally, the JBC gave their approval 
for the land lease, and in the process secured a major victory in the battle for control of 
reservation lands.  
Scandals 
In 1909, the relationship between Wadsworth and the JBC failed to improve. 
Arapaho and Shoshone council members questioned their agent’s fiscal responsibility, 
and in turn, Wadsworth attempted to subvert the authority of Arapaho and Shoshone 
leaders, while at the same time he clamored for additional land leases. When the tribal 
nations received a mere five dollars per capita payment in 1909, tension between the 
JBC and Wadsworth escalated. In examining accounting records, JBC councilmen 
discovered that Wadsworth spent the bulk of their oil revenues on a telephone line to 
the agency that year, and they forcefully requested a new agent.27 In response, 
Wadsworth launched a two year campaign to disband the individual Arapaho and 
Shoshone councils, as well as the JBC. Wadsworth first requested that the OIA provide 
documentary evidence outlining his role as a “guardian” of the Arapaho and Shoshone. 
According to these documents, the agent could oversee the election of council members, 
determine the matters submitted to the business councils, report his concerns regarding 
unworthy councilmen, and suggest that certain office holders be removed. Though 
fairly influential, Wadsworth hoped for the approval to depose leaders from office or 
shut down the councils completely. In February 1910, Wadsworth suggested that the 
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“time has come to do away entirely with this so-called ‘business committee’ or 
‘business council.’”28 Seeking proof that that the council members were an unnecessary 
indulgence, the disgruntled agent insisted that the election process on the Wind River 
was “always more or less a farce” in which incompetent leaders assumed positions of 
authority.29  
Wadsworth targeted Wind River voting patterns because they differed 
significantly from Anglo-American elections. Though he believed that councilmen 
rigged elections to produce a specific outcome, in reality, they reflected indigenous 
forms of governance, not deception. Arapaho leaders, for instance, earned their offices 
by a near majority vote every election, an anomaly in mainstream American society. 
This pattern did not indicate voter fraud, rather the citizenry’s overwhelming support 
for leaders who earned the position through a lifetime of dedication to their people. 
Arapaho councilmen embodied certain traits including honesty, bravery, generosity and 
a deep understanding of Arapaho culture, all achieved through years of study and good 
deeds. Often, Arapaho leaders managed long terms until death or illness prevented them 
from sitting on the council.30 On the other hand, the Shoshone substituted leaders nearly 
every term, a characteristic that annoyed both the Arapaho and Agent Wadsworth.31 
Shoshone constituents sought a variety of perspectives, and elected leaders of different 
ages to fill council seats. In some cases, inexperienced councilmen proved incapable of 
the task, and in turn the Shoshone called for midterm elections to remove incompetent 
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office holders. The frequent exchange of Shoshone leaders vexed Wadsworth, who 
pointed to this practice as further proof that the Shoshone did not understand the 
purpose of elections. Wadsworth’s accusations of voter fraud indicated his 
obliviousness to Arapaho and Shoshone leadership patterns, rather than genuine 
mismanagement by the councils.  
Ultimately, the Office of Indian Affairs denied Wadsworth’s request to disband 
the councils on the grounds of voter fraud. Though sympathetic to his situation, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs explained that “the reasons given…are not sufficient to 
justify it in recommending to the Secretary of the Interior that such action be had.”32 
Undeterred, Wadsworth objected the existence of the councils in his 1910 annual report. 
First, the agent criticized the members that comprised both councils, calling them the 
“greatest hindrances to the individual advancement of these people.” Rebuking the very 
character of Arapaho and Shoshone leaders, Wadsworth declared that the councils “are 
seldom composed of progressive, representative men, but of those who generally would 
rather talk than work.”33 Though Arapaho and Shoshone leaders received the brunt of 
his ire, few escaped Agent Wadsworth sweeping vilification of Wind River politics.  
In a fit of bad judgment, Wadsworth also criticized the policies of the OIA. The 
agent accused the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and his personnel of permitting the 
regression of the Shoshone and Arapaho, because though they might adhere “to the 
position that [they are] the guardian of these people and their property,” Wadsworth 
argued that the OIA’s failure to disband the councils illustrated their lack of dedication 
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to the advancement of indigenous people. In a final dramatic flourish, Wadsworth 
denounced the entire political system protesting that “If these people are able to handle 
their own affairs…then the guardianship supposed to be exercised over them and their 
property by the Government is absurd. If they are not competent to handle their own 
affairs, then these councils are unnecessary and the reference to them of important 
matters for settlement is absurd.”34 In adamantly protesting the councils, Wadsworth 
hoped to emphasize the OIA sponsored process of detribalization and illustrate his 
seemingly untenable situation, but the Commissioner of Indian Affairs once again 
denied his request to disband the councils.35  
In response to Wadsworth’s attack, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders formed a 
united front. Though not unprecedented, this tactic had rarely worked in the past. Even 
when successful, an uneasy truce usually lasted just long enough to serve the two tribal 
nations before their cultural differences drove them apart.36 The JBC, a powerful 
vehicle for change on the reservation, had already begun to change this pattern, as it 
required the active participation of both Arapaho and Shoshone leaders. Shared goals 
also drew the tribal nations together, as they sought to increase income from tribal 
leases, secure the distribution of revenue from natural resource extraction, and protect 
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their reservation and its inhabitants from destitution and unwelcome outsiders. During 
the 1910s, both Arapaho and Shoshone councilmen quieted their dissent and overcame 
cultural differences, though at times, conflicts did arise. In disagreement, council 
members either agreed to a compromise, or if a controversial issue could not be 
resolved, individual leaders left the meeting, breaking the quorum and effectively 
tabling the issue for a later date. Though typically an Arapaho practice, the Shoshone 
also adopted this tactic to avoid all out bickering in front of their agent and guests of the 
council. Former Arapaho councilman, Gary Collins, explains that this practice still 
continues today, “many times they sit down and get into a controversial issue and there 
might be eight people there for a quorum and one person might not like what is going 
on so he will get up and leave and break the quorum. It stops the business.”37  
At the same time, a few obstacles threatened the apparent unity of the JBC in the 
1910s. Culturally, the Arapaho and Shoshone remained distinct peoples. They lived on 
different sides of the reservation, and bad roads limited contact between council 
members outside of the agency. Past conflicts, including age old rivalries over the Wind 
River, Shoshone attempts to remove the Arapaho from the reservation, and Arapaho 
allotment, all picked at the new alliances that kept he two tribal nations’ political 
systems intact.38 To their credit, councilmen of the 1910s recognized the damage that 
these differences could inflict upon the increasing power that the business councils 
wielded. Instead of succumbing to the characteristics that divided them, Arapaho and 
Shoshone leaders politically supported each other’s displays of cultural expression, 
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businesses, and even legal claims to secure just compensation for past grievances 
committed by the United States government.  
Despite the astounding unification of the two tribal nations, Agent Wadsworth 
doubted the strength of their newly formed bond. He remained steadfast in his attack 
against the Wind River business councils, and waited for the right moment to test the 
commitment of these reservation neighbors. A potential scandal, in 1911, provided 
Wadsworth with the perfect opportunity to loudly voice his doubts about the Arapaho 
and Shoshone councils. The end result, however, proved far less than satisfactory for 
the disgruntled agent. The incident occurred at the January 1911 meeting of the 
Arapaho Business Council, when a prospector by the name of G.A. Case spoke to the 
councilmembers. Case, an independent business owner, hoped to secure Arapaho 
support for an oil lease that would be considered at the next JBC meeting. According to 
council members later interviewed about the incident, the Arapaho explained that they 
appreciated Case’s respect for their council, but to fully secure their support, they 
suggested that he donate a small monetary gift to the Arapaho for a feast that they 
planned to host later in the year. Case happily agreed. When Wadsworth heard of the 
prospector’s “bribe” he greedily held onto the news and revealed the deception at the 
Shoshone council meeting later that week, in a blatant attempt to unsettle the newly 
formed alliance between JBC members. Much to the agent’s surprise, Shoshone 
councilman George Washakie causally remarked that Charles Lahoe, a representative 
for the Hudson Coal Company and former Shoshone councilmember, had recently 
approached the Shoshone business council with a similar proposition, which they 
accepted. Unsuccessful in his campaign to divide the JBC, an infuriated Wadsworth 
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reported the “bribes” to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and demanded a full scale 
investigation into the “corrupt” business practices of the JBC’s members.39  
At the heart of this issue, rests Wadsworth’s continued unfamiliarity with 
Arapaho and Shoshone customs. Though the agent served ten years as superintendent of 
the Wind River, he repeatedly failed to fully understand or appreciate the persistence of 
Arapaho and Shoshone styles of leadership. In this case, the practice of reciprocity and 
gift giving, long predated the reservation era. Indeed, the exchange of goods and/or 
services characterized interactions between residents of the Wind River for most of the 
nineteenth century. Far from a “bribe,” Case’s and Lahoe’s offers of small payments, 
between twenty-five and thirty dollars, symbolized an exchange between business 
operators and the councils. In approaching the councilmen for support, both Case and 
Lahoe recognized the customary practice of reciprocity, and honored the tribal nations 
by participating in this cultural exchange. Wadsworth, on the other hand, believed that 
the “scandal” would finally cause the disbanding of the loathsome Wind River councils.  
Indeed, Wadsworth made such a fuss that three separate investigations explored 
every detail of the “bribery scandal.” First, the Indian Rights Association sent a special 
investigator to interview members of both councils, residents of the reservation and 
even the Arapahoe town grocer. Above all else, the organization wanted to make sure 
that Arapaho and Shoshone land interests were not compromised by these “fraudulent 
methods.”40 Additionally, the Department of the Interior dispatched two different 
inspectors to scrutinize the situation. In May 1911, investigator Will Tilden provided 
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supplemental information about the composition and decision making practices of the 
individual councils, as well as the JBC. After observing the councils and interviewing a 
wide range of community members, Tilden declared that “the time has not come when 
the business council can be abolished,” but added conclusively that guardianship of the 
Arapaho and Shoshone must remain as “there is no doubt in my mind that [the JBC] 
ought to be abolished at the first practicable moment.”41  
A second inspector, Joe H. Norris, complimented Tilden’s report by delving into 
the lingering bribery charges. Norris interviewed each member of the JBC, and sought 
an understanding of the events in question, as well as the decision making practices that 
created this situation. The inspector reported, with distaste, that council leaders 
explained to him, that when leases are presented to the council they typically grant them 
to “the first man that asks us to do him a favor, we feel that we ought to do it because he 
came first.”42 Rather than interrogating the financial standing of an applicant or their 
ability to develop the land properly, the councils, Norris believed, simply approved the 
first lease they considered on each section of ground. The hundreds of pages of council 
minutes from 1910, 1911 and 1912, prove that this was simply not the case, as both 
individual councils and the JBC thoroughly explored the qualifications and financial 
standing of Case, Lahoe, and many other potential speculators. 
In fact, council members maintained fairly specific criteria in seeking qualified 
lease holders. All too often, tension percolated between council members and Agent 
Wadsworth, because the criteria that Arapaho and Shoshone leaders sought differed 
greatly from their Agent’s. Certainly Arapaho and Shoshone councilmen did not 
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randomly approve the first lease that passed before them, however, they frequently 
granted leases to corporations and individuals who first visited the general Arapaho and 
Shoshone councils to present their proposals. More specifically, the actions of Case and 
Lahoe, though galling to men like Wadsworth and Norris, proved to the councils that 
the potential lease holder would respect the tribal nations and honor their contracts, 
thereby securing Shoshone and Arapaho support for their leases.  
On the subject of the alleged “bribes,” Norris reported the incident fairly. He 
explained to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that “Case came first to them [the 
Arapaho council] and asked them to sign a lease to him, and they felt that because he 
was the first he should have the preference.” With regard to Case’s monetary gift, he 
stated that “persons seeking favors in the way of leases from the Business Council have 
been in the habit of making small presents to the Indians…such presents or donations, 
[were] no doubt given for the sole purpose of gaining favor and influencing the action 
of the Council.”43 Norris disapproved of this practice, because he believed that men like 
Case and Lahoe secured land leases without proving their financial stability, but 
concluded that the Arapaho and Shoshone accepted a gift, rather than solicited a bribe, 
from the enterprising businessmen. Fully adhering to the guardianship rhetoric of the 
Office of Indian Affairs, Norris recommended that the councils remain, but that the 
“Superintendent in charge of the Reservation should, at all times, have the supreme 
control over all matters involving the business administration of affairs.”44 This report 
officially closed the investigation, much to Agent Wadsworth’s disapproval.  
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The bribery scandal of 1911 signaled an end to Agent Wadsworth’s tenure on 
the Wind River. In his final report as Superintendent of the Shoshone Agency, 
Wadsworth criticized the very existence of the business councils. Regardless of the 
Department of the Interior’s findings, he doubted the competence of the councilmen, 
condemned Arapaho and Shoshone political organizations, voting practices, and 
decision making processes. By August of 1912, the Office of Indian Affairs had heard 
enough, and replaced Wadsworth with Department of the Interior investigator Joe 
Norris. By and large Norris supported the council’s lease making practices, while at the 
same time he exercised his “guardianship” over the Arapaho and Shoshone. Both tribal 
nations wholeheartedly supported this change in the administration, and celebrated their 
considerable victory over a vicious political opponent.  
Indeed, Joe Norris became one of the most beloved agents on the Wind River. 
As acting superintendent, he restructured their leasing contracts, so that the Arapaho 
and Shoshone could increase profit margins. Previous leases signed with the JBC 
required payment only after businessmen extracted and sold coal or oil from reservation 
grounds. Norris suggested, and the council eagerly approved, an addendum to this 
clause, in which any leasee who produced nothing from the land paid fifteen cents an 
acre for the first year, forty cents the second, and seventy-five cents the third for the use 
of the land.45 Norris supported the increased dispersal of lease money to Arapaho and 
Shoshone families through per capita payments, and promoted the continued presence 
of the JBC.  The Agent imposed fines for the trespassing stock of surrounding non-
Native ranchers and persuaded the Arapaho and Shoshone to diversify their leases by 
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encouraging area stock growers to rent pasturage for their sheep and cattle. In four 
years, the agent collected more than $100,000 in fines, as most of the money came from 
area stockmen who previously allowed their cattle to roam freely on reservation lands. 
In the mid-1910s, the Arapaho and Shoshone finally enjoyed their first taste of 
prosperity, largely through the efforts of the JBC and their agent, Joe Norris. The 
perpetual hope that the next lease could sustain this newly acquired financial stability 
drove the councils to lease more land and illustrated the carefully hidden desperation of 
Wind River leaders. Far from seeking fame and fortune, JBC members badly wanted to 
secure at least enough capital to care for reservation inhabitants, including the infirm 
and elderly, as well as increase monetary support for their children’s education.  
Dependent Populations  
 Other reservation-wide issues occupied the JBC’s agenda, though none more 
frequently than oil leases.46 The social welfare of the reservation’s dependent 
population, including the elderly and infirm, as well as Arapaho and Shoshone children, 
concerned council members. This portion of the reservation community became 
inextricably linked to discussions of oil revenues, as Arapaho and Shoshone councilmen 
hoped to better support these people with increased per capita payments. In promoting 
land leases, both Arapaho and Shoshone leaders frequently voiced their concerns about 
reservation dependents. Arapaho leader Yellow Calf iterated the JBC’s position, when 
considering a lease renewal in 1914. “There are a good many Indians that are not able to 
make their living,” he reminded his peers and their agent. “Blind, crippled, disabled at 
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work, that this money will be an awful good thing for them.”47 In fact, councilmen 
repeatedly renewed this sentiment throughout the 1910s, as federal assistance to the 
unemployed reservation population dwindled.  
In addressing this situation, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders acknowledged their 
cultural obligation to care for the less fortunate members of their society, a pattern 
forged in the pre-reservation era, and one that still continues today. For example, 
Arapaho councilman, Lone Bear, argued that on the issue of rations and federal 
assistance, “The old people do not get much benefit, whereas if they would give this 
lease money that is derived from the leases in per capita payments, then the old and 
blind and crippled would have a benefit from this lease money as well as the young 
ones.”48 It is important to note that old, blind and crippled individuals represented only 
a minority of the Wind River’s population. At the same time, anthropologist Loretta 
Fowler argues that while infirm and elderly people did live on the reservation, 
references to these dependent members of society were largely metaphorical. By 
placing emphasis upon the less fortunate, council leaders reinforced the necessity of 
increased reservation income, and their reciprocal responsibility to their constituents.49  
The JBC’s perpetual adversary, Agent H.E. Wadsworth, espoused a laissez faire 
approach to the Wind River’s elderly population. In the summer of 1906, the agent 
reduced rations to an all-time low and proudly reported to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, “The most important innovation, namely, that of withholding rations from all 
able-bodied Indians, has been in my opinion, the greatest incentive to individual effort 
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that has ever been brought to bear upon these people.” In denying those whom he 
believed did not deserve rations, Wadsworth only allowed assistance to “the old and 
infirm, and the women and children who have no other means of support.”50 When the 
JBC questioned his criteria and protested this cruel practice, Wadsworth suggested that 
the tribal nations “encourage the selling of allotments held by old, decrepit and non-
competent Indians. The proceeds from these sales could be made available for the 
support of the parties concerned.”51 In Wadsworth’s estimation, this practice would reap 
rewards in three ways. First, the proceeds from the sale of reservation lands would 
benefit the destitute members of the Wind River community. Additionally, 
homesteaders clamoring for Indian allotments could choose from a broader array of 
sections, and finally, if land sales could support the infirm and elderly, “The issue of 
rations to these people could then be discontinued, and the gratuity feature in the 
handling of these Indians gradually eliminated.”52 Naturally, the Arapaho and Shoshone 
business councils denounced Wadsworth’s suggestions, and their dissatisfaction with 
the agent steadily grew, until his removal from office in 1912. 
Under Norris’s administration (1912-1916), care of the infirm and elderly 
became a top priority. The agent coordinated relief efforts with the Episcopal and 
Catholic missionaries, and in “consultation with the leading and well posted Indians, we 
made up a list of all those Indians who were absolutely destitute and who might, 
through no particular fault of their own, have absolutely nothing to subsist upon and 
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insufficient clothing.”53 The forty-five Arapaho and Shoshone citizens who comprised 
Norris’s list, received rations including coffee, sugar, rice, bacon, tea, crackers, and 
blankets. Non-Native residents who lived on or near the reservation offered their 
support as well, and asked Agent Norris to contact them if their Indian friends and 
neighbors needed additional assistance. Even after Norris left the Wind River, the 
practice of care continued, through religious organizations, members of the tribal nation 
and the local non-Native communities. In addition to care for the infirm and elderly, the 
plight of reservation youth and their education systems occupied a small but constant 
portion of the JBC agenda.  
Concerns regarding Arapaho and Shoshone children, another part of the 
reservation’s dependent population, frequently engaged the individual councils and to a 
lesser extent the JBC. While discussions of school curriculum and enrollment typically 
took place at the individual council meetings, the use of OIA funds for reservation 
school development, fell under the purview of the JBC. When educational matters came 
before the council, reservation leaders preferred to quickly handle the business, fully in 
favor of improving reservation education. More than anything else, this practice 
reflected the unwavering support of the Wind River’s dependent populations, as well as 
on-reservation education, as opposed to distant boarding schools. Despite the 
astounding unity espoused by Arapaho and Shoshone councilmen in the 1910s, the 
reservation’s education systems problematized their relationship, because the two tribal 
nations maintained fairly different and mostly segregated schools.  
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Education Reassessed  
At the turn of the twentieth century, two primary institutions educated Wind 
River youth.54 The Wind River Government Boarding School, operated by Reverend 
John Roberts, taught a large majority of the Shoshone children, as well as an increasing 
number of Arapaho pupils. Additionally, St. Stephen’s Mission, the reservation’s 
Catholic boarding school, housed a sizable portion of the Arapaho youth. 
Dissatisfaction with the priests at St. Stephen’s in the 1890s, created considerable 
tension between boarding school personnel and Arapaho parents. Yet, Arapahos 
continued to support the Catholic school, as they had few alternatives. The geographic 
distance from the government school, located thirty miles from St. Stephen’s and 
Arapaho communities, deterred dissatisfied parents. On principle, the Arapaho simply 
refused the only other alternative, off reservation boarding schools. Many still 
remembered the devastating attempt by tribal leaders in the early 1880s to send 
Arapaho children to Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania. Several died while in 
attendance, casting a long shadow of fear upon Arapaho families, who subsequently 
proved unwilling to send their children far from home in the name of education.  
 In 1910, Episcopal Reverend Nathaniel Thomas offered an educational solution 
to Arapaho parents. Thomas recognized their dissatisfaction with Catholic educators, 
and proposed the creation of a new school to the Arapaho council, the JBC, potential 
benefactors and the Episcopal Church. In his estimation, the Wind River, specifically 
the Arapaho people, needed a school that would take a “new departure in Indian 
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education and development.”55 Initially, this move divided reservation Episcopalians 
into two factions, those who remained loyal to Reverend Roberts and those seeking 
change on the reservation. Attempting to quell the dissent, Thomas insisted that the 
school’s mission would be to convert Arapaho Catholics to the Episcopalian faith 
through the education of their children, not to oust Reverend Roberts from his post as 
the Episcopal leader of the Wind River. Once fully outlined, the Shoshones and many 
non-Native congregates supported the proposal, but Shoshone councilmen initially 
refused to fund the venture as they largely favored the government school near Fort 
Washakie. Additionally, the Arapaho council also wanted Thomas to raise a majority of 
the school’s funds before they would commit to the project.56   
 Undeterred, the ambitious Reverend sought generous benefactors to fund the 
construction of a school for reservation children. The Episcopal Church only 
tangentially supported his venture because, after all, there already was an Episcopal 
school on the reservation. In soliciting funds for the proposed school building, Thomas 
sent letters to “patrons of Indian work” in the East, begging for donations.57 Finally, the 
Office of Indian Affairs agreed to co-sponsor the school, but full financial support failed 
to emerge until an endowment made by Mrs. Baird Sumner Cooper, a Philadelphia 
woman who once visited the reservation, provided the capital for the school’s 
construction.58 With adequate support to build a school house and dormitory, Thomas 
pleaded with the councils, and the JBC finally agreed to donate the land in order to 
better educate reservation children. 
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The newly created St. Michael’s Mission school began accepting pupils in 1912. 
Reverend Thomas boasted a rather progressive educational philosophy and curriculum, 
one that both tribal nations applauded, but certain government officials disapproved. 
Designing the school around a circular meeting place, Thomas encouraged his students 
to feel at home and even erected a teepee in the center of St. Michael’s campus to ease 
their transition. The reverend invited his student’s parents to visit the school frequently 
and suggested that the Arapaho gather at the center of his school to host dances and 
festivals for their children. He hoped that one day, the tribal nation could create a 
headquarters on the school grounds “in which the tribe will be frequently gathered to 
discuss the welfare of the young people.”59 Naturally, this type of communal education 
appealed to the Arapaho people, who loathed the time away from their children. Over 
the next four years, several parents removed their children from St. Stephen’s and the 
government boarding school, eager to participate at St. Michael’s Mission. 
The initially success of Thomas’ school did not please all reservation 
inhabitants, however. Though popular Shoshone Agent Joe Norris (1912-1916) 
encouraged the active participation of Arapaho parents in their children’s education, his 
successor, E.A. Hutchinson, (1917-1922) sought to dismantle the entire operation. 
Shortly after accepting his post at the Shoshone Agency, Hutchinson penned a 
complaint to the Office of Indian Affairs, regarding the “School Situation on the 
Shoshone Reservation.” The Agent protested that St. Michael’s personnel used 
unethical tactics including “much solicitation and a series of feasts prior to the opening 
of school…[and] have held out to the members of the Arapahoe Tribe the promise that 
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this new mission school was established for their exclusive use, as their home.”60 In 
Hutchinson’s estimation this practice created three interrelated problems. First, the 
agent believed that a decrease in the number of students enrolled at the Government 
Boarding School could result in a reduction of federal funding given to the tribal nations 
for educational purposes. The second problem, of a more serious magnitude, was the 
encampment of numerous parents who left their allotments and took up residence near 
St. Michael’s. Hutchinson protested that “Besides interfering with my policy of having 
the Indians reside upon and improve their allotments, the centralization into large camps 
is conducive to loose morals and encourages the Indians to indulge in gambling.”61 
Finally, the Superintendent protested St. Michael’s practices, because despite his best 
efforts to encourage the intermingling of the Arapaho and Shoshone, the school catered 
primarily to the Arapaho people. Fearing that this segregation would “aggravate their 
tribal differences” he suggested that an investigation into St. Michael’s be conducted 
immediately.62  
Upon Hutchinson’s request, the Chief Supervisor of Indian Schools, O.H. Lipps, 
visited St. Michael’s in the spring of 1918. In general, Lipps applauded many of the 
practices at the school, and approved of the fundamental principles guiding its 
missionaries and teachers. Though generally favorable, the report also generated 
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changes based upon two points of contention. First, Lipps discouraged the existence of 
Arapaho parents camped so close to their children. Fearing that parents living in these 
camps hampered the reformation efforts of the mission school, the Supervisor suggested 
the addition of small cottages, built on the school grounds, to house up to twelve girls or 
boys and a “house-mother” to watch over the students. In addition, Lipps protested the 
proliferation of Arapaho cultural practices at St. Michael’s. After a long conversation 
with headmaster Royal H. Balcom, Lipps determined that although the school leader 
adopted the policy of “making the Indian a good Indian,” his tactics were, at best, 
unorthodox. Balcom erected a teepee in the center of St. Michael’s campus, encouraged 
his students to speak in the Arapaho language, and allowed pupils to wear Native 
apparel, practices certainly discouraged at other reservation boarding schools. Though 
Lipps disapproved of these behaviors, headmaster Balcom refused to bow to the 
pressure of the Chief Supervisor of Indian Schools or the Shoshone Agent.63 
At the end of his report, Lipps commented on the natural segregation of Arapaho 
and Shoshone children. As a mere afterthought, Lipps noted his confusion, though he 
voiced no protest to this practice. Instead his issued a warning, “I fear, however, that it 
will result in accentuating the old animosity that has long existed in a more or less 
dormant state between these two tribes. It certainly must be confusing to the Indian 
mind to see the same Christian church supporting two schools on the same reservation – 
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one for the Shoshoni and one for the Arapahoe.”64 Though perplexed by this practice, 
Lipps did not suggest the immediate desegregation of the two Episcopal schools, but 
argued that if slight changes could be made, he would fully support the continued 
attendance of children to St. Michael’s.  
Unbeknownst to Lipps, the Shoshone fully supported the mission of St. 
Michael’s school. A budding relationship between the two tribal nations, thanks, in 
large part, to the creation of the Joint Business Council, prompted increased cooperation 
between the Shoshone and Arapaho. The tribal nation generously agreed to donate the 
land for St. Michael’s Mission, a parcel that existed on their side of the reservation.65 In 
addition, Shoshone leaders encouraged the festivals and celebrations held at St. 
Michael’s. In part, their nonplussed attitude stemmed from their satisfaction with the 
Government Boarding School.  The Shoshone, fiercely loyal to Reverend Roberts, 
supported his mission, and in return he encouraged the tribal nation to hold their own 
dances and feasts at his school. Parents visited their children frequently, and stayed near 
the school when necessary, just as the Arapaho did near St. Michael’s. Far from 
creating additional animosity, the natural segregation of reservation children, in the eyes 
of both Arapaho and Shoshone councilmen reflected the preexisting division of 
reservation lands and the individualized care necessary for the children’s education. 
Indeed, both tribal nations heartily encouraged missionaries to develop these cultural 
bonds.  
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 Upon receiving Lipp’s report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells sent a 
pointed letter to Nathaniel Thomas.66 Sells informed the reverend that “some features in 
your general plan…are not in entire accord with the general policy of civilization and 
education of these Indians.”67 Suggesting immediate changes to the attire of the 
students, the allowance of indigenous languages, and the existence of Arapaho parents 
on school grounds, Sells outlined the critiques of Lipps’ report. In closing his letter, the 
Commissioner cautioned Thomas that “Discrimination in small ways against the 
Shoshones should be avoided, both by my representatives within the reservation and by 
your people at the Mission.”68 Needless to say, the report did not sit well with Thomas, 
now the acting Episcopal Bishop of Wyoming. The Commissioner’s pointed comments 
regarding St. Michael’s school, including the allowance of Arapaho clothing, long hair, 
and use of their Native language, prompted a scathing sixteen page response co-
authored with Arapaho councilman Lone Bear. The authors denounced the criticisms 
made by “some one [sic] who really knows very little of our deeper purposes, and 
whose observation has been quite superficial.”69 In defense of his practices and the 
school, Thomas sent several pictures depicting life at St. Michael’s, a full biography of 
Headmaster Balcom, and a carefully worded justification for each “offense” charged by 
the Commissioner and by extension Lipps.  
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On the subject of Arapaho and Shoshone relations, Thomas clearly articulated 
the school’s position, adamantly protesting that “Each tribe takes pride in its own life 
and traditions.” Thomas insisted that the school did not “wish to perpetuate a hereditary 
antipathy between the two tribes,” and furthermore he argued, “the Shoshone have no 
grievance.”70 In noting the differences between the two tribal nations, Thomas made a 
compelling argument for the sustained segregation of Arapaho and Shoshone students. 
How might a Shoshone child learn in an Arapaho-centered environment, he questioned. 
And could an Arapaho pupil flourish in an educational system geared toward Shoshone 
customs? As such, Thomas believed their natural segregation was acceptable, and even 
necessary. For Cato Sells, the duality of a Wind River education system based upon 
cultural differences appeared problematic, but for reservation educators and pupils, the 
preexisting system worked efficiently, even if it did segregate Arapaho and Shoshone 
children. Refuting the suspicions of Agent Hutchinson and Commissioner Sells, Bishop 
Thomas, Headmaster Balcom, and other Wind River educators dismissed the perceived 
hostility between the two tribal nations.  
Indeed, the Shoshone took little interests in the affairs of the Arapaho school, as 
one final example clearly illustrates. In 1917, St. Michael’s popularity with Arapaho 
pupils necessitated the construction of additional cottage type dormitories. Seeking OIA 
funding, the Arapaho business council brought the issue to the JBC for consideration. 
At the October JBC meeting, the Arapaho proposed that Agent Hutchinson hold a 
petition to allow government funds to aid in the construction project at St. Michael’s. 
Hutchinson agreed, but later complained to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that 
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although the Arapaho councilmen signed the document, the Shoshone refused.71 
Angered by the apathetic and uncooperative Shoshone councilmen, the agent insisted 
that cultural differences clearly prompted their noncompliance. In reality, the Shoshone 
viewed this episode from an entirely different perspective. The councilmen simply did 
not believe that it was their responsibility to sign the document. Education largely fell 
under the purview of the individual tribal councils, and Shoshone leaders saw their 
participation in Arapaho business as largely unnecessary and unwanted. When the 
councils reconvened, all of the tribal leaders, both Shoshone and Arapaho, signed the 
document, and the Arapaho easily received additional government funding for St. 
Michael’s school.  
 Irony abounds in this discussion of segregated reservation schools. Forty years 
earlier, few government officials bothered to acknowledge the Arapaho and Shoshone 
relationship, or recognize their cultural distinctiveness, but in the 1910s, sensitive 
government officials now accepted their long history and avoided the creation of 
animosity at all costs. These concerns would have been more useful when the federal 
government unceremoniously placed the Arapaho on the Shoshone’s reservation. The 
Arapaho struggled to survive their first few years on the Wind River, under the near 
constant threat of eviction at the hands of the Shoshone. In turn, the Shoshone, who 
secured their reservation through a treaty with the United States government, hesitantly 
welcomed the Arapaho on a temporary basis and then watched as their former enemies 
accepted allotments to half of their reservation. After thirty years of managing these 
grievances and making tenuous alliances, the Arapaho and Shoshone finally managed to 
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establish a working relationship, while at the same time, government officials finally 
recognized this historical rivalry.   
Together, Shoshone and Arapaho councilmen achieved an unprecedented 
measure of political growth at the turn of the twentieth century. They combatted 
political interference by corrupt government agents, improved reservation living 
conditions, and refused to be infantilized by self-serving outsiders. Arapaho and 
Shoshone leaders fought for their people, and for the right to govern their land and 
resources. In turn, the extant reservation population supported productive leaders, 
removed from office those who failed to promote reservation progress, and, at times, 
even flourished under the ever-changing reservation system. These councilmen not only 
wielded considerable political power, but also fostered the redefinition of Arapaho and 
Shoshone communities, both politically and culturally, at the beginning of a new 
century. Members of the Arapaho and Shoshone business councils also encouraged 
outward displays of cultural expression by hosting feasts and dances, and supporting 
pluralistic forms of reservation education. This trend continued throughout the 1920s, as 
reservation leaders actively supported Arapaho and Shoshone involvement in town 
celebrations, state fairs, and even in a major motion picture. Their participation, 
witnessed by Wyoming residents, American movie goers, military personnel and even 
European royalty, tested the pervasive notion that American Indians were a destitute 
minority population effectively confined to reservations, and brought the spotlight, both 
literally and figuratively, upon the “little known Indians of Wyoming.”
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Chapter 5 – Cultural Representations 
In August 1923, Francis Sitting Eagle happily wrote to Agent Rueben Hass of 
his travels beyond the reservation. “Yesterday they took us to the Park, biggest Park 
they got. Sure enough we saw all kinds of animals from the different places of the 
world…White people didn’t care about Wild Animals after we got in. The hole [sic] 
crowd just come together where we were, and follow us every place we go. We had to 
step on there [sic] toe[s] and run over them.”1 To Francis Sitting Eagle’s mutual 
amusement and discomfort, other patrons of Chicago’s Lincoln Park found the Arapaho 
Indian and his friends a far more entertaining sight than the lions and monkeys of the 
zoo cages. The entourage, traveling to London by way of Chicago and New York City, 
attempted a brief tour of the famous destination during their five hour layover in the 
windy city, but the gathering crowd restricted the Indians’ view and movements. While 
the Arapaho studiously inspected foreign creatures, including elephants and monkeys, 
Chicago’s tourists blatantly stared at Francis Sitting Eagle, his wife, and the twenty 
other members of the Arapaho troupe. Perhaps the headbands or beaded apparel worn 
by the group initially attracted their stares. Or, was it the sound of the lyrical but foreign 
Arapaho language, preceding their arrival that piqued the attention of visitors to the zoo 
that day. Regardless, the episode became a noteworthy entry, in a fascinating account of 
Francis Sitting Eagle’s travels abroad.  
Though remarkable, the Chicago incident is reflective of a much larger trend on 
the Wind River. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, Arapaho and 
Shoshone performers increasingly displayed their cultural heritage beyond the confines 
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of their reservation. Participating in a vast array of events, from border town 
celebrations on the Fourth of July to trips to the Chicago zoo, these entertainers 
attracted non-Native crowds who watched their cultural performances in awe, and paid 
handsomely for the right to do so. Arapaho and Shoshone leaders actively encouraged 
such opportunities for two reasons. First, councilmen insisted that their performers 
represent not just Indianness, but more specifically, the tribal nation. Their shows 
brought the unique cultural characteristics of the Arapaho and Shoshone people to the 
masses and in doing so, dancers from both tribal nations re-popularized dwindling 
cultural practices. They revitalized long forgotten dances, reinforced their indigenous 
languages through song and connected to their history through the creation of dance 
regalia. This movement solidified Arapaho and Shoshone cultural identities, tarnished 
by several decades of assimilationist pressure and OIA restrictions. Together, 
reservation leaders and event participants preserved their cultural heritage, and actively 
promoted not just its proliferation, but its popularity, beyond the Wind River. As 
historian L.G. Moses explains, their actions outside the reservation did little to reduce 
the significance of this movement, as “ethnic identity need not be preserved through 
isolation; it may also be promoted through contact.”2 In this case, dancing for non-
Native audiences reaffirmed the bonds of nationalism for citizens of both tribal nations.   
Additionally, Arapaho and Shoshone leaders sought to cast aside negative 
stereotypes regarding Indians in general, and the tribal nations, more specifically. At 
this time, most Americans understood racial difference on an evolutionary spectrum, on 
which people of Euro-American decent ranked highest, while Chinese, Hispanic, Native 
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American and African American people slid down the ranks, supposedly belonging to 
cultures of lesser intelligence and backward behaviors. In the early twentieth century, 
the Office of Indian Affairs supported this notion. Federal agents deemed indigenous 
people unfit for modern life, as “their susceptibility to alcoholism and their ignorance – 
made them ‘dependent’ people whose personal freedoms might legitimately be curbed 
by their guardians,” or agents.3 This debased mentality regarding Native people 
permeated the Wind River, as the rising border towns of Riverton and Lander, brought 
Wyoming Indians and their non-Native neighbors into sustained contact for the first 
time. Signs proclaiming “No Indians or Dog Allowed,” and derogatory comments from 
town citizens regarding Native drunkenness, troubled reservation leaders. As such, 
Wind River councilmembers selected performers who demonstrated extensive 
knowledge of their past, exhibited strong moral fiber, especially temperance, and 
usually spoke English as fluently as their Native tongue. These individuals then 
demonstrated to Wyoming residents, state officials, philanthropists and movie 
producers that friendly, courteous, articulate Indians from the Wind River had adapted 
to the modernizing influences of mainstream American society, but still celebrated their 
vibrant cultural heritage.  Ultimately, Arapaho and Shoshone performers demonstrated 
the strength of their indigenous cultures, as well as the fortitude of tribal nationalism at 
a time when Anglo-Americans only recognized singularly unique individuals for their 
remarkable accomplishments. This process of preserving, and even reforming, their 
ethnic identities was not an easy one, but a cause, most argued, that was well worth the 
fight.  
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“Playing Indian”4 
Between 1883 and 1920, Americans flocked to Wild West Shows seeking the 
thrill of a staged, prairie adventure. Anxious spectators wanted to see American Indians 
on the “war path,” chasing stage coaches or performing extravagant dances. While 
entertainers like Buffalo Bill Cody and Pawnee Bill brought the rugged individualism of 
the West to crowds across the country and abroad, audiences most often craved the 
sight of indigenous performers, who participated in a multitude of shows, at venues 
large and small. In addition to the incredibly famous Buffalo Bill style Wild West 
shows, Native people participated in expositions including several World’s Fairs 
between 1893 and 1904, as well as more localized events including the Dallas State 
Fair, Cheyenne Frontier Days and the Louisiana Purchase Centennial.5 While at times, 
event organizers hoped to demonstrate the effectiveness of assimilationist reforms with 
Native exhibits, by and large American audiences preferred demonstrations from exotic, 
untamed Indians. This pervasive fascination with Native peoples provided American 
Indians with a unique opportunity to preserve a specific ethnic identity and broadcast it 
to willing audiences.  
Out of this western performance era, “Show Indians” emerged in American pop 
culture. These American Indian entertainers, received wages for “playing Indian,” and 
projected the most popular, though stereotypical, imagery of Native culture. At a variety 
of venues, indigenous performers donned magnificent headdresses, rode horses or 
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danced in shows that arguably minimized their cultural existence to that of hand signals 
and a few carefully placed interjections, including the infamous greeting: “how.”6 
While these performers often displayed their indigenous apparel or danced for the 
amusement of a culturally insensitive crowd, Show Indians achieved a fair measure of 
authenticity at Wild West shows and received tangible benefits for their participation. In 
general, fairs, shows and expositions provided a unique, off reservation employment 
opportunity for Native peoples. Performers travelled to different towns, across the 
nation and even to Europe. They received a salary for their part in the show, and gained 
a rare opportunity for cultural self-expression. Historian L.G. Moses argues that “It 
would be wrong therefore to see the Show Indians as dupes or pawns or even victims. It 
would be better to approach them as persons who earned a fairly good living between 
the era of the Dawes Act and the Indian New Deal playing themselves, re-creating a 
very small portion of their histories, and enjoying it.”7 In turn, the success of famous 
Show Indians further encouraged Native people across the country to join a 
performance troupe or hold local celebrations of their own, to earn a little money and 
perform dances declared subversive by assimilationist reformers.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, indigenous performers attracted not only 
vast audiences, but also very powerful critics. Reformers and Office of Indian Affairs 
personnel implemented widespread, but ultimately futile, campaigns against Wild West 
Shows, and by extension Indian dancing. Ironically, just as the American public 
clamored for a glimpse of the “wild Indian,” government agents and moral crusaders 
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fiercely protested Native participation at such events. 8 In fact, the vast popularity of 
Wild West Shows, expositions and fairs further prompted displays of indigenous culture 
on reservations across the country, a reality that OIA personnel deplored. In response, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, T. J. Morgan, clearly outlined a strict policy against 
Native performances in 1892. “It is unwise for Indians to be allowed to appear before 
the public exhibiting their savage characteristics,” the Commissioner argued. “It tends 
to create in their minds the idea that what the white man particularly admires is that 
which really is a mark of their degradation.”9 In reality, OIA personnel feared not the 
non-Native perception of American Indians, but rather how their participation in these 
performances would hinder the assimilationist efforts, conducted en masse, on 
reservation across the country. The Commissioner insisted that dancing and other types 
indigenous performance “tends to foster a roaming spirit; it brings them, almost of 
necessity, into contact with the low and degraded white man, encourages vice, and 
begets the false ideas of civilized life; it takes them from home, breaks up any habits 
that may be forming of ordinary industry, and has a tendency to awaken a spirit of 
restlessness among those that remain behind.”10 In most cases, these fears proved 
unfounded. At the same time, the popularity of famous Show Indians did thwart 
assimilationist attempts to suppress cultural expression, as indigenous performers, at all 
levels, increasingly used fairs, expositions and shows to solidify a new, and uniquely 
ethnic, cultural identity.  
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Most often, this process of identity reformation occurred as Native people 
participated in the vibrant and increasingly adaptable cultural practice of dance. Though 
different in their iterations, indigenous dancers from tribal nations across the country 
generally represented the defiant spirit of American Indians. While certain 
performances, particularly those of the “Wild West” variety, attempted to characterize 
indigenous peoples as static and uncivilized, dancers proudly exhibited the legacy of 
their cultures at these events. In taking a very public path of resistance, the mere 
presence of indigenous performers, also directly refuted notions of American Indians as 
a “dying race,” and instead fostered an image of cultural exuberance, both on 
reservations and in the non-Native world. Additionally, Show Indians and local 
performers portrayed a specific cultural consciousness to their audiences. Historian L.G. 
Moses explains that through their involvement in these events, indigenous performers 
accepted dual roles of show participants as well as “spokespersons for the right of 
Indians to be themselves.”11 By participating in local dances, fairs, expositions and 
shows, American Indians across the country actively promoted a very specific cultural 
representation for spectators to behold.12  
In reality, most Native Americans did not participate in Wild West Shows. 
Rather, the desire to perform, fueled by the popularity of Show Indians, encouraged 
tribal nations, including the Arapaho and Shoshone, to hold dances and festivals of their 
own on or near their Agency. Curiously, reservation missionaries and even border town 
residents, encouraged Wind River indigenous performances, despite pervasive notions 
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of racial inferiority, and actively supported Arapaho and Shoshone dancing for non-
Native enjoyment.13 Outsiders marveled at the skill and agility of these performers and 
eagerly supported their shows, much to the dismay of Shoshone Agency personnel. By 
the early twentieth century, invitations from across the country, requested Arapaho and 
Shoshone dancers for a whole host of events, including Cheyenne Frontier Days, the 
opening of National Parks, political rallies, expositions and parades. Through their 
participation in these events, Wind River performers attracted increasingly diverse 
audiences, and in the 1920s, the notice of Hollywood producers. Perhaps more than any 
other venue, Arapaho participation in the moving picture, The Covered Wagon, secured 
a vast audience upon which they proudly projected their national iconography. 
Dancing on the Wind River 
 Few anticipated the popularity of Arapaho and Shoshone dances near the Wind 
River, let alone their success in Hollywood. During the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century, Indian Agents devised repressive measures to thwart indigenous 
cultural practices, especially dancing, on reservations across the country. With the full 
support of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Shoshone Agents verbally discouraged 
dancing, particularly the Sun Dance, as it appeared destructive to Native bodies, and 
because when dancing, the Arapaho and Shoshone “neglected their work.”14 OIA 
personnel also targeted reservation parents, as they enforced compulsory boarding 
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school education and attempted to stem the distribution of cultural knowledge, from 
respected elders and spiritual leaders, to Arapaho and Shoshone youth.15 Upon 
completion of their education, Arapaho and Shoshone teenagers often felt out of place 
and even ostracized by their communities. This directionless existence, a byproduct of 
assimilationist campaigns generated by government agents, perpetuated the disparity 
between young and old on the Wind River. During this rather bleak and difficult time, 
an unsuspected, unifying force appeared, as a prophet with an inspiring message 
brought together not only young and old, but also Arapaho and Shoshone on the 
reservation.  
 News of Wovoka, the Paiute Ghost Dance messiah, reached Wind River 
residents through a group of Bannocks in 1889. The Shoshone, who maintained close 
ties with the onetime residents of the Wind River, welcomed them warmly and implored 
their old friends to explain the dance and its purpose. Arapaho chiefs, familiar with the 
new dance, had yet to see it performed and requested a meeting with the Bannocks as 
well, to gather additional information about the practice. Inspired by the Bannocks’ 
account, a group of Shoshones quickly prepared to depart for Paiute country, seeking 
firsthand knowledge of the dance that, through supernatural means, could remove the 
non-Native threat from their lands and bring deceased relatives back to life. Arapaho 
elders hastily obtained permission from Washakie to send Sherman Sage, a confidant of 
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Black Coal’s, with the five Shoshones departing for Wovoka’s camp, so that they too, 
could learn the movements of the dance and better understand its meaning.  
 In Mason Valley, the delegation watched a Ghost Dance in awe. After dancing 
all night, Wovoka met with the Wind River Indians and told them that in two years (or 
in the fall of 1891) they would meet their dead relatives. He encouraged the group to 
quickly return to their reservation and dance often because, “the dance moves the 
dead.”16 Back on the Wind River, the Arapaho and Shoshone eagerly adopted the Ghost 
Dance. Elders encouraged younger members to participate, effectively bringing them 
back into the fold of the tribal nations. In general, the Arapaho and Shoshone adopted 
the dance because, like most other participants, they yearned for a day in which they 
could see long lost loved ones and live in a world free of oppression. The two tribal 
nations found common ground in this new faith and shared a temporary cultural bond 
through their separate, but nearly identical performances of the dance. 
 Not everyone on the reservation supported the Ghost Dance, however. Chief 
Washakie initially dismissed the new faith and even discouraged Shoshone participation 
in it, while Tawunasia, one of Washakie’s confidants, actively encouraged its 
proliferation on the Wind River.17 Similarly, Arapaho chiefs Sharp Nose and Yellow 
Calf became two of the most dedicated Ghost Dance parishioners, while Black Coal 
doubted the movement and even sponsored a second delegation to Nevada, so that the 
Arapaho could further investigate the sudden popularity of the dance. Naturally, their 
agent, John Fosher, abhorred the dance and tirelessly, but unsuccessfully, attempted to 
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suppress Wind River participation in the “craze.” In response to criticism from skeptics, 
Wind River believers often held their lodges, or dances, in secret.18  
Anthropologist James Mooney visited the Wind River in 1892 and questioned 
Agent Fosher, as well as several Arapaho and Shoshone leaders, about the Ghost Dance. 
Fosher insisted that the tribal nations did not take part in the dance because he had 
explained to them “how foolish it was and had strictly forbidden it, and that in 
consequence the Indians had abandoned it.”19 Mooney remained unconvinced and 
continued to seek out performances of the Ghost Dance on the Wind River that summer. 
When interviewed, Shoshone leaders explained that they became skeptical of the 
benefits of the dance and no longer participated. In fact, at the time of Mooney’s arrival, 
most of the Shoshone discounted the Ghost Dance, because the messiah’s new world 
failed to appear, as predicted in the autumn of 1891. Additionally, the influential Chief 
Washakie increasingly discouraged the dance and while some still practiced the faith, 
most of the Shoshone no longer subscribed to the religion.20   
The Arapaho, on the other hand, appeared to Mooney far more steadfast in their 
beliefs, yet they professed abstinence to their agent and the scholar. He confirmed these 
suspicions when, one night during his stay, Mooney and his agency interpreter received 
an invitation from the Arapaho elders to visit their camp. He later reported of his 
encounter, “We started [over], and had gone but a short distance when we heard from a 
neighboring hill the familiar measured cadence of the ghost songs. On turning with a 
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questioning look to my interpreter…he quietly said: ‘Yes; they are dancing the Ghost 
dance. That’s something I have never reported, and I never will. It is their religion and 
they have a right to it.’ Not wishing to be an accomplice in crime, I did not go over to 
the dance.”21 The Arapaho eventually turned away from the Ghost Dance, but continued 
to hide their cultural practices, as did the Shoshone, to ensure the preservation of their 
heritage.  
At other times, Arapaho and Shoshone dances were far from clandestine. 
Religious organizations, including the Catholic Sisters of Charity and the Wind River 
Episcopal mission, directed by Revered John Roberts, often encouraged Native dances. 
For example, under the auspices of cultural pluralism, the Sisters of Charity and the 
Arapaho celebrated their diversity at a feast in 1884. The Sisters later wrote of the 
event, “the Indians requested to be allowed to show their appreciation and respect for 
the occasion by having one of their exceedingly picturesque dances in costumes…the 
Indian dance lasted for about two hours in the afternoon, to the delight of the Sisters, 
who had never before witnessed such a scene.”22 Additionally, the Shoshone infused 
their dances with Christian messages, a practice that garnered the support of religious 
officials, namely Reverend Roberts. The Episcopal leader ultimately earned the 
Shoshones’ respect, though his tolerance of such cultural practices, including the Sun 
Dance.23  
 By 1906, even the residents of Lander, a booming reservation border town, 
encouraged the Arapaho and Shoshone to participate in their Fourth of July celebration. 
Event coordinators proudly boasted that, “Lander will have a Celebration on the 3rd and 
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4th of July, 1906, never before known,” and solicited Arapaho and Shoshone 
involvement in several events. Wind River Indians joined the parade, at which they 
appeared between the local infantry unit and the fire department and participated in a 
contest, in which the “Best dressed Indian” won a two dollar and fifty cent prize.24 In 
fact, celebrating the Fourth of July became the ideal setting for displays of cultural 
representation. Part of a far larger movement sweeping the country, the Arapaho and 
Shoshone adopted the patriotic celebration and infused the holiday with their own 
indigenous practices, thereby increasing the number of spectators and opportunities to 
perform dances for an audience.  
Invitational performances supplemented these yearly, local celebrations, as an 
increasing number of event planners sought American Indian involvement in their fêtes. 
With the encouragement of their agent, Joe Norris, the Arapaho and Shoshone also 
participated in state and local fairs. In 1912, for example, Norris encouraged a group of 
Wind River Indians to travel to the Wyoming State Fair, in Douglas. In consultation 
with the Arapaho Business Council, the agent suggested that only those performers who 
could speak and understand English should participate and insisted to the fair 
organizers, “you will find each and every one worthy of all the attention that you may 
give to them.”25 In addition to providing their transportation, Norris agreed to pay the 
Wyoming State Fair Board two dollars a day, for the care of the performers, 
expenditures previous agents would have never allowed. In fact, Norris took a fairly 
practical approach to Native dancing and indicated in an annual report, “Close 
personnel observation has been given to these dances and it is believed they should be 
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allowed to indulge in this religious ceremonial so long as they can do so without 
resulting in damage to their health, crops, cattle or personal affairs.”26 For Norris, the 
exclusion of indigenous performances was an unnecessary restriction to Native life. 
In 1913, the Arapaho and Shoshone scheduled their Sun Dances to coincide with 
the Lander Fourth of July festivities. Held annually by both the Arapaho and Shoshone, 
the Sun Dance marked a time of year in which community spirit and individual 
achievement coalesced in a three or four day celebration. As both a political and 
cultural event, the Sun Dance allowed spectators and participants to celebrate the 
strength and endurance, kinship and community, of the tribal nations.27 Throughout the 
first decade of the twentieth century, however, it became increasingly difficult to host 
such an event, as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Cato Sells, forcefully objected to 
the Sun Dance and the non-Native crowds that the celebration attracted. During his 
administration, Sells adopted a particularly strict, no tolerance policy with regard to Sun 
Dances, though supportive Indian Agents and reservation residents subverted his 
attempts to completely quash the practice.  
 In the summer of 1913, Shoshone Agent Joe Norris proposed an exception to 
the Sun Dance ban on the Wind River. Norris insisted that he had witnessed the 
Arapaho and Shoshone Sun Dances, “and there were no barbarous features in 
connection therewith except fasting for three nights and two days.” Furthermore, Norris 
attempted to convince the Commissioner that by allowing the Arapaho and Shoshone a 
Sun Dance during their Fourth of July celebration, they would be less inclined to 
participate in “debauchery” and it would successfully keep them “away from outside 
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wide open towns as much as possible.”28 Knowing that perhaps only Sells’ feelings 
towards Indian drinking superseded his disgust for Native dances, Norris hoped to 
successfully secure permission for the Wind River Sun Dance.29 Hastily, the 
Commissioner responded via telegram, that the Office of Indian Affairs “Can not [sic] 
consistently permit it [on] one reservation and not another therefore can not [sic] recede 
from order… See no reason why Indians can not [sic] have modern dance instead of sun 
dance as part of Fourth of July celebration.”30 Undeterred, the Arapaho and Shoshone 
simply carried on without OIA permission and Agent Joe Norris turned a blind eye to 
the festivities. 
 Recounting the event, the Lander Eagle declared, “Indians Enjoy Annual ‘Sun 
Dance’ at Fort.” The unnamed reporter noted, “the attendance from Lander was only 
fair,” on this particular holiday, largely due to the fact, that “The pruning given to the 
original dance by the Indian bureau has taken about all the romance out of the sun 
festival, which in the past was a most picturesque yearly fete of the Indians.” 
Bemoaning the OIA’s restriction of skin piercings, the reporter for the Lander Eagle 
compared the reformed Sun Dance to that of the white man’s “bunny hug.” The 
newspaper grudgingly conceded the moderate success of the event, as the “Indians 
enjoyed the fete immensely, but now look upon it more as a commercial venture than as 
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a religious observation.”31 Indeed, part of the reason that Wind River residents invited 
local non-Native communities to this cultural practice, was to secure small spectator 
fees and donations, used for later feasts and to defray travel expenses for dances beyond 
the reservation. While the commercialization of the Sun Dance disappointed the Lander 
reporter, changes to the ceremony in 1913 reflected two political trends in motion on 
the Wind River.  
First, the practice of skin piercing, traditionally part of the Sun Dance, all but 
vanished in the early twentieth century. In deference to agents who supported their 
dances, as well as increased pressure from the OIA, Arapaho and Shoshone participants 
discontinued this part of the ceremony, much to the dismay of gore seeking spectators.32 
The increased commercialization of Arapaho and Shoshone dances also reflected the 
changing nature of Native performance. As the Lander Eagle deftly noticed, the 
commercialization of Wind River dances indicated the active promotion of Arapaho and 
Shoshone performers by their tribal nation, as well as the increased profitability of these 
festivals through spectator fees. One final change to the Sun Dance, implemented by the 
tribal nations themselves, was the renaming of the ceremony as they actively attempted 
to shed the increasingly negative connotations of the dance. Arapaho and Shoshone 
people, in non-Native company, referred to the Sun Dance through a variety of aliases 
including the “Sage Chicken Dance,” “Wolf Dance,” or “Harvest Dance,” which 
implied a more innocuous festival, rather than the “pagan ritual” of popular 
imagination. 
                                                 
31
 “Indian Enjoy Annual ‘Sun Dance’ at Fort,” Lander Eagle, July 3, 1913, 4.  
32
 Alfred Kroeber noted the changing practice in 1889, when evidently, the last Arapaho man underwent 
their piercing as part of the sun dance. Kroeber, The Arapaho, 279.  
229 
This thin veneer of misdirection did little to sate the concerns of a few Shoshone 
Agents, or Commissioners of Indian Affairs. In 1917, E.A. Hutchinson noted in his first 
report as Superintendent of the Shoshone Agency, “These dances, while not called by 
their original names…[last] for about three days without intermission, causing the 
Indians to gather from all over the reservation, neglect their crops and dance until they 
were entirely exhausted. These long-continued dances, under whatever name, have been 
prohibited.”33 Though far less supportive of this form of cultural representation than the 
previous agent, Joe Norris, Hutchinson conceded that the Wind River people should be 
allowed to participate in their less controversial dances, because “To prohibit them 
altogether would bar the old Indians from their only form of recreation…In fact, I 
seriously question whether they [the “old” dances] are near as immoral as the modern 
dance indulged in by the whites.”34 Hutchinson’s allowance for dances of any kind did 
not extend beyond the reservation’s boundaries, however. Consequently, Arapaho and 
Shoshone tribal nations sought additional supporters for their indigenous performances. 
Patrons 
As in the past, the Arapaho turned to religious missionaries on the reservation 
for assistance. In particular, St. Michael’s Mission offered the Arapaho, not only 
educational services for their children, but also a central gathering place for festivals 
and feasts. From its inception, in 1912, the school allowed Arapaho parents to visit their 
children frequently. At the school’s behest, the tribal nation also hosted dances in 
celebration of the synchronicity of Episcopalian and Arapaho educational and cultural 
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practices. However, the fairly radical methods espoused by St. Michael’s educators, 
including the allowance of long hair, indigenous dress and the use of Native languages, 
did not please Shoshone Agent E.A. Hutchinson (1917-1922) or Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, Cato Sells. In fact, during Hutchinson’s first year on the Wind River, the 
Agent and Commissioner unsuccessfully launched a fierce campaign to eradicate the 
educational pluralism found at the school and remove Headmaster Royal Balcom from 
his post.35  
When the Wyoming State Journal quietly announced on May 16, 1919, 
“Arapahoes to Hot Town,” a second pitched battle between government agents and St. 
Michael’s staff ensued. Though perhaps a passing novelty to the causal State Journal 
reader, news of Arapaho participation at this particular event certainly added to the 
growing dissonance between the Shoshone Agent and the Episcopal mission. The article 
in its entirety noted,  
     Rev. R.H. Balcolm [sic] and Dr. A.L. Corey will accompany a band of 
Arapahoes to Thermopolis on June 27-29 to attend the big wild west show and 
buffalo hunt. An Indian village will be transported over the mountains by the old 
Mexican Pass route and will be the center of attraction for tourists.  
     Two buffalos have been purchased from the state and these will be turned 
loose for the Indians who will enjoy an old-fashioned buffalo hunt, such as the 
younger members of the tribe have never witnesses.36 
 
Hutchinson vehemently denounced the school’s support of Arapaho cultural practices, 
including their sponsorship of the Thermopolis event, not to mention Headmaster 
Balcom’s blatant disregard for Agent Hutchinson’s authority regarding trips beyond the 
Wind River. On the other hand, St. Michael’s staff knew that Arapaho participants 
relished this celebration because they could perform beyond the boundaries of the 
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reservation and be part of an event that required not only dancing, but additional 
entertainment, including life in an Indian village and a buffalo hunt. Indeed, 
Thermopolis event planners specifically designed their celebration with the Arapaho in 
mind. But, when Agent Hutchinson heard of the proposed (and not approved) sojourn 
from the Wind River, he addressed his complaints directly to Commissioner Sells.  
 Of particular concern to Hutchinson, Arapaho participation in the Thermopolis 
affair coincided with the eve of Wyoming prohibition. The last “wet” bastion in the 
Rocky Mountain region, Wyoming resisted prohibition until state legislated temperance 
began on July 1, 1919. Advertisers touted the Thermopolis celebration, lasting from 
June 27th to the 29th, as a “Wild Show for Wild Men,” and promised to welcome 
prohibition with great style. The addition of Arapaho Indians, perhaps some of the first 
“wild men” of Wyoming, enthralled festival goers, but greatly angered Agent 
Hutchinson, who protested to Commissioner Sells, “indications are that this is to be a 
‘grand and glorious’ drunk just preceding the passing of John Barleycorn.”37 In raising 
the issue of Native temperance, a perpetual crusade of Commissioner Sells, Hutchinson 
undoubtedly hoped to secure OIA backing to suppress Arapaho participation at this 
event.  
In reality, the Shoshone Agency noted very few instances of drunkenness on the 
Wind River, before and during prohibition.38 Annual reports from reservation agents 
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continually noted the infrequent use of liquor by the Arapaho and Shoshone people. In 
1917, even Agent Hutchinson reported “Very little liquor is introduced onto this 
reservation except on rare occasions when some of the Indians go to nearby towns, such 
as Lander, Hudson and Riverton, all close to the reservation.”39 The following year, 
Hutchinson recorded only seven arrests for intoxication.40 More than a fear of 
drunkenness and debauchery, Hutchinson deplored Arapaho participation at the 
Thermopolis event, because St. Michael’s personnel, specifically Headmaster Balcom, 
subverted his authority on the matter.  
The rift between St. Michael’s and Agent Hutchinson began almost immediately 
after the Hutchinson’s appointment to the office. After several confrontations regarding 
St. Michael’s educational philosophy and practices, Hutchinson launched a thorough 
investigation into the Episcopal mission, but ultimately failed to enact drastic changes at 
the school. The Thermopolis episode, less than a year after Hutchinson’s assault, chafed 
a raw wound. The Agent protested to Sells that “Neither of them, [Headmaster Balcom 
or Dr. A.L. Corey] have consulted me in regard to the proposed exodus of the Indians, 
and in fact they rarely consult me touching matters of administration among the 
Arapahoe Indians.”41 The tribal nation, caught up in the jurisdictional infighting 
between the two agencies, greatly appreciated the effort of their religious allies, but 
bore the brunt of Hutchinson’s ire, as he insisted that they needed to stay on the 
reservation because the distance of the celebration from the reservation (eighty miles), 
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and the duration of the Arapahos’ stay (at least ten days), would interfere with the first 
cutting of hay on the Wind River, taking valuable workers out of reservation fields.  
Finally, Hutchinson denounced Arapaho participation in the Thermopolis event, 
as part of a larger campaign to prevent the performance of unauthorized dances. Fearing 
that the “Indians contemplate staging the sun dance for the edification of the crowd,” 
Hutchinson demanded that the Arapaho stay on the reservation. “As a consequence,” 
the Agent wrote to Sells, “the Indians are in an ugly mood, some of them threatening to 
go whether I consent or not.”42 Hutchinson noted that force might be necessary to keep 
the Arapaho on the reservation and requested advice from the Commissioner. In 
response, Sells sent letters to Agent Hutchinson, as well as the Arapaho people and 
Bishop Nathanial Thomas, founder of St. Michael’s Mission, outlining his preferred 
course of action. Though Sells applauded Hutchinson’s efforts on the Wind River, he 
warned the agent, “that it would be difficult and unwise to attempt to restrain them 
should they decide to go which would probably result seriously in consequences.”43 To 
the Arapaho people, Sell insisted that he had only their best interest in his heart, as he 
advised against a trip to Thermopolis. The Commissioner explained, “I feel that these 
so-called ‘wild west shows’ are detrimental to the best interests of the Indians, who are 
making most encouraging strides in their civilization, and serve no useful purpose other 
than satisfying a desire of others for excitement and a perpetuation of old-time customs 
and practices.” In closing, Sells requested that the Arapaho people “take immediate 
steps to cancel any arrangements you may have made for holding a show at 
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Thermopolis.”44 In his letter to Bishop Nathanial Thomas, however, the Commissioner 
adopted a far different tone. 
By 1919, Sells and Thomas maintained a fairly adversarial relationship. Sharply 
phrased criticism and thinly veiled critiques punctuated their correspondence of the past 
year, especially with regard to the practices at St. Michael’s Mission. Sells informed 
Thomas that he had received word from “reliable sources” that Headmaster Balcom was 
“encouraging the Indians to participate in the old time customs, and their connection 
with the, ‘wild west show’ to be held at Thermopolis, would seem to confirm these 
reports.” Furthermore, Sells argued to Thomas, “I believe that you fully appreciate the 
dangers and temptations in attending these shows and the difficulty our superintendents 
have experienced in discouraging the ‘sun dance’ and others of a similar character, 
which are so detrimental to the progress of the Indian.”45 Sells requested that Thomas 
halt the trip to Thermopolis and maintain a firm hand on the matter of Arapaho and 
Shoshone cultural performances.  
The Arapaho would not be deterred from this incredible opportunity, however. 
Though event planners frequently requested the presence of Wind River Indians at 
celebrations and fairs, audiences most often clamored for pulse-pounding chants and 
vibrantly dressed dancers. The Thermopolis festival, on the other hand, promised to be a 
far more involved affair, in which not only talented performers, but also everyday 
Arapahos could be a part. Indifferent about the last wet days in Wyoming, Arapaho 
participants delighted in the prospect of living in an Indian village that attracted the 
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interest of non-Native audiences, not to mention the ability to conduct a buffalo hunt. 
Furthermore, many of the elder members of the tribal nation belonged to what historian 
L.G. Moses has labeled a “transitional generation.” Moses explains that these 
members/performers “grew up before the reservations closed in; yet they encountered 
the governmental programs designed to eradicate native life.”46 For this “transitional 
generation,” an opportunity to participate in a festival that honored a lifestyle, one to 
which they previously belonged, certainly held immense appeal. The Arapaho would 
also receive payment, though a minimal one, for their services. Agent Hutchinson’s 
ardent stance regarding dances beyond the Wind River, and the Arapaho’s positive 
experiences at St. Michael’s, prompted leaders of the tribal nation to exclude their 
Agent and seek council with the mission as they planned their trip. Once informed, 
Hutchinson clearly failed to recognize the many tangible benefits of their participation, 
or the careful selection process through which the Arapaho Business Council 
handpicked those who would be in attendance at the three day affair.47  
In the end, despite the fierce resistance generated by Agent Hutchinson and 
Commissioner Sells, the Arapaho went to “Hot Town.” The Thermopolis Independent 
happily reported on June 27, “The band of Arapahoe Indians from the reservation came 
in yesterday morning headed by Yellow Calf, Lone Bear and other former warriors. 
There were about one hundred in the band, and came in twenty wagons. They brought 
with them all equipment for the village, including teepees, cooking equipment and 
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everything that goes to make up a typical Indian camp.”48 Leading the troupe, elders 
Yellow Calf and Lone Bear also held esteemed positions on the Arapaho Business 
Council. The veritable spokesmen intrigued spectator crowds with “snake dances,” as 
did life in the Indian village, however, a last minute pardon by the “state humane 
officer,” spared the sacrificial buffalo for the hunt, well, at least until the festivities 
concluded on Monday. As Wyoming residents prepared for their final night of free 
flowing liquor, the Arapaho in Thermopolis received permission from state officials to 
shoot the buffalo, but only “by someone who could make a clean kill.”49 The tribal 
nation feasted on the mighty beast during their final night in Thermopolis, and as 
“Cheyenne awoke…with a headache, a yearning thirst, a fuzzy taste in its mouth and 
not a chance for the morning eye-opener,” the Arapaho traveled back to the Wind 
River.50  
Though not included in this particular fête, Shoshone performers did participate 
in local celebrations and at times, they turned to familiar patrons for support. Longtime 
friend of the tribal nation, Reverend John Roberts, allowed the Shoshone to hold 
festivals and dances at the Episcopal mission, though unlike his religious counterparts at 
St. Michael’s, Roberts simply tolerated Shoshone cultural practices and did not 
advocate for the tribal nation’s participation in off reservation celebrations. 
Furthermore, the Shoshone expressed less interest in sending performers beyond the 
reservation, preferring instead to dance for surrounding non-Native communities, who 
paid small spectator fees to watch their performances. On occasion, they did receive 
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invitations to display their national heritage beyond the reservation and faced resistance 
from their Indian Agents, who actively quashed such opportunities. In 1921, for 
example, the publicity director for Yellowstone National Park, Gene Cohn, wanted to 
borrow a few Shoshones and use them, as both performers and informants, in a 
publicity campaign designed to lure tourists to the travel destination. In a letter to Agent 
Hutchinson, Cohn explained, “at present the eastern papers are filled with stories 
regarding the action of the Sioux Indians in meeting on the question of whether or not to 
abandon their ancient and so-called ‘Barbaric’ dances…If we could take advantage of 
this revived interest in Indian matters to get something about the Shoshone’s over in the 
press it would give me a great opportunity for getting publicity for that region [the 
southern edge of Yellowstone] and its colorful surroundings.”51 The publicity director 
added a series of questions, including “What is and has been the attitude of the 
Shoshones on the ancient dance?” and “Just what dances have they abandoned?” 
wishing to, at the very least, generate a discussion with the Shoshone about their 
customs.  
Unfortunately for Cohn, he unwittingly raised a subject that perpetually rankled 
Hutchinson and other Indian Agents. The Office of Indian Affairs had recently 
appointed a new Commissioner, Charles Burke, to replace Cato Sells. Like his 
predecessor, Burke deplored what he viewed as the destructive effects of indigenous 
dance and other cultural practices. As one of the first orders of business at his new post, 
the Commissioner compelled agency superintendents across the nation to stand firm on 
this issue. Utilizing “The Secret Dance File,” or an in-house collection of reports from 
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agents regarding explicit dances, Burke crafted “Circular No. 1665,” in April of 1921.52 
The Commissioner insisted that it was not “the policy of the Indian Office to denounce 
all forms of Indian dancing.” In fact, he argued, throughout history, dance was a 
“medium through which elevated minds may happily unite art, refinement and healthful 
exercise.” The problem of Indian dancing, as Burke and other reformers understood it, 
was that Native Americans simply held the wrong kind of dances. Instead of 
“something in the way of wholesome, educational entertainment,” indigenous people on 
reservations across the country participated in “disorderly or plainly excessive 
performance[s] that promote[d] superstitious cruelty, licentiousness, idleness, danger to 
health, and shiftless indifference to family welfare.”53 In creating the circular, Burke 
implored OIA personnel to prevent Indians from performing ceremonies that they 
considered offensive, namely the Sun Dance.  
It is possible, though not likely given his proclivities about the subject, that 
Agent Hutchinson would have welcomed the opportunity to discuss Shoshone dancing. 
However, with the additional support of his new Commissioner and “Circular No. 
1665,” Hutchinson parroted to the Yellowstone publicity director, that “It has not been 
the policy of the Department to prohibit all the Indian dances.” At the same time, the 
Agent remarked, “Such exhibitions [including the one that Cohn proposed] tend to give 
the public a wrong idea of the existing conditions among the Indians by featuring them 
as delighting in the atmosphere of the past in exhibitions of his uncivilized state at the 
expense and in the discouragement of those Indians who are applying themselves to 
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industrial activities.”54 In this instance, the Shoshone appear to have been largely 
unaware of the correspondence between Cohn and Hutchinson. While performers for 
the tribal nation would have undoubtedly enjoyed the opportunity, the Shoshone, for the 
most part, contented themselves in the creation of, and participation at, festivals on or 
near the Wind River. Additionally, they did not bemoan the missed opportunity to speak 
with Cohn at subsequent council meetings.55  
In fact, between 1906 and 1927, Shoshone performers left the reservation far 
less often than their Arapaho counterparts. Their absence from state festivals could 
indicate a lack of desire to travel beyond the reservation, through historical evidence 
also suggests that the Shoshone directed their attention instead to reservation crops, as 
their general contentment with local dances kept performers closer to home. This 
discrepancy can also be attributed to a lasting friendship between the Arapaho people 
and Edward Farlow, a frontiersman, show promoter and longtime resident of the Wind 
River.56 Farlow first became acquainted with the Arapaho and Shoshone in the late 
1870s, as he worked for stock grower, Jules Lamoreaux.57 The cattleman frequently 
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visited with Wind River residents, as he delivered beef and hauled freight to and from 
the region. By the turn of the century, Farlow independently raised cattle on the eastern 
side of the reservation and befriended several influential Wind River leaders including 
Shoshone Chief Washakie and Arapaho elder and councilman Goes in Lodge.58  
In 1912, Shoshone Agent Joe Norris sought Farlow’s assistance in transporting a 
troupe of Arapaho performers to the Wyoming State Fair in Douglas. During this initial 
collaboration, beautiful performances by Arapaho dancers and Farlow’s promotional 
talents, earned performers of the tribal nation statewide notoriety. With Farlow’s 
assistance and enthusiasm, the Arapaho increasingly performed away from the 
reservation, at shows in Casper, Rawlings and Fort Collins, not to mention a visit to the 
annual conclave of the Knights Templar in Denver, Colorado.59 Alone, Farlow’s 
accomplishments, as part of the Wind River community, are impressive, particularly his 
respect of, and dedication to, the Arapaho people. But by facilitating cultural 
performances beyond the Wind River, Farlow also created a vehicle through which the 
Arapaho could preserve and promote their cultural heritage. Unlike the educators at St. 
Michael’s, Farlow negotiated with personnel at the Shoshone Agency and slowly, 
Indian Agents recognized that he could be trusted with their charges. By the 1920s, the 
area rancher had become the Arapahos’ most powerful patron. Armed with accolades 
and glowing reports of Arapaho behavior at these performances, Farlow successfully 
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convinced Indian Agents to increasingly permit travel beyond the reservation’s 
boundaries and even outside of the state. In turn, these cultural performances 
successfully solidified the bond between citizens of the tribal nation, as they created a 
national iconography, one that represented both traditional ways and modern influences. 
But Edward Farlow was not the only show promoter to support the cultural 
representations of Wind River Indians.  
The Covered Wagon 
In 1909, an eighteen year old traveler left the safe confines of his family’s 
Chicago home and boarded a train car seeking the western frontier of his dreams. When 
the train reached Arapahoe, a growing town on the Shoshone Agency, the young man 
“stared in amazement at the delegation of long-haired Arapahos wrapped in red and 
blue blankets…He also saw fifteen or twenty cowboys lining the station platform.”60 
Perhaps second, only to a life changing encounter with the infamous western performer 
William F. Cody, this scene left an indelible imprint on the young life of Tim McCoy. 
Long before America knew him as the famous cowboy actor, McCoy stood awestruck 
on a train bound for Lander, Wyoming.61 That summer, the teenager worked for the 
Double Diamond Ranch in the Wind River Valley, a job that brought him into frequent 
contact with Arapaho and Shoshone people. Unfamiliar with the languages of either 
tribal nation, McCoy quickly learned to communicate with hand gestures, and through 
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courteous behavior he befriended several Arapahos including George and William 
Shakespeare and Goes In Lodge.62  
From this rather inauspicious beginning, the young and ambitious traveler 
embraced the western lifestyle. After homesteading near the Owl Creek for several 
years, McCoy eagerly enlisted with the cavalry during World War I.  When he returned 
to Wyoming, Governor Robert Carey appointed the lieutenant colonel to the position of 
adjutant general for the state. While at this post, McCoy met with a representative from 
a Hollywood film company, the Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, a chance encounter 
that would forever change his life. The production firm sought his assistance in locating 
five hundred Native Americans to be used as extras in a movie based upon Emerson 
Hough’s western novel, The Covered Wagon. 63  Hough’s story, a riveting tale of the 
heroism and tragedy experienced by pioneers of the Oregon Trail, required not only a 
fairly extensive cast of Native Americans of all ages, but also horses, tipis, regalia and 
someone to organize the entire affair.  
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To support such an ensemble, The Covered Wagon began with a production 
budget of $100,000. But, recognizing the magnitude of their endeavor, the production 
company quickly increased the allowance to $500,000, an impressive sum in 1922.64 
When considering his role in the production, McCoy insisted to producers that if he 
took the job, the Native performers he enlisted, including many of his friends from the 
Wind River, deserved a fair wage. Accordingly, the Famous Players-Lasky Corporation 
responded with a generous offer. Since the film, shot on location in Utah, took Wind 
River residents away from their homes and farms, adult performers earned a daily wage 
of five dollars, while parents netted an additional fifty cents per child. For every horse 
in use, the extras earned one dollar a day and an additional dollar for every tipi.65 In 
total, a family consisting of a man, woman and one child, with one horse and a tipi, 
could earn $87.50 a week. As McCoy later pointed out, the sum was “more than most of 
them probably saw in a year.”66 When asked, Arapaho performers needed little 
convincing to be part of The Covered Wagon production. Not only would they be paid 
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well for their services, but the movie extras also welcomed the opportunity to travel 
beyond the reservation, chase Anglo-American actors on horseback and practice the 
“old ways” without fear of Agency intervention or repression. While on the one hand, 
their role in the film mimicked other cultural performances in Wyoming, on the other, 
participation in the film necessitated several weeks away from the reservation and the 
engagement of a cross section of the tribal nation, including many Arapahos too old, or 
too young, to perform in state festivals.   
In September 1922, McCoy implored Edward Farlow, a frequent travel 
companion of the Arapaho, to assist him in the transportation and care of the 
performers.67 Flattered by the request, Farlow welcomed the opportunity. Together, the 
two men, with the help of the Arapaho Business Council, recruited nearly seventy 
Arapaho families for the production, as well as a few Bannocks from the Fort Hall 
reservation in Idaho. 68  While on location, McCoy directed the performers by day, and 
Farlow attended to their needs at night. Though frustrated with the painfully slow speed 
at which the director organized his shots, not to mention the chilly autumn weather, 
Farlow proudly reported to the Shoshone Agency “the Arapahos have the leading parts 
in all events so far as they put on a better show than the others.”69 The sheer magnitude 
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of the production continually astounded Farlow and the Wind River Indians, as 175 
covered wagons, 700 head of horses and nearly 1200 people milled about the Snake 
Valley in Utah, costing the production company an estimated $18,000 per day. When 
not performing in full regalia, the Arapaho extras and their companions thoroughly 
enjoyed the “picture shows” given by the production company. Every day, the director 
sent a cut to Los Angeles for development and screened the previous day’s work that 
night, often with a rather large Native audience nearby.   
By the time production wrapped in late November, most of the Arapaho 
performers expressed a desire to return to the Wind River. Farlow led the troupe back to 
the reservation, while McCoy and thirty-five of the Arapaho extras stayed behind to 
participate in a “prologue,” to the show. On April 10, 1923, Tim McCoy and the 
Arapaho performers first stood on the stage at Grauman’s Egyptian theater in 
Hollywood and enthralled audiences, as specific Indians gave their earliest recollections 
of conflict with Anglo-Americans. Goes-In-Lodge, for example recounted nightly his 
role as a warrior and later scout for the U.S. Army. In California, the Arapaho actors 
delighted, for the most part, in the incredible sights and sounds of the non-Native world. 
McCoy gleefully reported back to the Wind River, that the performers marveled at the 
vastness of the Pacific Ocean, though the elderly Goes In Lodge appeared troubled by 
the size of the “big lake.”70 Homesickness inevitably accompanied the rush of 
excitement in Hollywood, as the noise and congestion of the big city grew tiresome. 
After three months of performances, the remaining actors returned to the Wind River.  
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Following the successful Hollywood premier, McCoy wanted to give the 
Arapaho performers and their families on the Wind River an opportunity to experience 
the motion picture that they helped create. In consultation with Shoshone Agent Paul 
Haas and producer Jesse Lasky, McCoy convinced the Famous Players-Lasky 
Corporation to send a print of the film to the reservation, though it would not be 
released to the national public for several months.71 Agent Haas delighted in the 
opportunity to show the film, though, as the production company pointed out, “it would 
be quite impossible for you to give it [The Covered Wagon] the proper setting, the full 
musical score arrangements, etc.” Despite misgivings about the atmospheric quality 
surrounding the picture, Haas hoped to share the film with the entire reservation 
population and devised three different viewings locations, including St. Michael’s 
school, St. Stephen’s school and even on a train in Riverton. With a stern request “that 
no out-siders be permitted to review this production at the time you show it,” the 
Famous Players-Lasky Corporation released the film to Agent Haas, much to the delight 
of the Wind River Indians.72  
 The success of the Arapaho’s prologue favorably impressed the Famous Players-
Lasky Corporation. So much so, that they implored McCoy to gather a performance 
troupe for the grand opening of The Covered Wagon at the Pavilion Theatre in London. 
A clear departure from previous demonstrations of Arapaho culture, the staged prologue 
of the Arapaho actors became the ultimate representation of their reconstituted ethnic 
identity. While performing, McCoy allowed the Arapaho actors to speak freely of their 
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encounters with Anglo-Americans, though he did encourage them to do so in sign 
language, so that he could interpret for dramatic effect. Additionally, he gave the 
Indians “no standing orders as to how to dress… [instead, he] simply asked them to 
show the audience how they looked when they felt beautiful.”73 These avenues of self-
expression, allowed Arapaho performers to exemplify the cultural exuberance and rich 
history of the Arapaho people and in turn, they projected a nation image, one carefully 
honed through performances of the past two decades.   
Several hurdles stood in the way of this repeat performance, however. Indeed, 
both McCoy and Farlow knew that it would be difficult to convince the Arapaho to 
travel to the London premiere for several reasons. First, many of the performers, 
especially those who had just spent several months away from the reservation, did not 
wish to leave their families, friends and crops. A more troublesome issue, in the eyes of 
the potential Arapaho travelers, was the journey away from the Wind River. 
Councilman Yellow Calf explained to Tim McCoy, “It bothers me to go across the Big 
Water…I have talked with many Sioux who went over to this far country with Buffalo 
Bill. They tell me that…there is no land and when you look ahead, there is no land.”74 
Indeed, the fear of sailing on the open ocean deterred wary participants far more than 
the prospect of staying in the city of London or performing for the vast audiences that 
they would inevitably attract. In the end, the elderly Goes In Lodge, a friend of both 
Farlow and McCoy, spoke passionately in favor of the journey, agreed to travel with the 
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men and convinced several others to do the same.75 On August 12, 1923, nearly twenty 
adults and several small children gathered with Farlow at the train platform in 
Arapahoe, to say their goodbyes and depart for the trip of a lifetime.  
 Unlike their previous travels to The Covered Wagon set in Utah or to 
Hollywood, the London excursion provided the Arapaho troupe with wealth and even a 
bit of luxury. The Famous Players-Lasky Corporation agreed to an impressive five 
dollars a day salary for each Arapaho adult, not to mention, travel on the White Star 
Line’s R.M.S. Baltic from New York City to London.76 Farlow and McCoy also devised 
several small detours for the group, including a visit to Chicago’s Lincoln Park during 
their five hour layover, on the way to the East Coast. While in New York City, the 
Arapaho camped in Central Park, however, curious visitors gathered around the Indian 
village and began lifting the flaps of their tents, necessitating police intervention. 
Perhaps more than any other tourist attraction, shopping in large department stores, both 
in New York and London, provided welcome entertainment for the Arapaho 
performers. Though not necessarily a new experience for the Arapaho, as they had 
shopped in stores before, both on the reservation and at Riverton or Lander, the size of 
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metropolitan department stores, not to mention the seemingly endless merchandise on 
several floors, enthralled the shoppers.77  
Before they set sail for England, Farlow contacted the manager of Macy’s 
Department Store. He requested assistance, namely sales clerks and security to hold 
back the crowds, as he wished to show the Wind River Indians the finest department 
store in the city. For several hours, the Arapaho admired fine apparel and jewelry, 
including a pair of ladies silk pajamas that appealed to two of the elderly male 
performers. After purchasing several items, riding the escalator and posing for 
numerous pictures, the Arapaho took their first subway ride back to Central Park to 
pack and prepare for their ocean voyage.78 Though anxious about travel at sea, the sheer 
size of the R.M.S. Baltic impressed the Arapaho who eagerly explored the vessel. 
Despite the pervasive unease about their travels abroad, Francis Sitting Eagle happily 
reported from London, “Hardly any body [sic] got sick on ocean.”79  
 For nearly seven months, Tim McCoy, Edward Farlow and the Arapaho troupe 
performed the prologue for The Covered Wagon. Conducting two shows almost every 
day, the Arapaho enthralled sold out crowds in one of the most popular entertainment 
venues in the world. They visited Paris, went the top of the Eiffel Tower and toured the 
Tomb of Napoleon, the Arc de Triomphe, the Tower of London and even Madame 
Tussaud’s Wax Museum. They lived in a hotel for much of their trip, as the rainy 
London weather prevented a comfortable stay in their camp at the Crystal Palace 
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Grounds and they rode the “tube” to and from the theatre every day. Though by all 
accounts the performers thoroughly enjoyed their stay in Europe, homesickness and 
boredom punctuated the final weeks of their visit and finally, on March 1, 1924, Farlow 
led the Arapaho performers to the S.S. Cedric, the ocean liner that would carry them 
home.  
 The success, and frankly the longevity of the Arapaho’s prologue, impressed 
Edward Farlow and Tim McCoy. Initially contracted for only ten weeks, their 
performances created a perpetually sold out theater, indefinitely prolonging their stay. 
While the actors reveled in the sights and sounds of Europe, they also took seriously the 
duality of their role, as not only performers but also cultural ambassadors for the 
Arapaho people. Farlow and McCoy reported very few instances of drunkenness or 
dissention from the troupe, while in the employ of the production company. The 
performers did not, by all accounts, protest the frequent crowds that gathered around 
them or the many public appearances that the production company demanded, but 
instead embraced the attention. This trip, primarily lost to the historical narrative of the 
Wind River, is important, because through their participation, the Arapaho performers 
became the ultimate representation of their tribal nation. They embodied the 
persistence, survival and dynamic culture of their people, and proudly shared this 
heritage with audiences world-wide. For one shining moment, before Tim McCoy 
became a famous actor, before Edward Farlow published his memoirs in regional 
newspapers, even before John Collier advocated for the preservation of indigenous 
cultural practices, twenty eight Arapaho Indians earned the attention and respect of vast 
national and international audiences, for simply being themselves.  
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Dinwoody Cave 
During the first decades of the twentieth century, non-Native people typically 
experienced Arapaho and Shoshone culture only though performances beyond the 
reservation. Celebrations in places like Lander, Douglas, Riverton, Rawlings, Casper 
and Denver, as well as the prologue performed in Hollywood, London and Paris, 
attracted families from Ohio, sailors stationed in California, sales clerks working in 
New York City and royalty living in London, to the very distant world represented by 
people of the Wind River. At the turn of the century, most of these spectators had never 
visited central Wyoming, but by the 1930s, the world was becoming a much smaller 
place. Increased automobility, particularly the escalating popularity of road-trip style 
vacations, drew non-Native tourists ever closer to the reservation, forever altering the 
proverbial (and literal) curtain between indigenous performers and thrill seeking 
spectators. Pursuing uniquely “western” experiences, vacationers now sought something 
more than representations of indigenous culture, as they possessed the means and 
opportunity to travel in, on, around and through the many rugged locations previously 
relegated only to Wild West Shows and American mythology. And they did so, with or 
without the permission of those who inhabited the very real western landscape.  
One such location, a region known as the Dinwoody, is located on the far 
western edge of the Shoshone Agency. Made long ago by a slow moving glacier, the 
canyon has a small river flowing through it, on its way to a pristine mountain lake. High 
above the valley floor, cliffs and caves overlook the gorge, which provides a spectacular 
view of the Rocky Mountains. Long ago, the Shoshone acknowledged that supernatural 
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beings dwell in the Dinwoody caves. These pygmy-like creatures, known as Nimina or 
Nimerigar, protected the Shoshone from harm, but also demanded respect, as they 
frequently meddled with people’s lives. According to Shoshone legend, only a gifted 
few individuals could even see the Nimina, who remained friendly to the Shoshone, 
unless mistreated by them.80 Members of the tribal nation also say that it is nearly 
impossible to kill the Nimina, although the Arapaho certainly tried. As the story goes, 
an Arapaho man once deeply insulted the Nimina by calling them unintelligent 
cannibals. In response, the “little people” tipped their arrows in poison and thereafter 
mortally wounded any Arapaho who dared to enter their caves.81 As Shoshone cultural 
historian Reba Teran explained the legend to me, the story serves as a warning to the 
Arapaho people, a tribute to the long and periodically contentious relationship between 
the two tribal nations.82 But, it is also indicative of the power of cultural places. The 
Shoshone reserved this space, not just as a home for supernatural beings, but more than 
that, it was, and still is, a place of memory, a space in which the Shoshone kept a 
portion of their cultural heritage, to be visited and retold to later generations. 
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, in this budding age of automobile 
transportation, Wyoming residents touted the natural wonders of their state, including 
the Dinwoody region. Sensitive to the potential revenue that could be generated by the 
tourist industry, almost every town in Wyoming clamored for visitors and attempted to 
lure them in with campsites, bathing facilities and even electric lights. In the 1930s, 
discussions of the value of tourism steadily increased, facilitated, in part, by a 
questionnaire from the state’s highway department that estimated travelers spent an 
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astounding $6 million throughout Wyoming in 1926. But most of the state did see this 
revenue. Instead, Wyoming residents watched helplessly as tourists passed through their 
towns on the way to Yellowstone National Park. Across the country, Americans 
recognized Yellowstone as the Wyoming tourist destination, one that attracted 260,000 
visitors in 1929 and more than 300,000 by 1935.83 Wyoming historian, T.A. Larson, 
explained, “Every community tried to come up with some gimmick that would hold 
tourists overnight. Each thought that it had special recreational opportunities and 
scenery, but the average tourist dashed on to Yellowstone or hurried across the state on 
Lincoln Highway (aka Highway 30) with scarcely a pause.”84 Seeking to create 
effective “tourist traps,” many state officials believed that a New Deal make-work 
project/tourist mecca would effectively lure vacationers into businesses in eastern and 
central Wyoming.   
Seeking federal support, a state committee actively courted the Works Progress 
Administration in the spring of 1938. In addition, the Wyoming Supervisor of the Forest 
Service, the State Geologist and the Director of the State Planning Board traipsed across 
Wyoming, seeking the perfect destination for their tourist mecca. Though they visited 
several spots, the group favored the Dinwoody region in central Wyoming. On its own, 
the area contained remarkable geological formations, as well as extensive petroglyphs 
drawn on the walls of the caves and an abundance of indigenous artifacts, which 
assured the group of the vast potential of the site.85 Thoroughly encouraged by the 
richness of their find, the state committee eagerly drafted a proposal for a WPA 
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sponsored survey of the region, however, the group failed to consider the Arapaho and 
Shoshone response to such a project.  
Throughout the 1930s, Arapaho and Shoshone performers witnessed a steady 
decline in the availability of opportunities to travel beyond the Wind River. Both tribal 
nations secured a permanent spot in an “Indian Village,” as part of Cheyenne Frontier 
Days, one of the nation’s largest western celebrations. Additionally, Wind River Indians 
accepted performance opportunities at the Wyoming State Fair and during local Fourth 
of July festivities, but in general, Americans were no longer interested in Wild West 
shows. Instead, they wanted to travel throughout the American West, to experience the 
landscapes and people firsthand. In a spectacular role reversal, tourist now entered the 
reservation seeking displays of indigenous culture. Burdened by unwelcome visitors, 
Native Americans longed for the days, in which they sent select ambassadors, beyond 
the confines of their reservation, to promote their culture to the masses.  Consequently, 
tribal nations struggled to mediate their national image, as reservation poverty and 
notions of Indian drunkenness, tarnished the cultural representations that they worked 
so hard to create. If given the opportunity, Arapaho and Shoshone people might have 
initially discouraged the proposed WPA project for this very reason.  
Other Wyoming residents covetously eyed the cultural boon of the Dinwoody 
region, with little regard for the Native people whose culture the site depicted. In 
dramatic flair, Robert B. David, an amateur historian and “authority on Wyoming 
history,” heard of the possible WPA program, and called public attention to the region, 
in an article for the Casper Daily Tribune. David claimed to be the “discoverer” of the 
caves and provided several photographs of his collection of artifacts, undoubtedly 
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pilfered from the Dinwoody caves, to newspaper reporters. Advocating for the WPA 
project, David lamented, “The burden of exploration is too much for any one individual 
to carry,” and proclaimed that it was perhaps the last opportunity for the state of 
Wyoming to “retain possession of some of its most valuable prehistoric relics.”86  
Though perhaps working with the best intentions, the dangerously well informed 
“expert” and his publicity stunt did not immediately aid the proposed WPA project. 
Instead, the history enthusiast drew unwanted attention to the Dinwoody and the 
unprotected relics of the region’s many caves. Dan Greenburg, director of the State 
Planning Board and member of the state committee, wrote to Shoshone Agent Forrest 
Stone to warn him of the reservation’s impending popularity with tourists. Stone 
acknowledged the possibility of a WPA project on the Wind River, but neither the state 
committee, nor Stone, or the WPA, negotiated the site with the Arapaho and Shoshone. 
Greenburg told Stone, “A person by the name of R.B. David of Casper, Wyoming, who 
claims to be the discoverer of this cave, which is entirely erroneous, has published a 
story which is fantastic to say the least, and I am fearful that as a result of such story 
that hoardes [sic] of people will travel into that region…with an attendant result that 
undoubtedly we can expect some vandalism.”87 While destructive in the short term, 
David’s article did garner enough public support for the project and led to increased 
security around the Dinwoody caves. In turn, the Wyoming state committee agreed on 
the Dinwoody for their proposed tourist site and invited WPA personnel out to inspect 
the area.  
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In September of 1938, Vincenzo Petrullo, a national consultant for the Works 
Progress Administration, surveyed the vast limestone formations on the western edge of 
the Wind River. His mission, to determine the efficacy of a WPA sponsored 
archeological study of the Dinwoody cliffs and caves, only held part of his attention. 
Wyoming officials, quick to assist the project, implored Petrullo to assess the tourist 
potential of the region as well. In turn, his report to acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, John Collier, indicated that the reservation site held potential beyond that of a 
make-work project. Speaking to the indigenous history and culture of the region, the 
consultant described, “Not far from the entrance there are limestone cliffs on which 
have been carved numerous pictographs which form a spectacular show and which 
should be of immense interest to the general public.” While assessing the totality of the 
geographic formations, Petrullo noted that “The Canyon lends itself beautifully to a 
park monument. It is easily reached from the main highway and if it were properly 
explored first… [it] could be developed into an educational and scenic archeological 
monument.”88 Petrullo admirably played his part for the Wyoming community as well.  
At a chamber of commerce luncheon and fundraiser in Casper, the consultant noted, “A 
similar project is now under way in Texas, where more than $100,000 is being spent for 
exploration…but the richest untouched field lies in Wyoming.”89 By September of 
1938, state officials and University of Wyoming staff ardently supported the creation of 
the WPA project.  Public advocates of Dinwoody excavation, including Robert David, 
fed into this mentality, arguing that an archeological find the size of Dinwoody would 
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certainly bring people to the center of the state, not to mention the untold amount of 
tourist revenue and much needed jobs during the Great Depression.   
Of all the people consulted on this project, the Arapaho and Shoshone received 
word of the proposed WPA excavation only after the committee solidified their plans. 
Though certainly aware of the increased presence of visitors interested in the Dinwoody 
caves, their Agency Superintendent, Forrest Stone, assured Wind River residents that 
visitors to Dinwoody maintained the utmost respect for the caves and the cultural 
artifacts found within them. But the cliffs and caves on the western, or Shoshone side of 
the reservation, were not an “untapped” archeological site. Rather, the Wind River 
people admired and preserved the sanctity of the region, as a place of cultural and even 
spiritual significance.  It was not, as Robert David insisted, a place “shunned for 
centuries by superstitious Indians” or “a great tourist attraction.”90 Rather, it was a 
cultural preserve, a place that the Shoshone and Arapaho should have been able to keep 
for themselves, or at the very least decide when and how they would welcome outsiders 
to the region.  
When the matter finally came before the Joint Business Council that September, 
councilmembers debated at length, weighing the consequences and benefits of such a 
program. After considerable debate, and no small amount of criticism from the Arapaho 
and Shoshone people, the JBC decided to allow the excavation of Dinwoody on three 
conditions. First, they insisted that the artifacts removed from the site would forever 
remain the property of the tribal nations, namely the Shoshone. It is clear from the 
minutes of the Joint Business Council that  this issue was of the utmost concern, as 
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councilmen Robert Harris asked, “I would like to know just what they intend to do. Go 
in there and preserve those relics and keep them in a natural state, or move them out to 
some museum?”91 Since the WPA failed to send a representative to the Wind River for 
consult – they only sent a letter of request on this issue – Agent Stone assured the 
council, “No, it is to preserve them and establish a museum on the reservation, if they 
can. If they are unable to get a museum here to have one near so as they can preserve all 
material of value. In this way Dinwoodie [sic] will never lose its identity.”92 Assured by 
their superintendent on this matter, councilmembers also requested periodic progress 
reports from WPA archeologists, submitted directly to both councils. Finally, the 
Arapaho and Shoshone agreed to the excavation project, believing that it would provide 
much needed employment for people of the reservation.93 Superintendent Forrest Stone 
relayed the conditional approval of the JBC to WPA coordinators and excavation began 
promptly in January 1939.  
Initially, Wyoming’s winter weather slowed the excavation. During the first two 
months of the year, University of Wyoming archeologists and WPA employees worked 
only in the largest of the caves. Despite these tight confines, they removed an 
astounding 2000 artifacts in just two months and publically touted the richness of the 
find. By March, the WPA had established a laboratory in Casper and employed several 
residents there to catalog artifacts obtained by field workers, so that the relics could be 
better interpreted and shown to the public in the context in which the Shoshone once 
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used the items.94 Thoroughly appropriating Arapaho and Shoshone artifacts, State of 
Wyoming personnel rejoiced in the find and plotted the location for their museum in 
Casper, not on the Wind River.  
The new direction of the WPA project did not go unnoticed by the Arapaho and 
Shoshone. By March, the tribal nations had yet to receive a progress report from the 
field, yet truckloads of non-Native workers arrived daily on the Wind River, to ship 
crates full of artifacts off the reservation. The Joint Business Council fiercely protested, 
as the WPA flagrantly violated all three of the stipulations set in the conditional 
agreement. As tension escalated on the reservation, the chief administrator of the site 
eventually halted further excavation to address Arapaho and Shoshone concerns. 
Finally, on May 31, 1939, members of the Joint Business Council addressed their 
grievances directly to WPA Administrator, L.G. Flannery. Flannery emphatically stated, 
“When this study is finished, after these scientists have finished their studies of these 
specimens, and a proper place can be furnished on the reservation to take proper care of 
them, they will be brought back and left here as the property of the Indians.” These 
assurances did little to pacify the livid councilmembers, however. Influential Arapaho 
leader, Nell Scott, argued, “We haven’t any way of knowing what has been taken out of 
there. We should have some way of knowing what has been taken out…these are sacred 
things to the Indians, just as your cemetery is to you. You would not let the Indians 
come and dig in your cemetery, and take things away.”95 While angered at the direction 
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of the WPA project, the Shoshone and Arapaho did not immediately denounce the study 
in its entirety. Instead, with the encouragement of Agent Stone, the JBC agreed to 
continue excavation, but only if Flannery could guarantee the employment of Wind 
River residents. Additionally, the council voted to build a “work center,” to assist with 
the project. The space would temporarily house the WPA laboratory, but could later be 
retrofitted into a museum that would “mean something to the community and which 
will be an educational [facility].”96 Recognizing the worth of the work and of the 
educational center for their people, Shoshone and Arapaho councilmembers unilaterally 
agreed to the new conditions of the WPA project.  
State officials and Casper residents, however, rejected the changes outright. The 
citizens of Casper had raised a substantial amount of money to support the WPA, and as 
benefactors, they expected both the jobs and the museum that housed the artifacts. The 
new permit for Wind River excavation effectively shut out Casper altogether, and in 
response, the town’s citizens quit raising money. State of Wyoming personnel also 
withdrew their support for the project, petulant at the loss of their tourist mecca. By the 
end of June, it became clear that even the WPA had no further interest in the project. 
The final report on the Dinwoody excavation indicated the bitterness of the “failed” 
project, stating “Because the artifacts obtained from this territory actually belonged to 
the Indians on Wind River Reservation and could not be used legitimately toward the 
building of a museum in Casper and other parts of the State, activities were transferred 
to other sections.”97 Robert David, the man who supposedly “discovered” the caves and 
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advocated for their excavation, bemoaned this turn of events. “Wyoming would become 
the tourist mecca of the United States,” he wrote in an editorial to the Casper Times in 
January 1940. “Some time ago we had the Dinwoodie [sic] archaeological expedition to 
the Dinwoodie [sic] caves in Fremont county and made finds in basket work, pottery, 
and panels carved into cliffs that authorities say date back 20,000 years. The project was 
smothered,” he bitterly added, “with jealousies and findings were withheld.”98 
The Dinwoody controversy illustrates mainstream American appraisals of the 
value of indigenous culture. Dismissing the sanctity of this cultural site, state officials, 
regional inhabitants and even the Works Progress Administration, greedily eyed the 
Shoshone preserve, seeking only monetary gain and regional fame. In this fight, tribal 
sovereignty overcame capitalist ambition, but in many ways it was a hollow victory. 
Tragically, the State of Wyoming failed to support the tribal nations in the exploration 
of their cultural heritage. As a result, Wind River residents experienced the equally 
damning losses of tourist revenue and jobs to the reservation. In addition, they lost some 
of the artifacts taken from the cave by scavengers or those permanently placed “on 
loan” by WPA workers. Of the estimated 4,845 artifacts taken from the caves in 1939, 
nearly 350 had yet to be returned by 1962, when the tribal nations renewed their efforts 
to find the lost cultural artifacts.99 The search continues even today, though the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, or NAGPRA, allows for a more 
systematic way of finding these cultural markers and returning them to the Dinwoody 
caves.  
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Throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century, Wind River Indians 
appeared in unexpected places.100 From Lander, Wyoming to the Crystal Palace in 
London, Shoshone and Arapaho performers left their reservation communities and 
entered a non-Native world, one that had seemingly left them behind. While everyday 
Americans assumed that turn of the century Indians had faded into the western 
landscape, indigenous people of the early twentieth century engaged with modernity on 
their own terms, effectively disrupting easily identifiable markers of American 
superiority and progress. The “secret” histories of Native America, including Indians 
examining caged animals at the Chicago zoo, browsing clothing racks at Macy’s in New 
York City, and riding the subway to work in London, complicate the expected narrative 
of reservation destitution and cultural decline. Instead, indigenous performers across the 
country revitalized dwindling cultural practices. On the Wind River, they danced, sang, 
performed and traveled with, or without, the support of their Indian Agents, in a larger 
effort to reconnect to their cultural heritage. In promoting their cultures through 
performances near their reservation homes, across the state and in a film shown 
throughout the country, tribal nations of the Wind River solidified a uniquely ethnic 
identity, one that embodied the national spirit of the Arapaho and Shoshone people. 
Ultimately, the declining popularity of Wild West shows, in conjunction with the rise of 
western tourism, changed the medium through which non-Natives viewed indigenous 
people. The national images of Wind River Indians remained however, as they later 
personified, and even humanized, the Arapaho and Shoshone campaign for self-
determination, a fight that would extend from the edge of the Wind River to the halls of 
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Congress throughout the 1930s. Despite their cultural rejuvenation and political 
collaboration, the fierce debate regarding the Indian Reorganization Act threatened to 
dismantle the very thing that they fought so hard to iconize. 
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Chapter 6 – Shared History 
In January 1913, leaders of the Arapaho and Shoshone business councils met to 
address reservation affairs and advocate for change. While not an unusual occurrence, 
they held similar meetings every month, this one was different, as representatives rarely 
talked so candidly about the past.1 Councilman Dick Washakie first spoke of the 
reservation’s history, when the Shoshone, led by his father Chief Washakie, agreed to 
meet with the “Great Father,” and set apart a reservation “for Washakie and his tribe, 
and we have been there, and we have obeyed all the rules and regulations and the 
requirements… [we] have never been in any trouble, in any way, with the white men 
since we can remember.”2 But the Shoshone would not be the only tribal nation to 
inhabit the land reserved for Washakie and his people, the councilman explained. The 
Arapaho soon arrived at the Shoshone Agency, relocated to the Wind River by the 
federal government, and established their own communities. In 1913, the two tribal 
nations now recalled their shared reservation past and planned for a future together. In 
discussing the placement of the Arapaho onto the Shoshone reservation, a dark 
reminder of a difficult time for both tribal nations, the councilmen recognized that their 
unexpected relationship also signaled the beginning of unlikely friendships, political 
alliances and even opportunities for cultural preservation. Above all else, they 
remembered a past punctuated by mutual survival, endurance and success, though a 
path, not of their own design.  
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Reflecting upon their thirty five years of cohabitation, Washakie also discussed 
the future, namely, the financial future of the Shoshone people. “I have made up my 
mind that we have to call his [the government’s] attention to the fact that my Arapaho 
friends have been imposing on me for a little too long,” the councilman insisted.3 Rather 
than denouncing the Arapahos’ intrusion onto their homeland, he endorsed the creation 
of a lawsuit, to be filed with the Court of Claims. Washakie argued that despite the 
personal and political advancements made by the two tribal nations, the federal 
government took from the Shoshone, both land and resources, and gave their property 
to the Arapaho in 1878. If the tribal nation could receive compensation for their losses, 
Shoshone councilmen argued, the settlement would lessen the economic devastation of 
their community.4 Sensitive to the nature of their claim, the Shoshone frequently 
insisted that they bore no grievance to the Arapaho people and swore that the suit 
reflected only a Shoshone desire for just compensation. In creating their petition, 
councilmen adamantly denounced Arapaho culpability and even labeled them 
“prisoners of war [who were] placed on the Shoshone reservation, with the intention of 
leaving them there for the winter of 1877-1878, until a suitable reservation could be 
provided.”5  Additionally, they rooted their claim in social terms. By employing the 
rhetoric of a bygone era, one that stressed the “traditional,” “hereditary,” or even 
“ancient” enmity once espoused by both tribal nations, the Shoshone emphasized the 
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devastating nature of the broken promises and wrongdoings committed by the federal 
government and referenced the depth of their past. 
Remembering events in this way, Shoshone leaders purposefully used history to 
reinforce a sense of national pride in their past and hope for their future. In doing so, the 
tribal nation fostered a powerful connection between their ancestors and contemporary 
reservation inhabitants. Recalling the bravery and fortitude of former leaders, their 
commitment to remain on the Wind River, and the difficult path that brought the two 
tribal nations together, the Shoshone evoked powerful memories that could be shared by 
their citizens. But so too, did the Arapaho, as they remembered the untenable situation 
their chiefs faced in the 1870s and the cunning and tenacity they exhibited, which 
assured the Arapaho’s place on the Wind River. By claiming a history tainted by past 
rivalries over land and resources, members of both tribal nations proudly described a 
victorious and sometimes violent heritage. In this way, recollections of enmity toward 
their reservation neighbors, perpetuated at times, by both Shoshone and Arapaho 
citizens, further strengthened individual bonds of nationalism. At the same time, 
through remembrances of their mutual survival the Arapaho and Shoshone reinforced 
their necessary, communal ties. More than any other time on the Wind River, the period 
from 1913 to 1938, reveals that this shared history clearly influenced, and often 
dictated, Arapaho and Shoshone decisions.   
Interwoven into the rich history of the reservation, government paternalism and 
duplicity marred Arapaho and Shoshone memories. Damning federal policies, 
assimilationist rhetoric and corruption punctuate late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century accounts of the Wind River. The General Allotment Act alone wrought untold 
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damage to the cultural practices of the reservation’s inhabitants and Shoshone Agency 
lands, not to mention the relationship between the two tribal nations. In accepting 
allotments, the Arapaho secured claim to a portion of the reservation, a right the 
Shoshone did not believe that they deserved. As councilman Charles Lehoe explained, 
the Arapaho not only held title to land that his people claimed through treaty, but “they 
have sold allotments and they have got the money for it.” In seeking redress for 
Arapaho placement on the Wind River through a Court of Claims lawsuit, the Shoshone 
argued that they simply wanted compensation for lost land, not to remove the tribal 
nation’s citizens from their homes.6 By 1913, the Arapaho and Shoshone had accepted 
their past grievances, acknowledged their differences, as well as the ties that bound 
them together, and looked forward to a brighter future.  
Ultimately, shifting political currents in the mid-twentieth century illustrated the 
power and utility of this shared past, as both tribal nations addressed sweeping changes 
to federal Indian policy. Perhaps the most complex, era in Native American history, the 
twelve year administration of an unlikely political figure, John Collier, and his Indian 
New Deal policies, challenged long held beliefs about indigenous peoples as he 
implemented widespread change throughout Indian Country. Before he became 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Collier lobbied, often unsuccessfully, for a number of 
reforms including a reorganization of the Office of Indian Affairs, the end of allotment, 
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religious freedom for Native peoples and the organization of a judicial body to 
efficiently deal with Indian claims.7 By 1932, a perfect storm placed Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in the White House and the radical Indian policy reformer in the office of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Set against this backdrop, two strands of Wind River 
life, the shared past of both the Arapaho and Shoshone and their difficult history with 
the federal government, intertwined into a complicated story, replete with dynamic 
political personalities, radical legislative reform, prolonged lawsuits, voting disputes, 
cash settlements and, in the end, a brutal attack against indigenous sovereignty.  
Conceptualizing the Indian New Deal 
While several Indian Agents tested the resolve of Arapaho and Shoshone 
councilmen, John Collier effectively disrupted the reservation’s political system and 
inadvertently fractured the relationship between the two tribal nations. As a reformer, 
New Dealer and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Collier’s fairly radical stance 
regarding American Indians created havoc on reservations across the country. While 
perhaps well-intentioned, Collier never fully understood the needs of Native people. 
Instead, he became a catalyst for change, a force that disrupted indigenous homelands 
as his policies often created turmoil rather than stability and regeneration. From the 
beginning, Collier’s ideas clashed vividly against the political backdrop of the 1920s.8  
In part, life experience fueled this aggressive stance, as Collier began to develop his 
opinions about federal policy, when he stopped at the Taos Pueblo reservation, en route 
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during a family vacation. After witnessing several religious ceremonies and visiting the 
homes of many Pueblo, he concluded that he had found a “Red Atlantis,” in which the 
materialism and selfish individualism of modern America did not permeate. In turn, the 
young observer wished to preserve Native culture and imprint their social organization 
and cultural experiences onto mainstream American life. Ultimately, Collier wished to 
free American Indians from, what he saw as, the bonds of governmental oppression and 
use their model of society to redeem a materialistic and destructive world.9  
By 1923, John Collier had effectively developed this personal interest into a full 
scale campaign. Acting as a lobbyist for his newly formed organization, the American 
Indian Defense Association, Collier implored politicians, Indian rights advocates and 
the everyday man to improve the plight of American Indians. To advance this platform, 
he published and distributed a short manifesto titled, “Announcement of Purposes,” 
which outlined a series of long-terms goals aimed at improving reservations and 
preserving American Indian societies. Collier’s approach included social and religious 
freedom for all Native peoples, the ability to develop Indian arts and crafts into a 
reservation based industry, a repeal of the General Allotment Act which fractured 
reservation land bases and agricultural support to improve the condition of reservation 
farm lands. Above all else, Collier placed heavy emphasis upon the necessity of cultural 
preservation in Native American communities. Years later, these essential goals would 
eventually provide the foundation for a series of reforms during the 1930s, known as the 
Indian New Deal. Reflecting upon this influential time in his life, Collier asserted in his 
memoir, “By 1924, the program for what was to become the Indian New Deal had 
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become rather thoroughly formulated.”10 Indeed, throughout his career, Collier 
envisioned and supported programs that he believed would allow Indians to be free of 
the squalor of their reservations and aid in the preservation of their cultures.  
Fully committed to this mission, Collier enlisted the help of several influential 
political players. He spoke with Indian rights advocates, politicians and lawyers, but 
one of the most essential relationships he cultivated during the 1920s was with Lewis 
Meriam, the director of the Institute for Government Research. Meriam possessed the 
authority, and resources, to conduct top level research, assets that Collier desperately 
wanted to utilize. After several persistent requests from the ambitious advocate, Meriam 
acquiesced and received permission from Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work to study 
American Indian reservations. Leading a team of assistants, the researcher conducted an 
investigation between 1926 and 1928, in which a team of economic advisors, health 
officials, legal experts and education and agricultural specialists inspected the 
conditions on Indian reservations across the country. The final report, published in the 
spring of 1928, revealed the absolute devastation found on many Native homelands. 
The 847 page assessment, titled The Problem of Indian Administration, strongly 
criticized the Office of Indian Affairs’ inattention to areas of health and education. The 
commission advocated for major reform and denounced the level of federal 
commitment to indigenous peoples as “grossly inadequate.”11  
Indeed, the report served, in many ways, as a wakeup call to a broader political 
audience. It directly refuted the stereotypical assumption that Native people simply 
accepted their poverty, or that they were, “happier in their idleness and irresponsibility.” 
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In addition, the team found, “too much evidence of real suffering and discontent to 
subscribe to the belief that the Indians are reasonably satisfied with their condition. The 
amount of serious illness and poverty is too great to permit any real contentment.” 12 In 
short, the American Indian needed considerable help and could be ignored no longer. In 
addition to health and education, the “Meriam Report” noted that Indians refused to 
cooperate with federal officials or make future commitments until they received 
acceptable resolutions to their legal claims. Though not the primary focus of the study, 
the report revealed that the unsettled claims of numerous tribal nations had a negative 
psychological effect on the ways in which tribal nations ran their political organizations 
and reservations in general.13 Despite this adverse accounting of indigenous life, Collier 
applauded the comprehensive survey. He believed that the Meriam Report “‘blasted 
apart’ the walls of the dungeon called the Indian affairs system.”14 More importantly, it 
cleared a path for substantial change in American Indian policy.  
Following the success of the Meriam Report, Collier adjusted his focus. Less 
than a year later, he requested a second survey from the Institute for Government 
Research, one regarding the treatment of Native legal cases. The painfully slow legal 
process of adjudicating indigenous grievances, found in the Court of Claims, troubled 
not only Collier, but also tribal nations throughout the country. Seeking redress for past 
crimes, many tribal nations, including the Arapaho and Shoshone, quickly became 
entangled in yards of red tape as they protested the theft of their lands, undelivered 
annuities and inadequate treaty compensation. Simply receiving permission to sue the 
federal government, and obtain a platform upon which their cases could be heard, 
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required the assistance of expensive legal counsel, determination and many years of 
persistence.  
Shoshone leaders, with the encouragement of their Agent Joe Norris, expressed 
their desire to seek reparations in 1913. As to the tribal nation’s motivation, Shoshone 
councilman Dick Washakie, explained that they “had waited so long for the government 
that he had just made up his mind that this is the only way to ever get justice.”15 The 
Shoshones based their claim upon Article Two of the Treaty of July 3, 1868, which 
outlined the territory allocated to the Eastern Shoshone and stipulated who could be 
placed upon that land, should the Shoshone, or the government, chose to do so. In the 
treaty, the tribal nation surrendered an area of 44,672,000 acres across the states of 
Colorado, Utah, Idaho and Wyoming, in exchange for a 3,054,182 acre reservation in 
the Wind River region.16 The crux of their case was not the relinquishment of land, but 
rather the 1878 placement of the Arapaho onto the Shoshone Agency.  Shoshone 
councilmember Charles Lehoe insisted, “We are not looking to the Arapahoes for the 
pay but the Government and we do not want them to feel that we are including 
them…We feel that we want no more than justice, no more than the right which the 
Government owes us and you people, the Arapahoes, would do the same if you were in 
our position.”17 Shoshone councilmembers hired attorney George Tunison to draft their 
petition and eagerly awaited results. Despite the insistence that the Arapaho were not 
the target of their suit, temporary uneasiness settled upon the reservation as both tribal 
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nations anxiously followed the case’s progress. The excitement of this legal endeavor 
quickly waned however, as the Shoshone petition entered a gridlocked court docket.18 
Fourteen years passed before the tribal nation finally won the right to submit their suit 
to the Court of Claims, the only judicial body hearing the complaints of tribal nations 
against the federal government.19 
The Arapaho, too, sought recompense for past grievances in a Court of Claims 
case. Joining various Lakota, Dakota and Cheyenne representatives, the Arapaho 
petitioned the federal government to address promises made in an 1876 treaty regarding 
the Black Hills in South Dakota. The tribal nations employed legal counsel as early as 
1909, but the process of seeking compensation stumbled over several obstacles. First, 
the Arapaho frequently negotiated and often met with, leaders from at least nine other 
tribal nations. Orchestrating such a legal feat required numerous, in person, meetings, a 
rather large team of lawyers and long distance travel.20 Additionally, sorting out the 
issue of “ownership,” and providing documentation for use in a court system that placed 
primacy on corroborated evidence and not indigenous oral traditions, became a never 
ending process that produced hostility between the plaintiffs.21 In April 1918, the tribal 
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nations finally filed their petition with the Court of Claims, but delays and legal 
roadblocks quickly halted their case.22 
Long frustrated with these and other inadequacies of the American legal system 
regarding Indian issues, Collier implored Meriam to sponsor the second survey. Hoping 
to shed light on issues of indigenous jurisprudence, Collier also influenced the structure 
of the study by insisting that Nathan R. Margold conduct the Institute’s research. 
Margold, an attorney from New York, had worked with Collier on previous projects 
including the 1925 creation of the Committee on Pueblo Legal Aid, a mission started by 
Collier’s American Indian Defense Association. Meriam once again complied with 
Collier’s request, and in the fall of 1929, Margold began his investigation. For nearly 
two years, he delved into the decisions and records of Native claims cases, those cases 
pending review, jurisdictional acts surrounding such claims and jurisprudence on the 
subject. On June 1, 1931, Nathan Margold testified before the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs about his findings and proposed a bill to create an official claims 
commission, one that would provide “for the powers, duties and functions thereof.”23 
The proposed commission consisted of six members who would “investigate and 
determine the state of accounts between the United States, on the one hand, and each 
band, tribe or other communal group of American Indians residing within the territorial 
limits of the United States on the other hand, and to render a complete and final 
accounting.”24 The creation of this commission, Margold believed, would alleviate the 
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difficulties of the Court of Claims process, in which tribal nations often had little 
opportunity to present their case or receive just compensation.  
Unfortunately the bill proposed by Margold stalled in Congress. Disinterest and 
financial concerns at the onset of the Great Depression likely killed the potential Indian 
Claims Commission in 1931. Other commentators, including Vine Deloria, Jr., later 
suggested that, “the climate for reform had not yet reached the point where the United 
States wanted to have its past sins recited in a legal forum.”25 By the 1930s, the 
situation appeared dire for Indian claims. From 1881 until 1946 (when the federal 
government finally created the Indian Claims Commission) Native Americans filed 219 
petitions with the Court of Claims. Of those cases, the judicial body awarded only 35 
monetary settlements of various amounts.26 This ineffective system, Margold noted, 
would not continue to pacify the many tribal nations who demanded justice for past 
wrongs committed by the United States government. After the bill died on the Senate 
floor Meriam, Margold and Collier waited for an opportune moment to try again.  
Temporarily defeated but not discouraged, John Collier continued to outline his 
plans for redirecting American Indian policy. On December 28, 1931, for example, 
Collier wrote to Margold:  
With respect to shaping and justification of legislative dealing with Indian 
property and Indian civil rights what we have got to do, among other things, is 
to shape up the Bureau’s dealing with the following: 
(1) Tribal incorporation or some equivalent arrangement 
(2) Correction of evils in the allotment and heirloom laws, the probate 
system and the handling of Indian wills and of Indian matters in trust. 
(3) A system of credit for Indians. 
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(4) Indian Claims.27  
 
Compatible in their understanding of Indian policy reform, Collier concluded, “any 
general covering enactment dealing with Indian civil rights would be effective and I feel 
a haunting suspicion that such a covering enactment may be possible and 
worthwhile.”28 This “general enactment,” later known as the Indian New Deal, 
continued to develop as Meriam, Margold and Collier solidified their strong political 
alliance.  
 Nationally, the landslide victory of Franklin D. Roosevelt, in November of 
1932, generated nervous anticipation within the Office of Indian Affairs. The 
appointment of a new Commissioner meant that a decade of Collier’s hard work was at 
stake. In order to assure the nomination of a favorable candidate, Collier contacted both 
Lewis Meriam and Nathan Margold. In a series of conversations, they agreed “if 
Roosevelt favored one of them, the other two men should close ranks to insure his 
victory. Collier then sent an open letter to several personal friends which asked them to 
actively support Meriam, Margold, or himself for the commissionership.”29 The men 
hoped that their political pandering would guarantee that the next Commissioner 
favored Collier’s political agenda, should he be overlooked for the commissioner 
position. Roosevelt recognized the need for Indian policy reform, yet was hesitant to 
pick from Collier’s cohort. Following the nomination of Harold L. Ickes as the 
Secretary of the Interior, Roosevelt and Ickes agreed that despite his radical political 
ambitions and disheveled appearance, John Collier was the man for the job. 
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Indian Reorganization Act – Promoters and Problems 
John Collier appeared a most unlikely hero for Native Americans when he 
entered the office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933. Disheveled, often 
disorganized and distracted, Collier caused quite a stir in Washington D.C., but despite, 
or perhaps because of, these deterrents, biographer Kenneth R. Philp insisted that he 
was “one of the most colorful of the New Dealers.”30 Colorful perhaps, but also 
mistrusted and well discussed in and outside the halls of Congress and on reservations 
across the country. Many governmental officials feared that the new commissioner was 
nothing but a dreamer, yet many appreciated his enthusiasm for the cause of American 
Indian rights. Regarding his appointment to the position of Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, the Congressional Record even indicated that many felt he was “a long-legged, 
somewhat humorless Savonarola, blazing with zeal for the Red Man, haranguing, 
pleading, denouncing, organizing, writing, speaking for many years as secretary of the 
American Indian Defense Association…He has fought courageously and 
uncompromisingly.”31 With this final assessment about his moral fiber, Congressional 
Representatives found him an acceptable choice as Commissioner.  
Beloved by many and hated by several, Collier implemented sweeping reforms 
during his twelve years in office. His collection of New Deal era policies, frequently 
labeled the Indian New Deal, included an Indian branch of the Civilian Conservation 
Corps, an indigenous fund as part of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, an 
“Indian desk” at the Public Works Administration and similar positions with the Civil 
Works Administration, the Works Progress Administration and the Resettlement 
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Administration. In general, these measures can be credited to Collier, as well as his 
engagement with numerous Native and non-Native political actors. As he later 
explained, “In the event, the purposes and implementations of the Indian New Deal 
were supplied by various members of the Indian tribes themselves, and by the 
experience, knowledge, and sustained thinking of many others, non-Indians. Of these I 
name but a few…Nathan R. Margold, Felix S. Cohen...And I have to name myself.”32 
The Indian New Deal programs assisted struggling Native Americans during the 
Depression, but Collier’s pinnacle of reform was the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).  
Throughout the 1920s, measures to detribalize Native American groups 
dominated federal policy. Agency officials frequently attempted to implement non-
Indian forms of governance, including constitutions and by-laws, which met with 
resistance and animosity on many reservations, including the Wind River. The Arapaho 
and Shoshone had successfully created a political system that accommodated their 
unique situation, and loathed OIA attempts to alter their practices. When John Collier 
became the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he denounced the brutal history and 
ruthless measures perpetuated by the OIA, but continued to accentuate the importance 
of self-government on reservations across the country. In Collier’s opinion, federal 
policies of the late 19th century, including allotment and assimilation, had failed. Instead 
of reassessing these antiquated methods, which irreparably damaged the relationship 
between indigenous peoples and the federal government, he advocated for a different 
direction in Indian policy, one outlined in a new piece of legislation called the Indian 
Reorganization Act. But the process of redirecting not only the federal strategy 
regarding Native Americans, but also the racist and debased mentality about indigenous 
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peoples, held by many public officials, proved more daunting than Collier initially 
envisioned.    
 In 1933, the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs orchestrated a series of 
meetings to assess the current state of federal policy regarding Native Americans. An 
inveterate New Dealer, Collier wanted a variety of perspectives from predominant 
creators of national Indian policy, so that he could better prepare a new course of action. 
He proposed several measures that would effectively improve the relationship between 
tribal nations and the federal government, including the need for the complete removal 
of allotment policies, the implementation of self-government and an end to 
assimilation.33 Collier also questioned anthropologists at length, about the historical and 
cultural impact of past federal policies and sought suggestions from these scholars as to 
the ways in which he could better serve American Indian populations. Franz Boas and 
Alfred Kroeber, two of the most influential anthropologists studying Native Americans, 
ultimately played an important role in the creation of the bill.34 Additionally, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs contacted Felix Cohen, an attorney working in the 
Solicitor’s Office to the Department of the Interior, to draft the bill.35  
On February 12, 1934, Senator Burton Wheeler and Representative Edger 
Howard introduced the Indian Reorganization Act to Congress.36 Hastily offered and 
extremely complex, many Congressmen responded unfavorably to the legislation and 
denounced Collier’s decision “to incorporate most of the reform agenda in a single 
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bill.”37  The Commissioner emphasized certain key policy points, including the official 
end of allotment, the right for tribal nations to organize political governments that 
would manage local affairs, Native representatives in the Office of Indian Affairs, the 
formation of an Indian Claims Commission and finally the right for Native people to 
voluntarily accept all or part of the Indian Reorganization Act. Underscoring the 
necessity of self-government, Collier placed most emphasis upon Section 16 of the bill, 
which specifically provided the tribal nations with the “right to organize for its common 
welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall become 
effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the 
adult Indians residing on such reservations.”38 This proviso, strongly advocated by 
Collier and his political cohort, meant that tribal nations could “opt-out” if they 
disapproved of the legislation. For the first time, Native Americans could accept or 
reject legislation that pertained to their daily lives, instead of accommodating or 
combatting policies placed upon them by the United States government.  
One of the most heated alterations argued before Congress was a plan to exclude 
Collier’s Indian Claims Commission provision. Senator Theo Werner from South 
Dakota initially complicated the issue of claims adjudication, by questioning both the 
government’s responsibility and the statute of limitation as it applied to “crimes” 
against Native communities. Collier attempted to counter this critique by arguing “What 
you [Werner] are talking about is another subject that is very big, which is that the 
Government not only has violated its treaties, but the Government has gone on year 
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after year procrastinating to defend the just claims of Indian tribes.”39 Collier further 
explained that his proposed provision is one “designed to bring all of these Indian 
claims promptly to judgment… so that they can have their day in court and procure 
their final determination under these contracts.”40 Sensing defeat on this issue, however, 
Collier finally acquiesced during the fourth hearing on the Indian Reorganization Act. 
Instead of including the ICC as part of the debated legislation, Collier conceded, “We 
shall submit a bill providing for the prompt and complete settlement of these 
innumerable claims, through a special claims body that would, under the proposal be 
created by Congress.”41 Politicians fiercely debated the bill for several months, but 
eventually passed a vastly altered version of the original draft, and on June 18, 1934, 
President Franklin Roosevelt signed into law the Indian Reorganization Act.42 
In its final form, the Indian Reorganization Act implemented several important 
changes throughout Native lands.  The authors of the bill declared that it was, “An act to 
conserve and develop Indian lands and resources; to extend to Indians the rights to form 
business and other organizations; to establish a credit system for Indians; to grant 
certain rights of home rule to Indians; to provide for vocational education for Indians; 
and for other purposes.”43 Above all else, the Indian Reorganization Act ended the 
process of allotment, perhaps one of the most important and far reaching provisions of 
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the bill. In addition, ownership of the remaining, or “surplus,” lands created by 
allotment reverted back to the tribal nations. Other measures of note included Section 5, 
which created a mechanism for Native reacquisition of lands lost to allotment, Section 
10, which allowed for the appropriation of $10 million to be loaned to reservation 
governments for the purpose of economic development and Section 11, which provided 
for up to $250,000 annually for payment of tuition and other expenses associated with 
Native education.44 In just one year at his post, John Collier successfully implemented 
many of the sweeping policy changes that he had been working toward for more than a 
decade, but a far more daunting task lay ahead, as Collier traveled to reservations to try 
and convince Native Americans to accept reorganization.  
Indian Reorganization Act on the Wind River 
 Reservation superintendents began touting the positive attributes of the Indian 
Reorganization Act in the spring of 1934. Collier, confident in the bill’s passage, 
encouraged this premature campaign for two reasons. First, once the IRA passed into 
law, Congress stipulated that in one year’s time, tribal nations across the country had to 
decide if they would vote to accept or reject Reorganization. Accordingly, the 
commissioner had only one year to promote the benefits of the bill to indigenous 
people. In addition, Collier knew that many tribal nations, jaded by years of corruption, 
turmoil and deception, would not trust yet another federal policy outright. To assuage 
many concerns about the new legislation, the commissioner hosted meetings in ten 
cities across the country, including Rapid City, South Dakota, Fort Defiance, Arizona 
and Muskogee, Oklahoma, which allowed surrounding tribal nations to visit with 
Collier and ask questions regarding the intricacies of the IRA. Taking into account the 
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past history of broken treaties and paternal legislation, many indigenous people at these 
meetings expressed hesitation at the prospect of yet another shift in federal policy. 
Though varied in their opinions about the bill, many indigenous leaders voiced similar 
concerns, including the extent to which the IRA provided economic benefits and to 
whom, the amount of power wielded by the proposed centralized governments and the 
sovereignty of Native homelands.45 
It soon became apparent that these meetings alone would not prompt wholesale 
approval for the bill. Indeed, as Collier traveled throughout the nation touting his radical 
approach to policy reform, he met two major roadblocks: time and history. First, the 
commissioner, already facing a rather restricted timeline, spent very few days in each 
location. To leaders of tribal nations on the Northern Plains, for example, he explained, 
“We have four days for this meeting. That will mean morning, afternoon and evening, if 
necessary. We have a great deal of ground to cover.”46 In total, that meeting hosted 198 
delegates from over forty tribal nations, whose concerns Collier, and the collection of 
agents he brought with him from the Office of Indian Affairs, simply could not fully 
address. Native leaders received very little time in which to express their concerns, and 
many said nothing at all. The Shoshone, led by council member Charles Driskell, 
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simply stated, “At this time we are noncommittal but we are going to do our utmost to 
convey the interpretations of this Bill to our folks back home.”47  
A long history of abuse from government officials also impeded Collier’s 
mission, as his Native audiences often resurrected past crimes. When the Arapaho took 
the floor in South Dakota, Councilman Bruce Groesbeck spoke not of Indian 
Reorganization, but of historical grievances. “Back in 1904,” Groesbeck explained, “the 
Government sent a representative from Washington to buy, or have the Tribe of 
Shoshone and Arapahoe cede, a large portion of what is known as Big Wind River, 
located in Shoshone Reservation in Wyoming. There were agreements made between 
the Government and tribes located there and only two of those agreements have been 
fulfilled.” Instead of encouraging tribal nations to accept additional federal policies, the 
councilman suggested that John Collier resolve “the other agreements that have not 
been fulfilled. Look to that.”48 Other delegates to the Plains Congress troubled Collier 
with hypothetical scenarios, a veritable mind exercise for the commissioner, as he 
sought to address the possible ramifications of voting outcomes. Frustrated and 
ultimately unsuccessful in his campaign, Collier returned to Washington, D.C. and 
adjusted his strategy.  
To gauge indigenous sentiment regarding Reorganization, the commissioner 
instructed reservation agents to frequently poll the eligible enrolled members of all 
tribal nations. In Wyoming, federal officials also conducted several meetings with the 
Arapaho and Shoshone throughout 1934. Reservation leaders raised several concerns 
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about the Indian Reorganization Act, chiefly among them, issues of land tenure and 
ownership. While many politicians applauded the end of allotment, Native people 
worried that, if they accepted reorganization, they would be putting reservation lands in 
jeopardy. Collier’s misguided notions about the “Red Atlantis,” which can be found in 
the first draft of the Reorganization Act, particularly troubled the Shoshone and 
Arapaho. This misunderstanding about Reorganization and allotment clearly stems from 
Collier’s unrestricted ambition. By providing tribal nations with the first draft of the 
bill, one that would be debated and drastically altered before receiving approval, 
reservation leaders could discuss the provisions but fretted over certain policies that 
would, in the long run, not affect their communities. 
This discussion of land tenure became particularly important to the Arapaho, 
who believed that land ownership validated their existence on the Wind River. In the 
late nineteenth century, the tribal nation eagerly accepted allotments as a way to 
establish their claim to part of the reservation, a move the Shoshone deeply resented. In 
light of the Shoshones’ Court of Claims case, and unfounded rumors that a favorable 
settlement would effectively remove the Arapaho from the Wind River, issues of land 
tenure increasingly troubled Arapaho leaders and their constituents. In response, the 
Arapaho council explained to Collier, “Your plan of Indian Community life whereby 
we live in villages is unsuited and foreign to the Plains Indians…We wish to remain on 
our farms and continue to cultivate our lands. We oppose Community ownership of 
property and lands as unsuited to our tribe. The allotment of lands has not proven as 
disastrous to us as the commissioner believes.”49 Through perhaps imbued with 
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devastating intentions, the General Allotment Act, Arapaho councilmen insisted, 
provided their people with land titles, and they adamantly believed that the Indian 
Reorganization Act would remove their claim to individual parcels of land on the 
Shoshone Agency. In this case, the Arapahos’ collective memory regarding allotment as 
a favorable experience in their campaign to secure a portion of the Wind River, dictated 
their stance on Reorganization.  
Indeed, the state of indigenous land claims became one of the most discussed 
concerns regarding Reorganization. Many tribal nations, weary of seemingly helpful 
federal policies, feared that Collier intended to dissolve land titles or rescind individual 
land ownership on reservations across the country.50 In response, Dick Washakie, son of 
the revered Shoshone, Chief Washakie, adamantly denounced the bill in February 1934, 
“It is true that my father selected this land here as [our] home. The Commissioner has 
sent a program or a paper here for us to consider, asking us our opinions about 
recolonizing our people, turning our lands back and our allotments back, making a unit 
reservation out of it.”51 Thoroughly denouncing plans for a communal reservation, both 
the Shoshone and the Arapaho believed that acceptance of the Reorganization Act, in its 
original form, would bring no benefit to their reservation. By April 7, 1934, Wind River 
leaders adamantly opposed Reorganization, despite its considerable promotion from 
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their agent and the commissioner. An unofficial poll by agency officials noted, that the 
Arapaho voted 115 to 1 against the bill, while the Shoshones rejected it 153 to 5.52 
 The reservation’s overwhelming dismissal of the IRA would not last, however. 
Throughout the rest of the year, John Collier’s representatives actively promoted the 
final version of the bill, passed by Congress and signed into law that June. The arrival 
of a new Agency Superintendent, Forrest Stone, to the Wind River also heightened 
reservation interest in the issue, as he pressured council members, spoke openly in favor 
of the IRA and printed encouraging statements in area newspapers. Calling the Indian 
Reorganization Act a “practical answer to a very practical problem,” Stone worked 
diligently to promote Collier’s plans for federal policy reform.53 At the same time, 
Arapaho and Shoshone leaders read the final draft of the bill and reassessed their stance 
on the subject. In April 1935, a Wind River delegation traveled to Washington, D.C., to 
address their final concerns directly to the commissioner, before a reservation-wide vote 
took place. In preparation for their meeting, Arapaho councilman, Robert Friday, 
submitted his objections to the Office of Indian Affairs, including issues of water rights, 
land tenure and citizenship. But perhaps the most interesting critique of the bill can be 
found in his final objection, in which the “Indian Department [compelled] the Arapahos 
and the Shoshones to vote on the acceptance of the Act as one tribe.” 54 At the insistence 
of Congress, each reservation, not tribal nation, voted to accept or reject the bill. In the 
event of a favorable vote, the Arapaho and Shoshone could create their own 
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constitutions and “run their affairs as two tribes rather than as one,” but reservation 
agents would not divide the votes along national lines.55 
  Of course, this request represented nothing new when it came to reservation 
affairs. For more than half a century, the Shoshone and Arapaho fought to maintain a 
sense of individuality as they interacted with the federal government. Naturally, the 
leaders of both tribal nations wished for their people to be represented in this landmark 
decision, but shifting opinions about the bill and divisive political players on the 
reservation also prompted Friday’s request. Chiefly among them, Charles Driskell, a 
rather vocal Shoshone councilman, had befriended Agent Forrest Stone and 
subsequently led a charge for the reservation to accept Reorganization. Driskell argued 
that both tribal nations could benefit from the IRA and that it would not only enhance 
their political prowess, but also aid in the development of a stronger relationship 
between the Wind River and the federal government. Most of the Arapaho council 
members, and even a few Shoshone leaders, did not appreciate this shift in focus. When 
selecting delegates to send to Washington D.C. that April, all of the Arapaho leaders, 
and even two Shoshone councilmen, voted against sending the polemical 
representative.56   
Yet, by the time the delegation departed for Washington D.C., a number of 
Shoshone leaders had also reconsidered the utility of the IRA. Driskell’s influence 
notwithstanding, an excess of Arapaho voters alarmed Shoshone representatives, as did 
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Arapaho unanimity on the issue. Young Shoshone citizens, seeking wage work and 
educational opportunities away from the reservation, increasingly participated in an 
outmigration to metropolitan centers throughout the country, creating an unequal voting 
balance on the reservation.57 The 1933 census reported that of the 1,075 enrolled 
Arapahos, 995 lived on the reservation.  On the other hand, only 879 of the 1,245 
enrolled Shoshone lived on the Wind River. The shifting demographic of the Shoshone 
Agency ensured that the Arapaho could gain the upper hand in a voting disagreement. 
Unable to bolster their numbers or convince their people to return to the reservation to 
vote, the Shoshones grew increasingly concerned that the Arapaho would outnumber 
and thus outvote them.58 
Between April and June 1935, the Shoshone remained divided over the issue. 
Some, with the help of Agent Stone, continually advocated for acceptance of the IRA 
and encouraged surrounding non-Native communities to do the same. Stone became 
quite active in the weeks leading up to the vote. He issued a call to action in regional 
newspapers, encouraging Wyoming residents, both white and Native, to “urge them [the 
Arapaho and Shoshone] forward along the lines of self confidence and self 
government.”59 The Agent received authorization to use government funds and modes 
of transportation to collect “old Indians,” and those unable to travel to voting stations, in 
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a blatant attempt to bolster Shoshone numbers. He also postponed the event, from May 
18 to June 15, and met with both councils separately, just days before the vote 
occurred.60 For all of this effort, Agent Stone bemoaned, “Prospects for passage of bill 
does not look favorable tonight…Serious thought both for and against bill very 
pronounced throughout entire reservation which is most favorable sign observed.”61 As 
tension mounted, no one, least of all Stone, knew what Wind River residents might 
decide.  
On June 15, 1935, the Shoshone Agency boasted an astounding turnout, as 80 
percent of the eligible citizens cast their votes. Influenced by propaganda and certain 
political proponents, over three hundred people voted for Reorganization, but a majority 
of the population, more than four hundred and seventy people, defeated the bill. By 
some accounts, the Shoshone accepted the IRA by a one vote margin (175 in favor, 174 
against), but discrepancies in the final count remained.62 Immediately after the polls 
closed, agency officials struggle to determine the exact outcome, as polling stations kept 
inadequate records. Initially, W.R. Centerwall, an agent from the Office of Indian 
Affairs reported, “While the results as to the actual count of votes does not look so good 
on paper, the fact remains that they did not have enough NO votes to reject the bill.”63 
Congratulating themselves on a “great moral victory,” both Superintendent Stone and 
Agent Centerwall felt their efforts, including postponing the elections in order to sway 
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votes and the propaganda they published in area newspapers, contributed to the 
outcome.64 Confident in the votes of acceptance, Stone assured many Shoshone citizens 
that Reorganization passed, although the final count had yet to be fully tabulated.65   
These self-administered accolades soon proved premature. On June 22, Agent 
Stone reported to the Commissioner of Indians Affairs, “It has been difficult for me to 
make a final report on the results of the voting on the reorganization act.”66 In part, 
Stone refused to accept that the bill had been defeated on the Wind River and called for 
at least one recount. Naturally, the close margin of the contest also produced tension 
within the political ranks of the reservation. Agent Stone reported, “Never before, 
according to the employees and older Indians familiar with the affairs of the tribes have 
the Arapahoes and Shoshone Indians been so stirred up over their affairs.”67 Most of the 
hyperbole regarding “age old rivalries” and “hereditary tension,” appeared, to Wind 
River residents, dramatized for Collier’s benefit, but to be sure, the Shoshone expressed 
considerable disappointment. Long frustrated by the Arapahos’ presence on their 
reservation, the Shoshone denounced the tribal nation’s uncooperative behavior. After 
nearly three decades of collaboration, the Shoshone viewed the Arapahos’ adamant 
refusal to accept the IRA as an affront to their functioning political system. The 
temporary degeneration Stone witnessed following the vote on the Wind River, 
certainly an unintended consequence of the IRA, further illustrates the harmful nature of 
John Collier’s policies.  
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Additionally, in accordance with the guidelines of the bill, the Office of Indian 
Affairs could not allow the Shoshone to implement Reorganization, as a majority of 
voters on the reservation defeated the proposal. Members of the Shoshone community 
voiced outrage and concern, as they wrote to John Collier with complaints and regret.68 
Instead of seeking another vote on the matter or berating their Arapaho neighbors 
further, most of the protestors simply suggested that it would be necessary for future 
legislation to be considered separately, in order to maintain a peaceful balance on the 
Shoshone Agency. Once again highlighting the problems of a shared reservation, 
members of the tribal nation insisted that if the Arapaho had not been relocated to the 
Wind River, they would have been able to accept the IRA.  
In light of the Wind River experience, and the often heated debates regarding the 
acceptance or rejection of the IRA, it is perhaps surprising that many tribal nations 
voted for Reorganization. Once approved, the IRA directed agency officials to 
distribute template constitutions, as reservation leaders created, voted and established a 
centralized governing body. Although the federal government did not endorse a singular 
model constitution, they did provide, upon request, a standard form which is still in 
effect today on several reservations. Above all else, the IRA ended the devastating 
policy of allotment, although decades of damage could not be repaired. While John 
Collier made important advances towards the incorporation of Native Americans into 
the creation of government policy, IRA stipulations still revealed paternalistic notions 
and naiveté towards Native American people.  
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On the Wind River, a disheartened Agent Stone demanded that changes be made 
to the political system on the reservation. Despite the increased tension that enveloped 
the reservation, Arapaho and Shoshone council members united to reject Stone’s 
proposed changes. The Arapaho believed that a system of written by-laws and a 
constitution undermined their political authority, while the Shoshone noted their 
contentment with the current political system, a notion Stone could not comprehend. 69 
In reality, several Shoshone councilmembers voted to accept reorganization for the 
monetary benefits and improved government relationships, decidedly not to encourage 
the process of political reorganization. In the long run, by rejecting the IRA, Wind 
River tribal nations maintained a high level of OIA involvement in the governance of 
their reservation.70 
The Tide Turns 
In total, 181 reservations accepted reorganization, while 77 indigenous groups 
rejected the proposed legislation. These statistics indicate not only the divisiveness of 
Collier’s reform agenda, but also the varied opinions of the nation’s Native and non-
Native inhabitants regarding the Commissioner as a politician and an individual. On 
reservations across the country, Native votes regarding the IRA reflected feelings not 
just about the proposed legislation, but also past experiences with the Office of Indian 
Affairs and their personal feelings toward John Collier.71 In general, Native sentiment 
regarding Collier and his policies tended to be a bit more favorable than those of his 
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fellow politicians and the American public. At the same time, indigenous people, far 
from a monolithic ethnic group, held different views of their commissioner. A Shoshone 
citizen, William Aragon, proudly voted for reorganization and called Collier one of “the 
finest men [he] ever came into contact with.”72 On the other hand, Joseph Burner, an 
Oklahoma Creek man and leader of the American Indian Federation, became one of 
Collier’s most rapacious critics.  
Bruner viciously attacked Collier’s Indian Reorganization Act, suggesting that it 
opened reservations to communism and promoted the decline of Christianity.73 Initially, 
Collier ignored Bruner, keeping negative comments within his own political circle. But 
by May 1935, Collier succumbed to his frustration and publically wrote to newspaper 
editor Arthur Brisbane, lambasting “All of Bruner’s fulminations…about communism, 
anarchism, atheism, Turkism and Chinaism.” He argued, “The things that the President 
and Secretary Ickes are trying to do for Indians are plain American things long overdue, 
and are not influenced by Russia, China, Turkey…etc. etc.”74 Despite these defensive 
maneuvers, Bruner continued to mercilessly criticize John Collier’s Indian New Deal 
and his inability to find an acceptable way to adjudicate indigenous cases. Bruner’s own 
organization proposed a way to provide assistance for individual Native claims and 
solicited money from everyday Native Americans to pay AIF lobbyists. In turn, the 
activist planned to convince Congress to allot $3,000 disbursements to every Indian 
member of Bruner’s organization, effectively resolving the claims crisis. In response, 
Collier’s office issued a series of scathing press releases against the American Indian 
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Federation, Joseph Bruner and his proposed schemes, “The pretense which the 
Federation offered was that there existed in each Indian as an individual a valid claim 
against the Government. No such claim exists in fact. Only tribal claims exist…Thus a 
double deception is attempted – deception of Indians whose dollars are being solicited, 
and deception of Congress.”75 Though perhaps radical in his methods, Bruner did bring 
attention to the one plank of Collier’s reform agenda that had yet to be fulfilled, an 
Indian Claims Commission.  
Not surprisingly, Native people overwhelmingly supported Collier’s efforts to 
create a more efficient process for adjudicating their claims. When the Commissioner 
endorsed yet another proposal for the creation of an Indian Claims Commission in May 
of 1935, the Indian Truth, a newspaper published by the Indian Rights Association, 
applauded Collier, stressing that “Setting up the machinery for settling for all Indians 
and for all time their claims against the Government is urgently needed.”76 But Collier 
often found himself on the defensive, as he promoted the rest of his policy agenda. 
Burdened by Depression era budgetary concerns, exasperated members of Congress 
dismissed Collier’s advocacy and allowed his claims commission proposal to stall and 
expire on the House floor. 77 Beginning in the late 1930s, legislators increasingly 
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tribes wait around decade after decade for a settlement…They do not get the settlement and they feel 
aggrieved and they have a right to feel aggrieved.” Supporting the claim, Rufus G. Poole, the assistant 
solicitor of the Department of the Interior and Will Rogers the chairman of the House Committee on 
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denounced Collier’s programs and voiced concerns regarding their supposed 
“communist influence.”78 Surprisingly, Collier’s most powerful opposition did not 
come from the Native American population, or the halls of Congress, but rather the 
president himself, Franklin Roosevelt. In 1936, Roosevelt asked Collier if there existed 
“some better way to do justice than by paying money damages, whether small or vast, 
in behalf of the many dead to the few who as yet lived on?” Developing upon this 
thought further, the president continued,  
The government’s obligation was toward the living Indians and the Indians yet 
unborn, and simply could not be measured in terms of the wrongs done to 
Indians long dead. Let the Indians be furnished adequate land bases, adequate 
economic assistance, and adequate personal and group education; such an 
assistance, and not just paying out moneys on account of wrongs done to the 
dead, was the useful thing for the government to attend to; and practically 
viewed it was the way to do justice to the dead as well as to the living Indians.79 
 
Despite his admiration for Roosevelt, Collier strongly denounced this position. He 
asserted in his memoir (not to Roosevelt personally) that for the Indians, “their ‘claims’ 
rested deeply in their hearts as the claims for rights; furthermore, there could have been 
no assurance that as the years passed Congress would appropriate the necessary 
increased funds – necessary if the economic bases of all the tribes were to be made 
adequate for their present and their future.”80 Collier would not raise the subject with 
                                                                                                                                               
Indian Affairs along with Ickes and Collier pushed for its approval. On June 20, 1935 the Los Angeles 
Times reported “The House Indian Committee today approved a bill to establish a new Indian Claims 
Commission to adjust all complaints by Indians against the government.” Out of the House Committee, 
the bill still had a long way to go, yet in the history of Indian Claims Commission legislation the 1935 
proposal finally received considerable attention. Please see, John Collier, House Committee on Indian 
Affairs, Indian Claims Commission, 74th Cong., 1st sess., May 22, 1935: 6; “Indian Board Plan 
Approved,” Los Angeles Times, June 20, 1935; and Rosenthal, Their Day in Court, 62. 
78
 In 1939, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs even issued a report criticizing the Indian 
Reorganization Act.  
79
 Collier, From Every Zenith, 297. (emphasis original) 
80
 Collier, From Every Zenith, 298. (emphasis original) 
297 
Roosevelt again, however, as the president became occupied with foreign affairs and 
ultimately ignored the commissioner’s political agenda. 
Mainstream newspapers also denounced Collier’s plan to adjudicate Native 
claims. Several even vilified the formation of an Indian Claims Commission, as an 
atmosphere of suspicion punctuated news correspondence regarding Collier’s proposal. 
A New York Times article on March 17, 1935, proclaimed “Indians Plan Suits For 
$3,135,913,014.” The author of the provocative headline suggested that the ability of 
Native Americans to sue for such a “tremendous” sum and the profound legal power 
they supposedly wielded could force the government “in some cases to file counter-
suits, claiming that it has supplied, in some cases, more than the number of horses, 
cattle and blankets agreed upon in treaties made with the tribes, sometimes as long as 
fifty years ago.”81 Ironically, any government claim for extra cattle and blankets would 
in no way equal the millions of dollars in lost land claims, yet the New York Times 
believed that counter-suits were certainly in order. 
Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. The United States 
For those tribal nations whose cases already languished in the Court of Claims 
system, John Collier’s proposals seemed both too little and too late. Disaffected 
members of the Shoshone tribal nation, led by Charles Driskell, expressed 
dissatisfaction with both the outcome of the vote for Reorganization and their Court of 
Claims case to the commissioner. The council insisted, “Since the Act was defeated by 
the Arapahoe Indians who occupy part of our reservation and for which we Shoshones 
have not been compensated, we feel that we have been done a great injustice by being 
deprived of the right to come under the Act. We Shoshone are a proud and progressive 
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people and feel that our progress should not be hampered by the Arapahos who have no 
right to occupancy.”82 Clearly connecting past injustices committed by the federal 
government to their current plight, the Shoshone felt that they deserved, at the very 
least, their day in court. Pending a final decision from the Court of Claims, certain 
Shoshone leaders increasingly voiced their dissatisfaction with the Arapaho members of 
the JBC and at times even denounced the tribal nation as little more than a group of 
squatters on their land.  Despite, or perhaps because of, these complaints, the Shoshone 
looked with anticipation toward their court case, seeking retribution for the illegal 
placement of the Arapaho onto their reservation, and even a little poetic justice given 
the defeat of Reorganization on the Wind River.83  
In 1927, the Shoshone received congressional approval to file a claim against 
the United States for treaty violations. This victory, while encouraging, represented just 
the first step in the long journey toward obtaining compensation for the theft of their 
land. Attorneys for the government also based their case upon Article Two of the Treaty 
of the Eastern Shoshoni and Bannock in 1868, which stipulated that “friendly” tribal 
nations could be placed upon the Wind River. They argued that at the time of the 
Arapahos’ arrival, federal officials believed that the two tribal nations maintained a 
sociable relationship and that Shoshone Agents heard no protests to the contrary. The 
defendant’s attorneys demanded that the Shoshone, and their lawyer, George Tunison, 
prove otherwise. Tunison responded in a 1933 legal brief, “the evidence shows 
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conclusively that the protests were made, and the defendant’s brief shows that the 
Agents did not report them.”84 He also argued, that “the Government has failed 
absolutely to prove that the Arapahoes were qualified to share the use and occupation of 
the Shoshone Agency. Were they friendly Indians as the Treaty requires?  They are not 
so regarded even to this day.” Furthermore, Tunison cited the Report of the Twelfth 
Census, in 1900, which stated “they intermarry but little, as the Shoshoni still retain 
some of their hereditary enmity for the Arapaho, regarding the settlement of the latter 
on this reserve in 1878 as an invasion,” and even defined “hereditary enmity” as a 
sentiment in which “the enmity was of such long standing that it was passed on from 
generation to generation.”85 In the end, both the plaintiff and defendant based their case 
on the “friendly relationship” between the Arapaho and Shoshone as perceived by the 
tribal nations in 1878 and gathered evidence to bolster their arguments in the court.86 
Less than three years after the monumental vote regarding the IRA, the Supreme 
Court of the United States handed down the ruling on the case of the United States v. 
Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming. On April 25, 1938, 
the Court decided, “The fair and reasonable value of a one-half undivided interest of the 
Shoshone or Wind River Reservation of a total of 2,343,540 acres, which was taken by 
the United States on March 19, 1878, from the Shoshone Tribe of Indians for the 
Northern Arapahoe Tribe, was, on March 19, 1878, $1,581,889.50.”87 While certainly a 
momentous victory for the Shoshone, this case also set a very important legal precedent, 
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as the Court ruled that the tribal nation deserved compensation not just for surface 
usage, but also the worth of subsurface minerals on the oil rich reservation. The case, 
the first of its kind, marked a turning point in indigenous legal rights and became a 
decision of global significance.  
Accordingly, the Court awarded $4,408,444.23 to the Shoshone tribal nation for 
the amount of land and minerals taken, plus interest.88 By the time the government 
distributed payment, in July of 1939, the Shoshone accrued additional interest in the 
amount of $155,080.61. After paying their legal team, the tribal nation received an 
impressive sum of $4,191,132.83. The Shoshone council dispersed desperately needed 
funds to their citizens and held, in trust, nearly half of their settlement for reservation 
improvement. In creating a fiscal plan for their settlement, the Shoshone council 
reserved, “$1,000,000 to purchase land, a payment of $2,450 ($100 in cash and $1,350 
[$500 to each minor] in credit to be applied to the purchase of land, housing, equipment, 
seed, livestock, or support for the aged and incapacitated, and $1,000 to the individual 
account of each Shoshone for purposes approved by the secretary of the interior.)”89 
Shoshone compensation also provided them with considerable financial freedom and 
flexibility. For example, during World War II, Shoshone leaders purchased a $500 bond 
for each of the 1,278 enrolled members of the tribal nation, in an unprecedented show 
of patriotism and financial strength.  
The End of an Era 
Unfortunately, national undercurrents in federal Indian policy quickly threatened this 
newfound fortune. The creation of the Indian Reorganization Act, and the general 
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motivation behind the Indian New Deal, reflected a time in which policy makers 
realized that assimilation and detribalization efforts ineffectively dealt with the “Indian 
problem.” By adopting a system in which Native American consultants assisted in the 
creation of federal policies, and tribal nations voted to accept or reject programs like the 
IRA, Collier advocated for a step away from the paternalistic notions that many policy 
makers held of Native Americans, as “wards” of the government. Developments in 
federal policy in the mid-1940s, however, reflected yet another shift, one that 
emphasized a much more negative accounting of the long history between the United 
States government and tribal nations. As many indigenous people assessed the 
astounding changes promoted by the Office of Indian Affairs under Collier, legislators 
devised a plan to sever their trust relationship with the federal government.  
In the early 1940s, John Collier became increasingly discouraged with the 
inattention his policies received. In general, pressure of world war distracted legislators 
and minimalized Collier’s political ambitions. Frustrated by his increasing 
ineffectiveness as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Collier submitted his letter of 
resignation to President Roosevelt on January 10, 1945. Distance from office, however, 
simply allowed Collier the free time to put his ideas into print and further advocate for 
Native rights from a civilian’s perspective. A prolific writer, Collier published 
numerous articles regarding the plight of American Indians and their continued need for 
government assistance.90 He also attacked the recently organized Truman administration 
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for their inattention to Native affairs and their startling shift in political strategy. 
Turning away from Indian New Deal policies and rhetoric, the Office of Indian Affairs 
in the late 1940s instigated a campaign that would enable the United States government 
to “get out of the Indian business.”  
Within this charged political atmosphere, hyper-patriotic rhetoric justified the 
creation of devastating Indian policies that would haunt indigenous people for decades. 
Leading the charge, Senators Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma and Joseph O’Mahoney of 
Wyoming explored possible ways to end Native “dependency” and dissolve the 
government’s relationship with the tribal nations.91 This policy platform, known as 
termination, developed with the assistance of William Brophy, John Collier’s successor. 
Brophy, a friend and political ally of Collier’s, did not support tribal dissolution per se, 
but rather, encouraged Native people to rely upon their own resources and use 
government funding to improve reservation education and health, so that they could, 
one day, rid themselves of governmental dependency. In Brophy’s estimation, the only 
way that American Indians could operate without government intervention, would be 
through a large monetary infusion. This one time payment would enable indigenous 
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leaders to improve reservation conditions and, in turn, allow for the termination of their 
trust relationship with the federal government.  
In 1945, legislation proposing an Indian Claims Commission once again landed 
on the House floor, but attracted new supporters and a different tone. When speaking 
before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, Commissioner Brophy embraced 
patriotic rhetoric instead of pleading, as Collier had in the past, for a system in which 
tribal nations would receive “their day in court.” Advocating for the newly revised 
Indian Claims Commission legislation, Brophy stated, “It is only fitting that at the end 
of World War II the devotion and patriotism of our Indian citizens be recognized by 
abolishing the last serious discrimination with which they are burdened in their dealings 
with the Federal Government.”92 The bill itself appeared a mirror image of Collier’s 
1937 proposal and included a three man committee with the hope that one member 
could be an American Indian, a ten year period to adjudicate claims and the repeated 
assertion that all decisions would be final. This last point, included in each of Collier’s 
proposals, took on new meaning in 1945, however.  
The Indian Claims Commission legislation passed with shocking efficiency and 
little debate. Felix Cohen and Harold Ickes supported the bill as a lasting tribute to 
Collier’s Indian New Deal, while Henry Jackson, chair of the House Committee on 
Indian Affairs supported the measure because, “once Congress settled claims, thousands 
of Indians would abandon their tribal heritage, leave impoverished reservations, and 
enjoy the substance instead of the shadow of citizenship.”93 Even opponents of previous 
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claims legislation joined the Indian Claims Commission movement and expressed 
confidence in the belief that a monetary settlement would lead tribal nations on a path 
towards assimilation, and even termination. On August 13, 1946, President Harry 
Truman signed the Indian Claims Commission Act with great fanfare and insisted in a 
brief statement that the bill would create a new era for Indian citizens. With the ability 
to receive a just settlement, Truman encouraged Native Americans to find “community 
in the nation instead of the tribe and to fully share in the prosperity of America’s 
postwar capitalist market economy.”94 In essence, Truman argued that with this final 
settlement, Native Americans could assimilate into mainstream society and willingly 
accept termination, thereby embracing their status as individual American citizens, 
rather than members of their tribal nations. 
On the Wind River, reservation inhabitants acknowledged that events of the 
mid-twentieth century, including this shift in federal policy and the adjudication of the 
Shoshone’s Court of Claims case, signaled the end of an era. Following the resolution 
of Shoshone grievances, addressed in their Court of Claims case, both tribal nations 
effectively moved beyond discussions of Arapaho intrusion and abandoned the last 
vestiges of enmity.95  With regard to the court’s ruling, Shoshone Edward Wadda 
explains that, to some, the decision was bittersweet, “The Shoshone tribe, they did seek 
financial, I don’t know what you would call it, monetary damages, or whatever for 
having the Arapaho tribe there which they did receive… [but] once that happened then 
both tribes were given that fifty percent undivided interest,” in reservation lands.96 To 
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the Shoshone, shared, undivided interest in the reservation meant the legal 
relinquishment of half of their reservation to, and the formal recognition of, the 
Arapaho on the Wind River. To make the transition official, the Shoshone and Arapaho 
agreed to change the formal title of the Shoshone Agency to that of the Wind River 
Indian Reservation in a symbolic gesture of unification.97 Given the changing political 
climate of the mid-20th century, their unity would prove essential as federal officials 
evaluated the status of reservations across the country and prepared select tribal nations 
for termination.98  
In 1954, Congress asked Commissioner Brophy to indicate on a list of federally 
recognized tribal nations those sufficiently organized and capable of self-sustainment. 
The list eventually appeared in House Report Number 2680 before Congress, including 
item number 174, which simply stated,  “Wind River: Yes.” On the Wind River 
reservation, this news came as no surprise. Since 1947, Joint Business Council 
delegates had successfully withstood pressure from several congressmen, including 
their own Senator, Joseph O’Mahoney, to terminate their trust relationship in return for 
increased per capita payments. Additionally, on July 10, 1953, a report to the 
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs described the “recent forward progress of the Indians 
of the [Wind River] Reservation.” The statement noted that “statistics were compiled by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs regarding the Wind River Indians in 1947 which indicated 
that in 1930 these Indians were approximately 63 percent acculturated to white 
standards,” implying, of course, that in the intervening seventeen years, the Arapaho 
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and Shoshone did nothing but continue to acculturate. By 1957, federal officials argued, 
Wind River Indians should “be ready for complete removal of Indian Bureau 
jurisdiction.” To strengthen the case for terminating the Arapaho and Shoshone, 
William H. Gilbert of History and General Research pointed to oil revenues and the 
“concurrence of opinion” demonstrated by the Joint Business Council, whose 
“experience of handling their own individual money had been, on the whole, quite 
beneficial…They had, in fact demonstrated sufficient competency in business matters to 
justify the assumption that Indian Bureau control is rapidly becoming less and less 
necessary.” Ironically, the same business councils that had been denounced by Indian 
Agents for nearly fifty years as backward and disorganized institutions that promoted 
tribalism, refused to adopt constitutions under the IRA and humored the “kicks” of old 
men, now became the vehicle for modernity and self-sustainment according to 
termination advocates.99    
The report did not go unanswered, however. Delegates Nell Scott (Arapaho) and 
Robert Harris (Shoshone) tirelessly worked to avoid termination. Nell Scott 
remembered, “Bob and I cried on everybody’s shoulder… [We told them] we haven’t 
got no education. We got a lot of old people that isn’t education. Why don’t you let it go 
for a while. So they did.” Despite her remembrances of self-effacement, Nell Scott was 
a shrewd and articulate business councilwoman who, with the aid of Robert Harris, 
successfully campaigned for reprieve. Their pleas alone, however, probably did not 
defeat Wind River termination. Strong protests created delays, for sure, but a very 
lengthy Indian Claims Commission case from the Arapaho inevitably slowed the 
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termination process. By the early 1960s, the political tide began to turn against 
termination and in favor of self-determination, ultimately saving the Arapaho and 
Shoshone. While these factors certainly contributed to the Wind River reservation’s 
fate, the persistence of political alliances between Arapaho and Shoshone delegates 
cannot be denied. 
History, perhaps more than any other national element discussed in this study, 
reinforced Arapaho and Shoshone bonds of nationalism. As one scholar simply 
described the importance of a shared past, history “tells you who you are and why you 
must survive as a people.”100 But more than that, Arapaho and Shoshone recollections 
of the past formed a tangible link between a proud cultural heritage of endurance and 
survival and contemporary decisions that led them on a path to the future, one littered 
with federal roadblocks, destructive policies and discrimination. As the Arapaho and 
Shoshone endorsed Court of Claims cases, evaluated federal legislation, including the 
Indian Reorganization Act, and mounted a defense against termination, the history of 
their tribal nations influenced and often guided their way. At the same time, memories 
of a shared reservation past, including Arapaho placement, gradual accommodation and 
eventually partnership, solidified a powerful political alliance on the Wind River, one 
capable of withstanding even the most rigorous attacks against their sovereignty. While 
many scholars have ignored, or even denounced, the difficult and often contentious 
relationship between the Arapaho and Shoshone, a study of the mid-twentieth century 
reveals that it was exactly this history, and the ability of reservation leaders and citizens 
to rise above, but not forget, their past, that ensured their mutual survival and future 
success.   
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Conclusion  
 In the spring of 2008, Northern Arapaho Wayne C’Hair, reflected upon the 
status of Wind River Indians in the twenty-first century. Despite the many travails of 
reservation life, the language instructor insisted, “We’re still a people. We’ve still got 
culture. We’ve still got history.”1 Indeed, the very survival of their language, which he 
now teaches to students at the University of Wyoming, seemed to him a fitting tribute to 
the fortitude and endurance of the two Wind River tribal nations. From 1851 to 1938, 
the Northern Arapaho and Eastern Shoshone witnessed non-Native encroachment onto 
their ancestral homelands, negotiated with government officials for a reservation in 
central Wyoming, combatted starvation and assimilationist programs designed to 
eradicate their languages and cultures, created business councils to better manage 
reservation affairs, reconstituted their ethnic identities through the promotion of cultural 
performances, and addressed sweeping changes in federal Indian policy. For nearly a 
century, they endured hardship and celebrated triumph together, as two distinct tribal 
nations joined by chance and federal inaction. A survey of Wind River history during 
this era illustrates both the cultural distinctiveness, and common elements, of Arapaho 
and Shoshone indigenous nationalism. 
 For centuries, the Arapaho and Shoshone claimed territory on the Northern 
Plains. These spaces, both secular and sacred, rooted the citizenry of both tribal nations 
to their established homelands. During the nineteenth century, competition on the 
Northern Plains created territorial disputes, as they faced constant invasion from other 
indigenous groups, as well as non-Native outsiders. To mediate violence in the region, 
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federal officials began negotiating with tribal nations in 1851, to designate the territorial 
boundaries claimed by indigenous peoples and the lands open for Anglo-American 
settlement. This process initiated lasting contact between tribal nations and the federal 
government, as additional treaties repeatedly redrew border lines in the American West. 
By 1868, the Eastern Shoshone had secured a reservation in the Wind River Valley of 
central Wyoming, while the Northern Arapaho, out of favor with federal officials, 
wandered the Plains. A decade later, the Arapaho, left with few viable options, implored 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to allow them a temporary stay on the Wind River, 
until a more permanent reservation could be established. Delighted in the simplicity of 
such a plan, Office of Indian Affairs personnel agreed and secured Shoshone permission 
for their stay. Ultimately, governmental inactivity produced a most improbable 
outcome, Arapaho and Shoshone cohabitation of the Wind River.  
 Once situated on their reservation, citizens of both tribal nations experienced 
hardship. Immediately, they faced starvation as the number buffalo dwindled on the 
Northern Plains. In response, agency personnel encouraged members of both tribal 
nations to farm, believing that agricultural pursuits would reduce the effects of 
insufficient seasonal hunting and poor ration distribution. Additionally, farming, along 
with education and Christianity, comprised a three pronged approach, taken by federal 
agents and religious missionaries, to disintegrate the bonds of nationalism and 
assimilate indigenous people into mainstream American life. In 1887, land tenure 
became a fourth component of the assimilationist campaign, with the passage of the 
General Allotment Act. Though in practice, land allotment tore apart extended families 
and devastated Native homelands, on the Wind River the process of allotment also 
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allowed citizens of the Northern Arapaho tribal nation access to a portion of the 
reservation. Previously considered squatters on Shoshone land, the Arapaho claimed 
half of the Wind River through the process of allotment. The move infuriated the 
Shoshone, who tolerated the Arapahos’ existence, with the hope that their “guests” 
would one day be relocated to their own reservation. Only land cession negotiations in 
1891, inadvertently mediated the dispute, as federal agents acknowledged the 
sovereignty of both tribal nations during land cession negotiations.  
  The permanent establishment of the Arapaho on the Wind River and the death 
of influential chieftain leadership at the turn of the twentieth century necessitated a shift 
in political authority on the reservation. Slowly, both tribal nations adopted business 
councils to address larger, reservation-wide concerns. A land cession council in 1898, 
demonstrated the utility of such organizations, however, tension between Arapaho and 
Shoshone council members, and dissention within the councils themselves, indicated 
the difficulties associated with this shift in leadership practices. In 1904, federal agents 
returned to the Wind River to discuss the relinquishment of over half the tribal nations’ 
land base, a true test of reservation political authority. While Arapaho leaders 
denounced the land cession, and left the meeting in protest, the Shoshone remained and 
negotiated the sale of over half of the Wind River. By 1906, the larger ramifications of 
their actions became apparent, as non-Native settlers rushed onto former reservation 
lands. In response, Arapaho and Shoshone citizens forcibly protested the land cession 
while a mob of vigilantes overran the reservation until the death of Shoshone 
councilman, George Terry, ultimately stemmed the violence.  
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In 1907, the councils eventually regained control over their greatly diminished 
reservation. They did so, in large part, through the creation of a Joint Business Council 
comprised of Arapaho and Shoshone leaders, which became the governing body 
authorized to handle matters of reservation land and finance. Employing a new dialogue 
on the Wind River, the Arapaho and Shoshone learned to speak the language of politics, 
as they delved into the complicated legalese of land leasing for natural resource 
extraction, established social welfare programs to assist the orphaned and elderly 
members of their citizenry, and requested and utilized federal funds for the maintenance 
of reservation boarding schools. United in a common dialect, Arapaho and Shoshone 
councilmen made a few notable advancements toward reservation sovereignty, and in 
the process the tension, or “hereditary enmity,” between the two tribal nations slowly 
diminished. Though Office of Indian Affairs personnel frequently attempted to thwart 
Arapaho and Shoshone political advancement, by the 1920s the tribal nations had 
achieved a fair measure of self-determination on the Wind River.    
Despite notable political advancements, both tribal nations recognized the 
effects of assimilationist programs which vilified indigenous dancing and traditional 
lifeways. At the turn of the twentieth century, both tribal nations supported attempts to 
revitalize long forgotten ceremonies and encouraged performance opportunities beyond 
the reservation. Over time, the Shoshone and Arapaho effectively reconstituted their 
ethnic identities, and drew citizens of their tribal nations together under the banner of 
nationalism through these cultural performances. As in the past, the Arapaho and 
Shoshone turned to religious missionaries on the reservation for support. Reverend John 
Roberts, at the Government Boarding School, and Headmaster Royal Balcom at St. 
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Michael’s Mission School, encouraged Arapaho and Shoshone cultural performance. 
While the Shoshone conducted their cultural revitalization efforts on the Wind River, 
performing for surrounding non-Native audiences, the Arapaho, with the help of show 
promoter Edward Farlow, traveled to events beyond the reservation’s boarders. 
Furthermore, in 1923, Tim McCoy, working as an agent for the Famous Players-Lasky 
Corporation, facilitated Arapaho involvement in the creation of a major motion picture, 
The Covered Wagon. While previous performances solidified their national image, 
Arapaho involvement in a “prologue” to the show performed in Hollywood, London 
and Paris, became the ultimate representation of Arapaho ethnic identity. In the 1930s, 
the declining popularity of Wild West shows, and the rise of western tourism, reversed 
the relationship between cultural performers and their non-Native audiences. As tourist 
visited the reservation, seeking cultural relics not Native performances, both tribal 
nations struggled to mediate the national image they projected.     
During the 1930s, the Arapaho and Shoshone addressed changes to their 
reservation as well as shifting federal policies from the Office of Indian Affairs. As a 
new Commissioner, John Collier, implemented sweeping reforms both tribal nations 
relied upon history to reinforce a sense of national pride in their past and evaluate how 
proposed changes could affect their future. Assessing the pinnacle of Collier’s reform 
movement, the Indian Reorganization Act, the Arapaho and Shoshone considered both 
the costs and benefits of such a program. Guided by their past experiences with 
government officials, including numerous damaging federal policies, members of both 
tribal nations ultimately voted against Reorganization. In conjunction with the 
adjudication of the Shoshone’s Court of Claims case, events of the 1930s represent the 
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culmination of a long and difficult era on the reservation. In the end, history and the 
ability of reservation leaders and citizens to rise above, but not forget their past, ensured 
their mutual survival and future success. United in defense of their land and 
sovereignty, the tribal nations looked toward, and planned for, their reservation’s future.   
In total, the six elements discussed in this study represent the individual facets of 
any tribal nation. In the case of the Wind River, territory, citizenship, political authority, 
language, cultural practices and a shared sense of the past connected members of the 
Arapaho and Shoshone tribal nations together and provided them with a sense of 
identity and belonging. While certainly unique in some ways, the composition of both 
Wind River tribal nations also mirrors other indigenous groups across the country. 
Though different in their iterations, numerous Native American groups demonstrate the 
characteristics of tribal nations as they collectively claimed territory, gave political 
authority to respected leaders, spoke unique languages, participated in distinct cultural 
practices and recalled a past of shared experiences. In the end, my definition of a tribal 
nation, based on defining features rather than rigid criteria, provides a foundation of 
commonality that can be applied to almost any indigenous group. By studying Native 
Americans in this way, scholars can create a more nuanced history of one tribal nation 
or of a multi-national reservation, as I have done. This definition also provides six clear 
lines of analysis for the creation of a comparative study of two tribal nations from the 
same region, different areas of the country, or of indigenous peoples around the world. 
Furthermore, by utilizing the rhetoric of nationalism, scholars can redefine Native 
organizations of days past and help empower modern tribal nations in their ongoing 
campaign for self-determination.  
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Additionally, this model proposes a cyclical organizational structure for the 
study of tribal nations. Rather than creating linear studies, in which scholars place 
indigenous people on an evolutionary hierarchy where they become stranded on the way 
to the final stage of advancement, the tribal nation model employs a “life cycle” 
approach in which tribal nations are born, grow, die and become reborn through the 
process of ethnogenesis. Taking this notion one step further, this study also assesses 
four forces of change, or the ways in which internal demand and contact with other 
tribal nations, the federal government and non-Native outsiders encouraged growth, or 
generated crises, during the life of a tribal nation. Ultimately this study allows for the 
reassessment of Native groups within the larger federal system, affirms their sovereign 
status as “nations within,” and allows scholars to look more closely at the often 
understudied relationships that formed between indigenous peoples of different tribal 
nations. It is my hope that other scholars will employ this model to reassess antiquated 
“tribal histories,” which fail to demonstrate the complexity of the indigenous past, 
create new studies that sideline the federal government, when possible, to highlight the 
pervasive interaction between various tribal nations and engage in the ongoing 
discussion of nationalism occurring within the field. 
Future of the Wind River  
Addressing the future of the Wind River, in 2008, Northern Arapaho Felicia 
Antelope looked beyond their shared reservation. “I am hoping that one of these days 
there will be a ‘Sho-Arap’ band, tribal group,” she explains. “So that is what I’m hoping 
for. I think that we can make better progress instead of fighting over which economic 
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direction we should take, or my culture is better than yours.”2 Recognizing that this 
transition will take three or four more generations to complete, Felicia believes that 
more intermarriage between Arapaho and Shoshone people will ultimately spark a 
melding of cultures, in which the two tribal nations become one. The process, to which 
she refers, is that of ethnogenesis, a notion deeply rooted in the academic literature. 
Historian John Moore explains the inevitability of rebirth, in the life cycle of tribal 
nations, as people fragment “into diverse groups that ultimately become other nations, 
with different languages, religions, and political structures. But only the nation dies; the 
people and their culture do not. They become part of other societies and other 
cultures.”3 
Anthropologist William Sturtevant first described this final stage in the life 
cycle of the tribal nation, but utilized different terms, during an academic conference in 
1964.4 In his article “Creek into Seminole,” Sturtevant described the creation of a new 
tribal nation from the remnants of other indigenous groups. Situating the process of 
national rebirth in the context of a popular academic movement known as an “Indian 
Renaissance,” Sturtevant documented indigenous cultural resurgence, adaptation and 
development.5 But, by taking the notion of an Indigenous Renaissance one step further, 
Sturtevant introduced a new concept he called “ethnogenesis,” and defined the process 
                                                 
2
 Felicia Antelope, interview by author, Laramie, Wyoming, February 21, 2008.  
3
 Moore, The Cheyenne Nation, 14.  
4
 William Sturtevant, “Creek into Seminole,” in North American Indians in Historical Perspective, eds. 
Eleanore Burke Leacock and Nancy Oestreich Lurie (New York: Random House, 1971), 92. 
5
 See Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York: Vintage Books, 1969); 
William Gerald McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986); Patricia Albers and William James, “On the Dialectics of Ethnicity: To Be or Not To Be 
Santee,” Journal of Ethnic Studies 14, no. 1 (1986): 1-27; Eugeen E. Roosens, Creating Ethnicity: The 
Process of Ethnogenesis (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1989); Patricia Galloway, 
Choctaw Genesis, 1500-1700 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995); Bella Bychkova Jordan and 
Terry G. Jordan-Bychkov, “Ethnogenesis and Cultural Geography,” Journal of Cultural Geography 21, 
no. 1 (2003): 3-17.  
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as, “the establishment of group distinctness.” Despite the simplicity of his definition, 
Sturtevant portrayed ethnogenesis through the formation of a specific Seminole tribal 
nation, comprised of Native Americans from the surrounding communities, many of 
them originating from the Creek. In 1964, it seemed, to many historians and 
anthropologists, that a very particular set of circumstances must be present before 
ethnogenesis could take place. From its inception nearly fifty years ago, the concept of 
ethnogenesis has been adopted, rejected, misused, redefined and reaffirmed. Even 
today, some scholars argue that ethnogenesis implies declension, and is predicated on 
the dissolution of a tribal nation before a new and potentially radically different ethnic 
identity can emerge.6 On the other hand, as Felicia Antelope indicates, ethnogenesis 
could also provide the vehicle through which the Arapaho and Shoshone, of the Wind 
River Indian Reservation, could transcend cultural ties thereby strengthening the bonds 
of community. Only time will tell when, and if, the tribal nations of the Wind River 
ever experience such a phenomenon.7  
                                                 
6
 In addition to this negative understanding of ethnogenesis, misappropriation of the term appears to 
prohibit some scholars from considering its applications at all, yet many others promote ethnogenesis and 
continue to suggest its usage in historical writing. 
7
 Though a concept most often utilized by scholars of the colonial era, the musings of Felicia Antelope  
suggest that a twenty-first century ethnogenesis is possible. This process is also not new to the Northern 
Plains; see Gary Clayton Anderson, The Indian Southwest 1500-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention, 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 8.  In his book, Ghost Dances and Identity: Prophetic 
Religion and American Indian Ethnogenesis in the Nineteenth Century, Smoak describes the formation of 
a new ethnic identity the “Newe” created from members of both the Shoshone and Bannock tribal 
nations. Coming together in a process of ethnogenesis following their arrival on the Fort Hall reservation, 
the Newe emerged to cope with oppressive reservation conditions, governmental pressures of assimilation 
and general hardship of reservation life. Smoak suggests that the popularity of the Ghost Dance 
movement on the Northern Plains, and at Fort Hall in particular, reflected more than a powerful religious 
movement. Instead, the author sees the Ghost Dance, “as one vehicle for the expression of ethnic and 
racial identities among American Indian peoples.” Smoak’s work also suggests that through the process 
of ethnogenesis, it is possible for Native people to be part of two separate tribal nations. In this case the 
Shoshone or Bannock and the Newe. This process seems more applicable for Wind River inhabitants than 
that of total ethnogenesis. Gregory E. Smoak, Ghost Dances and Identity: Prophetic Religion and 
American Indian Ethnogenesis in the Nineteenth Century, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), 202. 
317 
Certainly, adaption and change will continue on the Wind River Indian 
Reservation, as both tribal nations move forward in the twenty-first century. When 
discussing the immediate future of their reservation with me, members of the Arapaho 
and Shoshone tribal nations spoke of ending discrimination and encouraging the 
development of natural resources on their lands. Amanda LeClair, a Shoshone student at 
the University of Wyoming, insisted that her people needed to combat common 
misperceptions about Indianness. “I think a lot of people still think that Native 
Americans, like the race, is dying out,” she explains. “And I think that we are going to 
have to fight against that. And just like we still have to fight against the whole like, 
noble savage thing. Like the romanticism thing.”8 Additionally, Felicia Antelope noted 
the discrimination that she feels each time she travels through the border towns of 
Riverton and Lander, insisting that they compete to see “which town is more prejudice 
than the other.”9 
 In tandem with these regional objectives, both tribal nations continue to assess 
their role in the United States and in the global marketplace. Arapaho Gary Collins, a 
former business councilman and intermediary between the JBC and the state legislature 
in Wyoming, explains the pivotal role that natural resource extraction will play in the 
future of both tribal nations. “There’s a global demand for energy and Wyoming has a 
lot of energy,” Collins insisted. “So the marketplace in the world [will ultimately 
determine] what we do here with our energy, including the tribes’, coal, methane, 
natural gas, oil, wind, water, and we have all those things.”10 As the tribal nations look 
forward to future prosperity through natural resource extraction, they also remained 
                                                 
8
 Amanda LeClair, interview by author, University of Wyoming, February 22, 2008.  
9
 Felicia Antelope, interview by author, Laramie, Wyoming, February 21, 2008.  
10
 Gary Collins, interview by author, Laramie, Wyoming, February 25, 2008.  
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united through the national elements that bind them together. They share and maintain 
territory, support an active citizenry, utilize the political authority of reservation 
business councils, encourage the revitalization of their indigenous languages and the 
language of politics, proudly support their cultural heritage, and remember a vibrant 
past. Just as Wayne C’Hair insisted, the Arapaho and Shoshone tribal nations will live 
on, in one form or another, because “We’re still a people. We’ve still got culture. We’ve 
still got history.”11 
 
                                                 
11
 Wayne C’Hair, interview by author, Riverton, Wyoming, February 28, 2008.  
319 
Bibliography 
Archival and Unpublished Sources 
     Denver, Colorado 
      National Archives 
      Records of District Courts of the United States – Record Group 21 
     U.S. District Court – Cheyenne, Wyoming 
   Clerk’s Minute Books, 1899-1948 
     Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs – Record Group 75 
      Wind River Files 
Annual Reports, 1890-1909 
General Administrative Records, 1890-1960 
General Correspondence Files, 1890-1960 
       
     Laramie, Wyoming 
      American Heritage Center 
      Grace Raymond Hebard Collection  
      James K. Moore Family Papers 
      John Roberts Papers 
       Loretta Fowler Papers 
     The Wind River Indian Reservation – Yesterday and Today: The  
Legends, the Land, the People  
 
     New Haven, Connecticut 
     Yale Collection of Western Americana – Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript  
Library 
      “Homeseeker’s Map and Guide of the Rich and Famous: Shoshoni  
Reservation in Wyoming – Opened to Settlement by U.S. 
Government” 
      Letter Books and Records  
        Shoshone Agency 
      Yale University – Sterling Memorial Library  
      John Collier Papers 
  
     Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
      Historical Society of Pennsylvania 
      Indian Rights Association Papers 
 
     Princeton, New Jersey 
      Princeton University – Mudd Manuscript Library 
      Association on American Indian Affairs Records 
320 
      
Washington, D.C. 
      National Archives 
  Central Classified Files, 1907-1939 – Shoshone Agency 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881 
            Wyoming Superintendency 
  Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1881-1907 
 
Printed Government Sources 
Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Government  
Printing Office, 1860, 1863, 1868, 1875, 1877, 1878, 1879, 1883, 1885, 1887, 
1892 and 1894. 
 
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Indian Affairs. Creating an  
Indian Claims Commission. 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945.  
 
_____. Hearings on HR 7902. 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1934. 
 
_____. House Report Number 2680. 83rd Congress, 2nd Session (1954). 
 
_____. Indian Claims Commission. 74th Congress, 1st Session, 1935. 
 
_____. Lease for Prospecting for Coal, etc., Wind River Reservation. 56th Congress, 1st  
Session, 1900.  
 
_____. Report to the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953. 
 
_____. Survey on Condition of Indians in United States. 73rd Congress, 1st Session,  
1933.  
 
McLaughlin, James. Agreement with Certain Tribes of Indians. Senate Executive  
Document 247, 54th Congress, 1st session, 2.  
 
Margold, Nathan. Survey of Conditions of Indians in the United States. Hearing before  
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, 1931.  
 
Report on Indians Taxed and Indians Not Taxed in the United States at the Eleventh  
Census: 1890. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1894.  
 
United States v.  Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming. 304  
U.S. 111, 115 S.Ct. 668 (1938). 
321 
 
United States Statutes at Large, vol. 15, 18, 24, 26 and 33. 
 
Unpublished These, Dissertations and Manuscripts 
C’Hair, Wayne ed. “Dictionary of the Northern Arapaho Language.” Ethete, Wyoming,  
2006.  
 
Stidolph, Julie. “The Hand that Rocks the Cradle: Assimilation Policy and the Women  
of the Wind River Reservation, 1890-1930.” M.A. Thesis, University of  
Wyoming, 2008.  
 
Newspapers 
Billings Gazette, Billings Montana 
Casper Daily Tribune, Casper, Wyoming 
Cheyenne Daily Leader, Cheyenne, Wyoming 
Cheyenne Daily Sun-Leader, Cheyenne, Wyoming 
The Illustrated Buffalo Express, Buffalo, New York 
Indian Truth, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Lander Eagle, Lander, Wyoming 
Laramie Boomerang, Laramie, Wyoming 
Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, California 
Natrona County Tribune, Casper, Wyoming 
The New York Times, New York City, New York 
Thermopolis Independent, Thermopolis, Wyoming 
Thermopolis Record, Thermopolis, Wyoming 
Wind River Mountaineer, Lander, Wyoming 
Wyoming State Journal, Lander, Wyoming 
Wyoming State Tribune, Cheyenne, Wyoming 
 
Books and Articles  
Adams, David Wallace. Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding  
School Experience, 1875-1928. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995.  
 
Albers, Patricia and William James. “On the Dialectics of Ethnicity: To Be or Not To  
Be Santee.” Journal of Ethnic Studies 14, no. 1 (1986): 1-27.  
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of  
Nationalism, 2nd ed. New York: Verso, 2006.  
 
Anderson, Gary Clayton. The Indian Southwest, 1500-1830: Ethnogenesis and  
Reinvention. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.  
322 
 
Anderson, Jeffrey. Four Hills of Life: Northern Arapaho Knowledge and Life  
Movement. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001. 
 
_____. One Hundred Years of Old Man Sage: An Arapaho Life. Lincoln: University  
of Nebraska Press, 2003.  
 
_____. “The Poetics of Tropes and Dreams in Arapaho Ghost Dance Songs.” In New  
Perspectives on Native North America: Cultures, Histories, and 
Representations, edited by Sergei Kan, Pauline Turner Strong, and Raymond 
Fogelson, 122-163. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006.  
 
Armstrong, John A. Nations Before Nationalism. Chapel Hill: University of North  
Carolina Press, 1982.  
 
Basso, Keith. Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language Among the Western  
Apache. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996. 
 
Berkhofer, Robert F. Jr. “The Political Context of a New Indian History.” Pacific  
Historical Review 40, no. 3 (1971): 357-382.  
 
Blackhawk, Ned. Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American  
West. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.  
 
Bray, Kingsley, M. Crazy Horse: A Lakota Life. Norman: University of Oklahoma  
Press, 2006. 
 
Calloway, Colin. “Indian History in Wyoming: Needs and Opportunities for Study.”  
Annals of Wyoming 63 (Fall 1991): 125-130.  
 
_____. One Vast Winter Count: The Native American West Before Lewis and Clark.  
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003.  
 
_____. “Snake Frontier: The Eastern Shoshones in the Eighteenth Century.” Annals of  
Wyoming 63, no.3 (Summer 1991): 83-92.  
 
Chalcraft, Edwin L. Assimilation’s Agent: My Life as a Superintendent in the Indian  
Boarding School System. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004.  
 
Clifton, James. “The Tribal History – An Obsolete Paradigm.” American Indian Culture  
323 
and Research Journal 3, no. 4 (1979): 81-100.  
 
Coel, Margaret. The Girl with the Braided Hair. New York: Berkley Publishing, 2007.  
 
_____. Wife of Moon. New York: Berkley Publishing, 2005.  
 
_____. The Silent Spirit. New York: Berkley Publishing, 2009. 
 
Collier, John. From Every Zenith: a memoir; and some essays on life and thought.  
Denver: Sage Books, 1963.  
 
Coolidge, Grace. Teepee Neighbors. 1917. Reprint, Whitefish, MT: Kessinger  
Publishing, 2010. 
 
Cowell, Andrew. “Bilingual Curriculum Among the Northern Arapaho: Oral Tradition,  
Literacy, and Performance.” The American Indian Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2002): 
24-43.  
 
Cox Richardson, Heather. Wounded Knee: Party Politics and the Road to an American  
Massacre. Philadelphia: Perseus Books Group, 2010.  
 
David, Robert B. Finn Burnett, Frontiersman. Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Co.,  
1937.  
 
Deloria, Philip. Indians in Unexpected Places. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,  
2004.  
 
_____. Playing Indian. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.  
 
Deloria, Vine, Jr. Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of  
Independence. New York: Delacorte Press, 1974.  
 
_____, ed. The Indian Reorganization Act: Congresses and Bills. Norman: University  
of Oklahoma Press, 2002.   
 
_____. The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty.  
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984. 
 
Dilworth, Leah. Imagining Indians in the Southwest: Persistent Visions of a Primitive  
Past. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996.  
324 
 
Dorsey, George A. The Arapaho Sun Dance: The Ceremony of the Offerings Lodge.  
Chicago: Field Columbian Museum, Publication no. 75, Anthropological Series 
no. 4, 1903. 
 
_____ and Alfred L. Kroeber. Traditions of the Arapaho. Chicago: Field Columbian  
Museum, Publication no. 81, Anthropological Series no. 5, 1903.  
 
Dow, James R., Roger L. Welsch, and Susan Dow. Wyoming Folklore: Reminiscences,  
Folktales, Beliefs, Customs, and Folk Speech. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2010.  
 
Edmunds, R. David. “Native Americans, New Voices: American Indian History, 1895- 
1995.” The American Historical Review 100, no. 3 (1995): 717-740. 
 
Ellis, Clyde. A Dancing People: Powwow Culture on the Southern Plains. Lawrence:  
University Press of Kansas, 2003.  
 
English, Mary Jackson. “Prairie Sketches, or Fugitive Recollections of an Army Girl in  
1899.” In Western Americana: Frontier History of the Trans-Mississippi West, 
1550-1900. New Haven: Research Publications, Inc., 1975.  
 
Ewers, John C. “The Emergence of the Plains Indian as the Symbol of the North  
American Indian.” In Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 531-544. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964.  
 
_____. The Horse in Blackfoot Indian Culture. Washington D.C.: United States  
Government Printing Office, 1955.  
 
Farlow, Edward J. Wind River Adventures: My Life in Frontier Wyoming. Glendo, WY:  
High Plains Press, 1998.  
 
Fixico, Donald. The Invasion of Indian Country in the Twentieth Century: American  
Capitalism and Tribal National Resources. Boulder: University Press of 
Colorado, 1998.  
 
Flynn, Janet. Tribal Government: Wind River Reservation. Lander, WY: Mortimore  
Publishing, 1998.  
 
Fogelson, Raymond D. “Perspectives on Native American Identity.” In Studying Native  
325 
America: Problems and Prospects, edited by Russell Thornton, 40-59. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1998.  
 
Fowler, Loretta. “Arapaho.” In Plains. Edited by Raymond J. DeMallie. Vol. 13 of  
Handbook of North American Indians. Washington D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution, 2001. 
 
_____. Arapahoe Politics, 1851-1978: Symbols in Crises of Authority. Lincoln:  
University of Nebraska Press, 1982.   
 
_____. Shared Symbols, Contested Meanings: Gros Ventre Culture and History,1778- 
1984. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.  
 
Franco, Jere. “Going the Distance: World War II and the Wind River Reservation.”  
Wyoming History Journal 68, no. 2 (1996): 14-21.  
 
Fried, Morton. The Notion of Tribe. Menlo Park, California: Cummings Publishing  
Company, 1975.  
 
Galloway, Patricia. Choctaw Genesis, 1500-1700. Lincoln: University of Nebraska  
Press, 1995.  
 
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,  
2006.  
 
Hämäläinen, Pekka. “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures.” The Journal  
of American History 90, no. 3 (2003): 833-862.  
 
Hebard, Grace Raymond. Sacajawea: Guide and Interpreter of Lewis and Clark. 1932.  
Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2002.  
 
_____. Washakie: Chief of the Shoshones. 1930. Reprint, Lincoln: University  
of Nebraska Press, 1995.  
 
Hilger, Sister Marie. Inez. Arapaho Child Life and Its Cultural Background.  
Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 
no. 148, 1952.  
 
History of the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, Kansas. Kansas City: Hudson- 
Kimberly Publishing, 1898.  
326 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
 
Holm, Tom, J. Diane Pearson, and Ben Chavis. “Peoplehood: A Model for the  
Extension of Sovereignty in American Indian Studies.” Wicazo Sa Review 18, 
no. 1 (2003): 7-24.  
 
Hosmer, Bryan. “‘Dollar a Day and Glad to Have It’: Work Relief on the Wind River  
Reservation as Memory.” In Native Pathways: American Indian Culture and 
Economic Development in the Twentieth Century, edited by Bryan Hosmer and 
Colleen O’Neill, 283-307. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2004.   
 
Hoxie, Frederick E. A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate Indian, 1880-1920.  
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.   
 
_____. “From Prison to Homeland: The Cheyenne River Indian Reservation before  
WWII.” South Dakota History 10, no. 1 (1979): 1-24.  
 
_____. Parading Through History: The Making of the Crow Nation in America, 1805- 
1935. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.  
 
Hunton, John. John Hunton’s Diary. Vol. 6 of John Hunton’s Diary, Wyoming  
Territory: 1885-1889. Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, Co., 1970.  
 
Irving, Washington. The Adventures of Captain Bonneville. New York: John B. Alden,  
1896. 
 
Iverson, Peter. The Diné: A History of the Navajos. Albuquerque: University of New  
Mexico Press, 2002.  
 
Jacoby, Karl. Shadows at Dawn: A Borderlands Massacre and the Violence of History.  
New York: Penguin Press, 2008. 
 
Jordan, Bella Bychkova and Terry G. Jordan-Bychkov. “Ethnogenesis and Cultural  
Geography.” Journal of Cultural Geography 21, no. 1 (2003): 3-17. 
 
Kilpatrick, Jacquelyn. Celluloid Indian: Native Americans and Film. Lincoln:  
University of Nebraska Press, 1999.  
 
327 
Kneale, Albert H. Indian Agent. Caldwell, ID: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1950.  
 
Konkle, Maureen. Writing Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals and the Politics of  
Historiography, 1827-1863. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004.  
 
Kroeber, Alfred L. The Arapaho. In Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural  
History 18, (1902-1907).  
 
Larson, T.A. History of Wyoming, 2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978.  
 
Lewis, David Rich. “Still Native: The Significance of Native Americans in the History  
of Twentieth-Century American West.” In A New Significance: Re-Envisioning 
the History of the American West, edited by Clyde Milner, 213-240. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996.  
 
Lowie, Robert H. “Notes on Shoshonean Ethnology.” Anthropological Papers of the  
American Museum of Natural History 20, part 3 (1924): 185-314.  
 
_____. “Sundance of the Shoshoni, Ute and Hidatsa.” Anthropological Papers of the  
American Museum of Natural History 16, part 5 (1919): 387-431. 
 
Lund, Nora Hall. Parshall Terry Family History. 1956. Reprint, Salt Lake City, 1963.  
 
McCoy, Ronald. “Tim McCoy: The Real/Reel Life of a Wind River Cowboy.” Dubois,  
WY: Lucius Birch Center for Western Tradition, 2003.    
 
McCoy, Tim and Ronald McCoy. Tim McCoy Remembers the West: An Autobiography.  
New York: Doubleday, 1977.  
 
McGovern, Rev. Patrick A. ed. History of the Diocese of Cheyenne. Diocese of  
Cheyenne, 1941.  
 
McLaughlin, James. My Friend the Indian. New York: Houghton and Mifflin, Co.,  
1910.  
 
McLoughlin, William Gerald. Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1986.  
 
The Manuscript Journals of Alexander Henry. Edited by Elliott Coues. Vol. 2 of New  
328 
Light on the Early History of the Greater Northwest: The Manuscript Journals 
of Alexander Henry and David Thompson, 1799-1814. New York: Francis P. 
Harper, 1897.  
 
Markley, Elinor Roberts and Beatrice Crofts. Walk Softly This is God’s Country: Sixty- 
Six years on the Wind River Indian Reservation. Lander, WY: Mortimore 
Publishing, 1997. 
 
Massey, Garth. “Making Sense of Work on the Wind River Indian Reservation.” The  
American Indian Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2004): 786-816.  
 
Massie, Michael. “Same Decision, Different Results? Indian Water Rights and the Wind  
River Case.” Annals of Wyoming 63, no. 4 (1991): 164-167.  
 
Meriam, Lewis. The Problem of Indian Administration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  
Press, 1928.  
 
Milek, Dorothy G. The Gift of the Bah Guewana: A History of Wyoming’s Hot Springs  
State Park. Cheyenne, WY: Frontier Printing, Inc., 1985.  
 
Mooney, James. The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890.  
Washington D.C.: Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American 
Ethnology, 1896. 
 
Moore, John H. The Cheyenne Nation: A Social and Demographic History. Lincoln:  
University of Nebraska Press, 1987.  
 
Morgan, Dale L. ed. “Washakie and the Shoshoni: A Selection of Documents from the  
Records of the Utah Superintendency of Indian Affairs.” Parts 1-10 in Annals of 
Wyoming (1954-1958).   
 
Morris, Robert C. Collections of the Wyoming Historical Society. Cheyenne: The  
Wyoming Historical Society, 1897.  
 
Moses, L.G. “Interpreting the Wild West, 1883-1914.” In Between Indian and White  
Worlds: The Cultural Broker, edited by Margaret Connell Szasz, 158-178. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.  
 
_____. Wild West Shows and Images of American Indians, 1883-1933. Albuquerque:  
University of New Mexico Press, 1996.  
329 
 
O’Gara, Geoffrey. What You See in Clear Water: Life on the Wind River Reservation.  
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.  
 
Olden, Sarah Emilia. Shoshone Folk Lore: as discovered from the Rev. John Roberts, a  
hidden hero, in the Wind River Indian reservation in Wyoming. Milwaukee: 
Morehouse Publishing Co., 1923.  
 
Ostler, Jeffrey. The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to  
Wounded Knee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
 
Ottogary, Willie. The Washakie Letters of Willie Ottogary: Northwestern Shoshone  
Journalist and Leader, 1906-1929. Edited by Matthew Kreitzer. Logan, UT: 
Utah State University Press, 2000.  
 
Philp, Kenneth R. John Collier’s Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920-1945. Tucson:  
University of Arizona Press, 1977.  
 
_____. Termination Revisited: American Indians on the Trial to Self-Determination.  
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.  
 
Prucha, Francis Paul. The Great Father: The United States Government and the  
American Indians. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.  
 
Reddin, Paul. Wild West Shows. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999.  
 
Renan, Ernest. “What is a Nation?” In Becoming National: A Reader, edited by Geoff  
Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, 42-56. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996.  
 
Roe, Frank Gilbert. The Indian and the Horse. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,  
1955.  
 
Rollins, Peter and John O’Connor, eds. Hollywood’s Indian: The Portrayal of the  
Native American in Film. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1998.  
 
Roosens, Eugeen E. Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis. Newbury Park,  
CA: Sage Publications, 1989.  
 
Rosenthal, Harvey Daniel. They Day in Court: A History of the Indian Claims  
330 
Commission. New York: Garland Publications, 1990.  
 
Rosenthal, Nicolas G. “Beyond the New Indian History: Recent Trends in the  
Historiography on the Native Peoples of North America.” History Compass 4/5 
(2006): 962-974.  
 
Rothman, Hal K. The Culture of Tourism, the Tourism of Culture: Selling the Past to  
the Present in the American Southwest. Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 2003.  
 
Rusco, Elmer. A Fateful Time: The Background and Legislative History of the Indian  
Reorganization Act. Reno and Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2000.  
 
Rzeczkowski, Frank. Uniting the Tribes: The Rise and Fall of Pan-Indian Community  
on the Crow Reservation. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012.  
 
Schreier, Jesse T. “Indian or Freedman?: Enrollment, Race, and Identity in the Choctaw  
Nation, 1896-1907.” Western Historical Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2011): 459-479.  
 
Shimkin, Demitri. “Dynamics of Recent Wind River Shoshone History.” American  
Anthropologist 44, no. 3 (1942): 451-462.  
 
_____. “Eastern Shoshone.” In Great Basin. Edited by Warren L. D’Azevedo. Vol. 11  
of Handbook of North American Indians. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution, 1986.  
 
_____. “Wind River Ethnogeography.” Anthropological Records 5, no. 4 (1947): 245- 
288.  
 
_____. Wind River Ethnogeography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947.   
 
Smith, Anthony D. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Cambridge: Polity Press,  
2001.  
 
Smith, F.S. and E.R. Wynn. “The Shoshone Indian Reservation, Fremont County: A  
Land of Boundless Mineral and Agricultural Wealth and Marvelous Scenic 
Beauty.” Lander, WY: Smith and Wynn, 1906.  
 
Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples.  
Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1999.  
331 
 
Smoak, Gregory. Ghost Dances and Identity: Prophetic Religion and American Indian  
Ethnogenesis in the Nineteenth Century. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005.  
 
St. Clair, H. H. and Robert Lowie. “Shoshone and Comanche Tales.” The Journal of  
American Folklore 22, no. 85 (1909): 265-282.  
 
Stamm, Henry Edwin, IV. People of the Wind River: The Eastern Shoshones, 1825- 
1900. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.  
 
Sturtevant, William. “Creek into Seminole.” In North American Indians in Historical  
Perspective, edited by Eleanore Burke Leacock and Nancy Oestreich Lurie, 92-
128. New York: Random House, 1971.  
 
Sutter, Virginia J. Tell Me Grandmother: Traditions, Stories and Cultures of Arapaho  
People. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2004. 
 
Swagerty, William. “History of the United States Plains Until 1850.” In Plains. Edited  
by Raymond L. DeMallie. Vol. 13 of Handbook of North American Indians. 
Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2001.  
 
Thomas, Nathaniel S. Building an Indian Village: St. Michael’s Mission, Ethete,  
Wyoming. 1920.  
 
Thomas, Robert K. “Language and Culture: Persistence, Change and Dissolution of  
Tribal Society.” In American Indian Tribes in the 21st Century, 68-71. Chicago: 
Native American Education Services, Inc., 1986.  
 
“Treaty of the Fort Laramie with Sioux, etc. 1851.” In Indian Affairs: Laws and  
Treaties. Edited by Charles J. Kappler. Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1904.  
 
“Treaty with the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho, 1868.” In Indian Affairs:  
Laws and Treaties. Edited by Charles J. Kappler. Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1904.  
 
Trenholm, Virginia Cole. The Arapahoes: Our People. Norman: University of  
Oklahoma Press, 1970.  
 
332 
_____. “The Shoshones and the Great Father.” Bits and Pieces 4, no. 4 (1968): 1-3. 
 
_____ and Maurine Carley. The Shoshonis: Sentinels of the Rockies. Norman:  
University of Oklahoma Press, 1964.  
 
Trennert, Robert A. Jr. “Selling Indian Education at World’s Fairs and Expositions,  
1893-1904.” American Indian Quarterly 11, no. 3 (1987): 203-220. 
 
Utley, Robert M. and Wilcomb E. Washburn. Indian Wars. New York: American  
Heritage Press, 1977.  
 
Van Tramp, John C. Prairie and Rocky Mountain Adventures: or Life in the West. St.  
Louis: Published and Sold Exclusively by Subscription by H. Miller, 1860.  
 
Waters, Frank. Book of the Hopi. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.  
 
Wallace, Anthony F.C. The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca. New York: Vintage  
Books, 1969.  
 
Warren, Louis. Buffalo Bill’s America: William Cody and the Wild West Show. New  
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.  
 
West, Elliott. The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado.  
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.  
 
_____. The Essential West: Collected Essays. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,  
2012.  
 
_____. The Way to the West: Essays on the Central Plains. Albuquerque:  
University of New Mexico Press, 1995.  
 
Wiles, Sarah. Arapaho Journeys: Photographs and Stories from the Wind River  
Reservation. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011.  
 
Wilkinson, Charles F. American Indians, Time and the Law. New Haven: Yale  
University Press, 1987.  
 
_____. Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations. New York: W. W. Norton  
& Company, 2005.  
 
333 
Wilson, Terry P. The Underground Reservation: Osage Oil. Lincoln: University of  
Nebraska Press, 1985.  
 
Woodruff, E. G. “The Lander Oil Field, Fremont County.” In the United States  
Geological Survey, Bulletin 452. Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1911.  
 
